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We affirm that the papers on pollution and resource allocation 
reported in Chapter Seven are genuinely joint research work. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
"Whoever hopes a faultless tax to see, 
Hopes what ne'er was, or is, or e'er shall be". 
McCullock's adaptation of Pope, 
as cited in J. Stamp, The 
FundamentaZ PrincipZes of Taxatian~ 
(Macmillan, London, 1929, p.198). 
The research reported here is mainly composed of a collection of 
papers published over the period 1971-75. There is an inevitable temptat-
ion in a submission of this type to supplement and make additions to the 
published studies, particularly in those instances where a period of 
several years has elapsed since the date of publication of a paper. How-
ever, with only two exceptions which are discussed below, I have chosen 
not to modify or add to the papers which have been published or are in 
the course of publication. 
Overall, the papers cover a wider range of subject material than 
would be found in a traditional thesis composed primarily of unpublished 
work. This is consistent with my interpretation of the spirit of the new 
rules of the Australian National University for the Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy by submission of published work. These rules state in part: 
" on the ground of a substantial contribution to 
learning at the highest contemporary University standards, 
revealing a capacity to relate his work to the broader 
framework of the discipline within which it falls and 
related disciplines contained in published work of which 
he is the author or joint author". 
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The central unifying theme running through the set of papers is 
their concern with public economics, especially as it relates to agriculture 
and the natural resource sector and, in particular, their concern with 
various aspects of taxation. Taxation is a subject which for a number 
of reasons assumes a place of special importance for agriculture and the 
natural resource sector. In the first place, in Australia and also in 
some other countries, the agricultural and forestry sectors have been 
major recipients of various forms of income tax-concessions. And it seems 
likely that these income tax-concessions have significantly influenced 
production and investment decisions within these sectors. 
In the second place, there are some difficult conceptual problems 
relating to how taxable income should be defined for economic activities 
that involve long-lived assets - such as developing and improving farm 
land, growing fruit trees and vineyards, and timber-growing - so that 
the tax will not distort optimization decisions. 
In the third place, there has been increasing concern in recent 
years with the consequences of various forms of market failure in the 
natural resource area, and especially with the problem of pollution. A 
central problem has been how to evaluate the relative merits of alternative 
methods of pollution control, particularly the use of tax measures versus 
the use of direct regulations and other legal instruments. The conceptual 
issues raised within the context of the pollution problem, and the feasible 
forms of government intervention, appear to apply quite generally to a 
wide array of environmental problems, including, for example, the choice 
of 'optimal' policies for the preservation and utilization of wildlife 
species. 
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There are ten papers, including several shorter notes, in the 
submission. These are classified into six chapters, each chapter com-
prising either a single paper or one major paper together with one or 
more supplementary papers as appendices. Whilst each of the major papers 
is a self contained study, it is helpful to classify the papers into 
three subgroups. The focus of the three main papers in the first subgroup 
is on intertemporal aspects of income taxation and investment decisions. 
In the author's view, this is the most difficult and intellectually 
challenging area of research pertaining to the study of the economic effects 
of income taxes. It is an area of study which has been the subject of a 
large number of papers in the economic literature. Many of the conclusions 
reached in these studies are difficult to reconcile and some, at least 
on the surface, appear to be quite contradictory. 
The first paper in the subgroup, which forms Chapter Two, is the 
main unpublished paper and was presented at the Australian Fifth Conference 
of Economists, in August 1975. It combines some of my earliest thinking 
on the subject of income taxes and investment behaviour with my most 
recent thinking, and forms a natural background chapter for the papers 
which follow. The paper is a theoretical one which examines the funda-
mental question of how income and in particular, tax-deductible depreciation, 
should be defined so that an income tax will not distort investment 
decisions. Following a detailed analysis of the concepts of immediate 
expensing (instantaneous depreciation) and true economic depreciation, the 
paper analyses the economic effects of a progressive income tax which, 
through various forms of tax-concessions, favours some investment activities 
relative to others. 
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Chapter Three comprises a paper in which a model is developed 
to analyse the effects of income tax policy on the optimal timing of 
replacement for farm machinery. The model is then applied to examine the 
effects of changes in the Australian income tax legislation made in 1973, 
relating to tax depreciation allowances and investment allowances for farm 
machinery. The effects of the United states income tax legislation on 
optimal replacement were also examined, albeit more briefly, and compared 
with the effects of the Australian income tax legislation. 
Chapter Four consists of two papers and forms a natural extension 
to the research contained in Chapters Two and Three. A supplementary paper 
is given as an appendix, though its subject matter logically precedes that 
of the main paper and it should be read first. This paper analyses the 
problem of choosing an appropriate criterion for determining the optimal 
replacement pattern for long-lived appreciating assets, such as a growing 
forest, in the absence of tax effects. An earlier version of the main 
paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Agricultural 
Economics Association, in August 1974, and the revised paper is scheduled 
to be published in the December 1975 issue of the journal Economic I nquiry . 
The paper develops a tax incidence model to analyse the economic effects 
of alternative methods of taxing income derived from products with long-
lived production processes, of which timber-growing is the classic example. 
Compared with a 'neutral' income tax, it is concluded that two other types 
of income taxes, which approximate those currently applying to the forestry 
sectors of Australia and the United States, bias production towards longer 
rotation cycles, increase land (site) values, and depress timber prices. 
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The main concern of the two papers which form the second subgroup 
is with problems which arise from, or can be related to, the nature of the 
progressive income tax rate scale. The focus of the first paper, which 
comprises Chapter Five, is on equity and efficiency questions, arising 
from the interaction of an annual tax accounting period and a fixed 
progressive rate scale when taxpayers have a fluctuating annual income. A 
comparison is made between a number of possible income averaging procedures 
on the basis of selected performance criteria. Several of the income 
averaging procedures considered are judged to have superior attributes to 
the current Australian income averaging procedure applying to primary 
producers. 
In Chapter Six, the second paper in the subgroup examines the 
possibility of using the income tax system as a vehicle for making transfer 
(welfare) payments to low-income farm families as part of a rural recon-
struction programme. That is to say, it is proposed that the progressive 
income tax rate scale would, below some specified level of income, become 
negative. At the time the negative income tax paper was written the rural 
sector in Australia, by contrast with the rest of the economy, was 
experiencing an extremely severe recession. And while a negative income 
tax was considered for low-income farm families only, the author strongly 
favours as a 'first-best' solution, the use of a comprehensive negative 
income tax, which would apply uniformly to all low-income families and 
which would be designed to replace the existing largely piecemeal system 
of welfare payments. 
The papers contained in Chapter Seven comprise the final subgroup. 
The chapter is composed of one major paper together with three supplementary 
papers as appendices. Chapter Seven stands somewhat apart from the 
preceding chapters, in that the papers do not have some aspect of income 
taxation as their central focus. Rather, the Chapter is concerned with 
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problems attributable to various forms of market failure in the natural 
resource sector, and in particular with the problem of pollution. However, 
various types of tax instruments provide a major means of correcting for 
market failure and for controlling pollution. The main paper, after 
considering the relative merits of market and political decision-making 
processes in attaining socially optimal levels of pollution, focuses on 
the alternative policy options for pollution control. The major conclusion 
which emerges is that in general, tax (fiscal) instruments provide a more 
efficient means of controlling pollution than the widespread use of 
regulations or other legal instruments. 
The paper on pollution and resource allocation was written jointly 
with Cliff Walsh and Geoffrey Brennan. The paper evolved mainly from a 
more wide ranging paper which Cliff Walsh and I presented at the 17th 
Australian Agricultural Economics Society Annual Conference, in February 
1973, and also in part, from a somewhat more theoretically orientated 
paper which Geoffrey Brennan, Cliff Walsh and I presented at the 45th ANZAAS 
Congress, in August 1973. A copy of the former paper is enclosed at the 
back of the submission. Altogether the research on this topic extended 
over a period of approximately fifteen months and the three authors all 
contributed fully to the many discussions and to the preparation of 
various draft papers. Although Geoffrey Brennan was not a joint author of 
the first paper presented at the Australian Agricultural Economics Society 
Annual Conference, he helped with fruitful discussions and bore the main 
burden of preparing the paper presented at the 45th ANZAAS Congress. The 
published paper on pollution and resource allocation in all its aspects 
thus represents a genuinely joint research effort and the three authors 
equally share responsibility for the ideas and views expressed in the paper. 
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Appendix 7.1 contains a short unpublished note which complements 
the main paper by examining the major alternative parameters to which taxes 
(or regulations) aimed at controlling pollution may be applied. Appendix 
7.2 is a reply to a comment by R.A. Richardson on our paper on pollution 
and resource allocation. A copy of Richardson's comment is enclosed with 
the submission. Richardson's comment, together with our reply, is to be 
published in the August 1975 issue of the Australian Journa l of Agr icultural 
Economics. 
The final appendix comprises a paper reprinted from the Proceedings 
of the Third Workshop of the United States/Australia Rangelands Panel, 
Tucson, Arizona, in March-April 1973. The paper contains a section 
which considers the use of tax instruments, and related regulations, to 
correct for various forms of market failure associated with the preservation 
and utilization of wildlife, with particular reference to the kangaroo. 
The paper illustrates that the basic methodology and alternative policy 
options which apply to the pollution problem also have application to other 
environmental problems. For the purposes of this submission the relevant 
part of the paper is confined to the discussion on the preservation and 
utilization of wildlife. But to enable this discussion to be placed 
within the context of the paper as a whole, a copy of the complete paper 
is given in Appendix 7.3. 
Finally, it should be observed that several major Australian 
taxation studies were published in 1975, subsequent to the completion of 
the major part of the research reported in this submission. No attempt 
is made here to relate some of the work in these studies to my own research. 
But it is of interest to note that some of the research in two of these 
studies, namely, The Industries Assistance Commission Report: Rural 
Income Fluctuations - Certain Taxation Measures, and the Report of the 
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Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (Henderson Report), is closely related 
to my research on alternative income averaging schemes and a negative 
income tax, respectively. 
CHAPTER 2 
PROGRESSIVE INCOME TAXES, TAX-FAVOURED 
INVESTMENTS, AND INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR 
PROGRESSIVE INCOME TAXES, TAX-FAVOURED INVESTMENTS, 
AND INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR 
Anthony H. Chisholm* 
There is now an extensive body of economic literature which focuses 
on questions relating to income taxation and investment decisions. A central 
problem, and one which is a major focus of this paper, is how income3 and in 
particular tax-deductible depreciation, should be defined so that a tax on 
income will not distort investment decisions. Among those who have contributed 
to the discussion on this topic are: Brown (1948), Musgrave (1959), Smith 
(1963), Samuelson (1964), Wright (1964), Gaffney (1967), Hall and Jorgenson 
(1967), Johansson (1969), Thomson and Goldstein (1971), Sodersten (1972), and 
Coen (1975). A useful point of departure is provided by the quotations given 
below: 
... Furthermore, there appears to exist no administratively 
feasible way to specify neutral write-off rules except to 
define taxable income as gross income minus all cash outlays 
including investment. This amounts to permitting businesses 
to expense fully capital expenditures for tax purposes and 
represents the maximum rate of accelerated depreciation. 
(Smith, 1963, p.90.) 
Fundamental theorem of tax rate invariancei If, and only 
if, true loss of economic value is permitted as a tax-
deductible expense will the present discounted value of a 
cash-receipt stream be independent of the rate of tax. 
(Samuelson, 1964, p.604.) 
In this writer's view, most of the apparent conflict and confusion 
surrounding the issue of immediate expensing (or instantaneous depreciation) 
versus true economic depreciation may be attributed to the fact that the 
formal proofs - if properly interpreted - which support the 'neutrality' claims 
* I wish to thank Ted Sieper and Peter Swan for helpful discussions and for 
comments on an earlier version of this paper. Errors are, of course, 
entirely my responsibility. This paper is a slightly modified version of 
the paper presented at the Australian Fifth Conference of Economists, 
August 1975. 
for both types of tax depreciation are basically correct, but different 
assumptions underlie each. 
The plan of the paper is to outline firstly, the case for immediate 
expensing and secondly, the case for true economic depreciation. 1 It will be 
shown that a general 'income' tax which permits immediate expensing of all 
investment outlays is effectively a tax on pure profits. On the other hand, 
a general income tax that permits the write-off of true economic depreciation, 
taxes both 'normal' interest earned on investments plus any pure profits. 
That is to say, it is a genuine income tax and not a pure profits tax. In 
the next section of the paper a progressive personal income tax which approx-
imates the 'Samuelson' type of income tax is assumed to exist. But it is 
assumed that some favoured investment activities (sectors) receive some form 
of tax-privilege, and the economic effects of a progressive income tax that 
is not uniformly applied are then examined. 
I. IMMEDIATE EXPENSING 
The analysis employs discrete rather than continuous time period 
models, since the author believes the results can be shown more simply and 
clearly using discrete models. The most important assumption underlying the 
analysis which follows is that of a perfect capital market enabling any indi-
vidual (firm) to freely borrow and lend at a constant market rate of interest. 
The before-tax net present value, P, of an investment outlay that provides 
a flow of annual net receipts, Nk , over a time span of n years is defined as, 
(1) P 
n 
L Nk(l+i)-k - C, 
k=l 
where C = the price of the capital good, and 
The first two sections of the paper are not intended to be a review of the 
literature, nor is the primary aim to break new ground. Rather, using a 
simple analytical framework an attempt is made to interpret and clarify some 
issues relating to immediate expensing and true economic depreciation which 
appear to have generated a fair amount of confusion. 
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i = the market rate of interest. 2 
Assume now that an income tax is imposed at a uniform rate, T, and 
that initially there is a zero tax allowance for depreciation. The after-
tax net present value, P*, is defined by relation (2). 
(2 ) n -k L Nk (Hi) ) (l-T) - C. 
k=l 
p* 
The above relation is expanded to incorporate a positive annual tax-
deductible depreciation allowance, Dk , in equation (3). 
(3) p* 
n 
L Nk(l+i)-k) (l-T) + T 
k=l 
n -k 
L Dk(l+i) )- C. 
k=O 
It is helpful at this point to define a parameter, K, where K defines 
the ratio of the value of the cumulative discounted depreciation allowance 
to the price of the capital good. 
(4) K 
n 
L Dk (Hi)-k 
k=O 
C 
Using equation (1) we can now rewrite equation (2) in the following 
form: 
(5) p* = P(l-T) - TC • 
Now fromequations (4) and (5), relation (3) may be rewritten as, 
(6) p* = P(l-T) - TC + TCK, 
which simplifies to 
(7 ) 
2 
p* = P(l-T) - TC(I-K) • 
It is assumed throughout the paper that the before-tax annual cash-receipts 
flows Nk are all non-negative. This ensures that all investments have a 
unique internal rate of return. 
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The parameter (l-K) provides a measure of the rate at which depreci-
ation can be written off for tax purposes. If no depreciation write-off is 
permitted, the value of K equals zero and equation (7) simply collapses to 
equation (5). At the opposite extreme, when K has a value equal to unity, 
the discounted present value of the depreciation allowance equals the acquis-
ition price of the capital good. One method of depreciation, for which the 
value of K is equal to unity, is 'immediate expensing', that is, a tax 
depreciation policy which permits the full price of a new capital good to be 
. .. 3 deducted from taxable income at the time of its acqulsltlon. Immediate 
expensing thus represents the most extreme form of accelerated depreciation. 
Under a general tax that permits immediate expensing of all capital 
outlays, only pure profits will be taxed. This important point is most easily 
explained by noting that with immediate expensing equation (7) reduces to 
(8) P* P(l-T) • 
Now for a truly marginal investment, pure profits and the net present value, 
P, will be zero. Also, the net present value of tax payments associated with 
the investment will be zero, since the value of the tax savings made at the 
time the investment outlay is expensed equals the present value of the sum 
of annual tax payments associated with the cash-receipt flow, Nk . Hence, 
investments that were marginal before tax will continue to be marginal after 
the imposition of a general tax that permits immediate expensing. 4 However, 
for all investments that earn pure profits, and thus have a positive net 
present value, tax will be paid in proportion to the pure profits earned, and 
the after-tax net present value of these investments will equal P(l-T). A 
3 
4 
It is assumed here that the investment outlay is made precisely at the end 
of a tax year and the tax-deductibility is therefore immediate. In 
addition, it is assumed that a system of 'full loss offset' applies if 
taxable income is negative in any period. 
This is true regardless of whether the investment is financed from equity or 
debt capital, providing that interest payments on investment financed by 
borrowing are not tax-deductible. The implications of permitting immediate 
expensing plus tax-deductibility of interest expenses on debt capital are 
considered in the third section of the paper. 
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general tax which permits immediate expensing of all investment outlays is 
thus perfectly neutral on the criterion that the before-tax net present 
values of all investments are reduced in exact proportion to the tax rate. 
The treatment of capital goods already in use when a general tax is 
imposed, that permits immediate expensing of all new investment, needs to be 
briefly considered. If no depreciation allowance is permitted for capital 
goods already in use at the time the tax is introduced, a capital levy at 
rate T will be imposed on existing capital goods. That is to say, if the 
value of a capital good immediately prior to the imposition of the tax is 
Vk , its value immediately after the introduction of the tax will be Vk (1-T).5 
If for distributional reasons, this capital levy was considered to be un-
desirable, immediate expensing of the value of the capital stock in existence 
at the time of introducing the tax could be permitted. But it would seem 
highly unlikely that full loss offset could be successfully administered in 
these circumstances. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that there are an infinite 
number of feasible methods of tax depreciation with the property that the 
value of K is equal to unity, and which are thus equivalent to immediate 
expensing. For all these alternative methods, however, the sum of the undis-
counted 'depreciation' allowances will exceed the value of the investment 
outlay. The most obvious alternative is to allow full tax deductibility of 
the cash-receipt stream Nk for all marginal investments. It is shown in the 
following section that, for a marginal investment, Nk equals the implicit 
rental price of capital services. For investments which have a positive net 
present value P, (i.e. inframarginal investments) only that part of Nk which 
represents the normal market rate of return on investment would be tax-
deductible. 
5 Unless stated otherwise, it is assumed throughout the paper that when a 
tax is imposed - or a tax change is announced - it is expected to be 
permanent. 
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The major conclusion to emerge from the foregoing discussion is 
that a perfectly general 'income' tax that permits immediate expensing of 
investment outlays, is in fact a tax on pure profits, and as such it is a 
neutral tax. The opportunity cost of capital, that is, the market rate of 
interest in a perfect capital market, is effectively excluded from the tax 
base. But it is clearly intended, primarily on equity grounds, that the 
personal income tax base should include interest income earned on equity 
capital. 6 Given this decision, it is of course impossible to specify a 
personal income tax base which does not distort individuals' saving-
. h' 7 consum1ng c 01ces. In other words, there is a bias against aggregate 
savings and associated capital formation which is inherent in taxing income, 
as compared with a consumption or a wealth tax, since the income tax lowers 
the effective interest rate on which rational individuals base their saving-
consuming decisions. 8 
In these circumstances, the important problem which remains to be 
answered - and the one which forms the central focus of Samuelson's (1964) 
paper - is how must income be defined if the present discounted valuations 
of all assets (cash-receipt streams), and therefore all optimal investment 
decisions, - is to be independent of the tax rate each individual is subject 
to? It is to this issue we now turn. 
II. TRUE ECONOMIC DEPRECIATION 
In a discrete time period model, true economic depreciation is de-
fined as the difference between the present value of the net receipt stream 
6 
7 
8 
There is a large public economics literature which focuses on the question 
of the appropriate base for the personal income tax. See, for example, 
Haig (1921), Simons (1938), Vickrey (1947), and Musgrave (1967). 
It is also well known, of course, that the income tax distorts the work-
leisure choice. 
No attempt is made in this paper to analyse, within a macroeconomic frame-
work, the effects that the imposition of a general income tax - and the 
associated government expenditure that it finances - may have on an 
economy's time path of aggregate private capital formation and the market 
rate of interest. The market rate of interest is tacitly assumed to 
remain unchanged. 
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generated by an investment outlay as at the beginning and end of an annual 
period. It can be shown that economic depreciation, in any annual period, 
is equal to annual net receipts minus interest on the value of the capital 
good as at the beginning of the year. 
Denoting the present value of the expected future earnings stream 
at the beginning of the kth year as Vk , we have 
(9) 
and 
Economic depreciation is therefore defined as 
Rearranging terms we obtain 
(12) N = V - V + i V k k k+l k' 
where Nk now can be interpreted as the implicit rental price of capital 
services, that is, the sum of economic depreciation plus the market rate of 
interest on the value of the capital good at the beginning of the period. 
It is this rental value of capital services that is effectively excluded from 
the tax base when immediate expensing of investment outlays is permitted. 
It follows that, for an investment which is wholly financed by borrowing~ an 
individual (firm) would be indifferent between an income tax of the Samuelson 
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type which allows tax-deductibility of true economic depreciation plus 
explicit interest payments, and a tax which permits immediate expensing but 
no tax-deductibility of interest payments. Consider now a perfectly general 
income tax which permits true economic depreciation as a tax-deductible 
expense. For a fully equity financed investment, taxable income, Y, is de-
fined as 
(13) 
Annual tax payments of TiVk will be made and after-tax income, Y*, net of 
depreciation, will be: 9 
(14) 
i (l-T) Vk • 
From equation (14), it is apparent that when true economic depre-
ciation is permitted as a tax-deductible expense, the present discounted 
value of a cash-receipt stream will be independent of the rate of tax each 
individual is subject to if, and only if, a private net-of-tax discount rate 
equal to i(l-T) is used to evaluate investments. 10 Under a perfectly gen-
eral income tax that permits the write-off of economic depreciation, the 
amount of the gross-of-tax rate of return siphoned off to the government as 
taxation, is exactly proportional to each individual's tax rate. And the 
9 
10 
Equation (14) corresponds to Samuelson's op.cit. 3 equation (4). There is 
an apparent error in Samuelson's equation (4). Note first that Samuelson's 
T equals our (l-T). Then his equation (4) for after-tax income should 
read: 
Throughout the discussion on the progressive personal income tax it is 
assumed that a proper income averaging system ensures that the tax rate is 
uniform over time for each individual. 
9 
opportunity cost of capital to each individual - and hence the relevant 
private rate of discount - is therefore given by the net-of-tax rate of 
return i(l-T), since an individual has no opportunities to invest free of 
its burden. The structure of optimal investment decision rules is thus 
unaltered by the tax, since the present discounted valuations of all cash-
receipt streams are independent of the tax rate to which each person is 
ub . 11 S Ject. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss either problems 
associated with the administration of an income tax which allows the write-
off of true economic depreciation, or problems raised by inflation. 12 Some 
of these problems have recently been examined by eoen (1975), in a study 
which explores a new approach to the estimation of true economic depreciation. 
It may be simply observed here that the time pattern of economic depreciation 
is a function of the time path of the flow of annual cash-receipts generated 
by an investment outlay. For instance, for a capital good yielding a con-
stant annuity over its life span and having zero scrap value, true economic 
depreciation would begin at a relatively low annual rate and rise exponen-
tially. The straight-line depreciation formula would be too rapid and would 
favour investment in long-lived capital goods. However, straight-line depre-
ciation provides a reasonable approximation to true economic depreciation 
when the annual cash-receipts flow begins at a high level and becomes pro-
1 1 
12 
This applies to investment financed from both debt and equity capital. 
In the former case, with tax-deductibility of interest payments, net tax 
payments at the margin are zero, i.e. Y = Nk - (Vk - Vk+l ) - i Vk = O. 
Investment will thus proceed to the point at which thegross-of-tax rate 
of return is equated with the market rate of interest, regardless of 
whether investment is debt or equity financed. 
The influence of inflation can be quite readily incorporated if the 
simplifying assumption is made that a uniform constant rate of inflation 
over the indefinite future is perfectly anticipated and the nominal rate 
of interest fully reflects the rate of inflation. In these circumstances, 
if the income tax is assessed on the basis of nominal income, the real 
net-of-tax rate of return will be uniformly lower on all investments than 
it would be in the absence of inflation, or if the tax were assessed on 
real income. Denoting the rate of inflation as, g, and the nominal rate 
of interest as, i, the real net-of-tax rate of return equals [i(l-T)-g]. 
To convert the tax base from nominal to real income it would be necessary 
to allow an additional deduction in each period for the capital appreciation 
in the value of a capital good resulting from inflation. 
10 
gressively smaller over an asset's life. This type of time pattern of the 
annual cash-receipts stream is probably quite common in practice, since a 
progressively increasing annual repairs and maintenance outlay is typically 
required to maintain an asset's output. 
Generally speaking, existing income taxes which permit the write-off 
of depreciation over the estimated economic (standard) life of a capital good, 
via such formula as the straight-line method, provide a rough approximation 
-to the Samuelson income tax. Interest income on equity capital is effectively 
included in the progressive personal income tax base. But the income tax is 
not uniformly applied over all investment activities. The economic effects 
of a progressive income tax which is not uniformly applied, that is, which 
favours some investment activities relative to others, are examined in the 
following section of the paper. 
III. TAX-FAVOURED INVESTMENTS AND 
A PROGRESSIVE INCOME TAX 
An appropriate starting point is to assume initially a 'neutral-tax' 
world in which a perfectly general income tax of the Samuelson type exists. 13 
Competitive resource allocation and the absence of uncertainty ensure that, 
in equilibrium, the gross-of-tax rates of return on all investment activities 
will be equal at the margin to the market rate of interest. 14 The private 
net-of-tax rates of return on equity capital will vary between individuals 
according to their marginal rate brackets, that is, for any individual taxpayer 
r = i (l-T) • 
The economic effects of introducing some form of tax-concession to 
apply to a particular investment activity are now considered. The tax-
1 3 
14 
The approach taken in this section of the paper has been considerably 
influenced by the recent publication of a paper by Bailey (1974), and the 
conclusions are broadly speaking similar to those reached by Bailey. 
That is to say, all investments having a positive net present value will 
be undertaken. For purposes of description and simplicity, the internal 
rate of return, or yield concept, is used rather than the present value 
concept, even though the former concept has some well known theoretical 
limitations. 
11 
concession may take the form of permitting the tax write-off of depreciation 
at a rate which exceeds the rate of true economic depreciation whilst main-
taining tax-deductibility of interest payments on debt capital; introducing 
an investment incentive - such as an investment allowance or tax credit -
which is separate from and additional to the depreciation allowance; or 
making income from the tax-favoured source partially or wholly tax-exempt. 
In Australia and the United States various forms of tax-concessions 
apply, for example, to investments associated with developing and improving 
land for farming, breeding livestock, growing fruit and nut trees, and timber-
growing. The tax-concessions are also variously referred to as 'tax-
privileges', 'tax-shelters', and 'tax-favoured' investments. 15 They commonly 
take the form of permitting immediate expensing of investment outlays, or, 
at least, allowing a rate of depreciation write-off that substantially exceeds 
the rate of true economic depreciation, while continuing to allow tax-
deductibility of interest payments on debt capital. For instance, many types 
of investment in developing and improving farm land effectively create, or 
substantially increase the productivity of, an asset that for all practical 
purposes is infinitely durable. With non-favoured tax treatment no tax-
deductibility of these investment outlays would be permitted, since the rate 
of true economic depreciation is effectively zero. If the land was being 
developed for purposes of resale, rather than to be farmed by the developer, 
then with 'neutral' tax treatment the capital costs of land development would 
15 The focus here is on the economic effects of tax-privileges as they apply 
to non-corporate investment, the income from which is subject only to the 
progressive personal income tax. It is pertinent to note, however, that 
Stiglitz (1973) has recently challenged the position taken by Harberger 
(1962) and many others, e.g. Bailey (1969; 1974); namely that the imposition 
of the corporate tax creates a distortion inducing a flow of capital from 
the corporate to the non-corporate sector. Stiglitz argues that in the 
absence of uncertainty all corporate investment will be financed at the 
margin from debt capital, and that existing interest deductibility pro-
visions plus depreciation allowances are approximately equivalent to 
permitting immediate write-off of investments with no interest deduct-
ibility. In these circumstances, in the absence of any tax-privileges to 
either sector, corporate firms will, like non-corporate firms, invest up 
to the point where the pre-tax marginal rate of return on investment is 
equated with the market rate of interest. 
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be capitalized and deducted for tax purposes only at the time of sale of 
the improved land. Of course, if the capital gains made on the sale of the 
improved land are not taxed, there should be no tax-deductibility of develop-
ment expenditures. 
In addition to tax-privileges in the form of accelerated depreciation 
(including immediate expensing), some sources of income receive favoured 
capital gains treatment, or are otherwise taxed at an effectively lower rate 
because the tax is assessed on an income realization basis rather than an 
income accrual basis. A good example is timber-growing in Australia, where 
planting costs can be immediately expensed but income is not taxed until 
realized at harvestime. 16 
For expository purposes, it is now assumed that a tax-concession is 
introduced to a small area of investment activity, whilst a neutral income 
tax continues to apply elsewhere. The tax-concession takes the form of 
permitting immediate expensing of investment in the favoured sector plus tax-
deductibility of interest payments on debt capital. For simplicity, consider 
an investment in land development and improvement which results in a permanent 
increase in the productivity of a block of farm land. In other words, the 
rate of true economic depreciation of the asset 'created' by the investment 
is zero, and the annual net receipt stream, Nk , is composed solely of the 
interest return on capital. In addition, it is conceptually convenient to 
initially consider a situation before any tax-induced changes in factor or 
product prices have occurred. Now for an investment which is fully financed 
from equity capital, the immediate expensing privilege gives rise to a tax 
refund which reduces the effective cost of the investment in proportion to 
the rate of tax. The annual net receipt stream will also be reduced in pro-
portion to the rate of tax. Hence, the privat~ net-of-tax rate of return on 
16 For a detailed discussion of the economic effects of alternative forms 
of income tax on timber-growing see Chisholm (1975). 
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the investment will precisely equal the gross-of-tax rate of return, and the 
effective rate of tax on the investment is in this sense zero. 
Now for an investment financed fully from debt capital, the immediate 
expensing plus tax-deductibility of debt interest payment privileges will, 
as before, via the tax refund, reduce the 'effective cost' of the investment 
in proportion to the rate of tax. But as a result of the tax-deductibility 
of interest payments, there is now effectively no tax levied on the annual 
net receipt stream. The net-of-tax rate of return (gross of debt interest 
payments) on the favoured investment will thus exceed the gross-of-tax rate 
of return. 
At this point two observations can be made. Firstly, regardless of 
whether the tax-favoured investment is financed from equity or debt capital, 
the value of the tax-privilege is greater for high-bracket taxpayers than for 
low-bracket taxpayers. In the former situation, high-bracket taxpayers re-
ceive lower net-of-tax rates of return on ordinarily taxed investments than 
do low-bracket taxpayers. And high-bracket taxpayers therefore obtain the 
largest benefits from investments which can be immediately expensed when 
the gross and net-of-tax rates of return are equated. In the latter situation, 
high-bracket taxpayers receive larger tax refunds when the investment is made 
than low-bracket taxpayers, whilst the effective tax levied on the net receip t 
stream is zero, regardless of the individual's tax-bracket. 
Secondly, we have so far analysed the effects of introducing the tax-
concession in the absence of any tax-induced changes in factor and product 
prices. Following the introduction of the tax-concession, the higher net-of-
tax rate of return will attract capital from high-bracket investors into the 
tax-favoured activity. Investment will continue to take place under the 'tax-
shelter', and factor and product prices will adjust, until in competitive equil-
ibrium, the gross-of-tax rate of return for high-bracket investors equals the 
net-of-tax rate of return obtainable on ordinarily taxed investments. 
J 
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In general, denoting the tax rate for high-bracket taxpayers as T', 
competition between investors in this group will lower the gross-of-tax rate 
of return on the tax-favoured investment activity to (l-T') times the gross-
of-tax rate of return on ordinarily taxed investments. At this point, the 
net-of-tax rates of return on the tax-favoured investment activity and on 
ordinarily taxed investments will be equated for high-bracket taxpayers. For 
instance, if we take the polar case of T'=l, the competitive equilibrium gross-
of-tax rate of return on the tax favoured investment will be zero. In any 
time period, the cash-receipt flow will just cover true economic depreciation 
of the capital good. For the opposite polar case of T'=O, the equilibrium 
gross-of-tax rate of return on the tax-favoured investment will equal that 
obtaining on ordinarily taxed investments. Since T' is zero, there is no tax-
induced shifting of capital. And in equilibrium, the cash-receipt flow in 
any period will cover true economic depreciation plus the market rate of 
interest on the current value of the capital good. 
As an illustrative example, consider the case where there are a large 
number of investors in the maximum tax-bracket of say 0.7. The market rate 
of interest - and the gross-of-tax rate of return at the margin on ordinarily 
taxed investments - is 10 percent. In this situation, competition between 
investors in the high-bracket group will lower the gross-of-tax rate of return 
on the tax-favoured investment to an equilibrium level of three percent. The 
net-of-tax rates of return at the margin, on the tax-favoured and non-favoured 
investments will be equated for high-bracket investors, regardless of whether 
they finance investment from debt or equity capital. Investment in the tax-
favoured activity will be unprofitable for individuals in tax brackets below 
0.7, since they can obtain a higher net-of-tax rate of return by investing in 
ordinarily taxed areas of investment, where the gross-of-tax rate of return is 
substantially higher. The tax-favoured investment activity will therefore 
come to be completely dominated by investors in the high-bracket group. 
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The lowering of the gross-of-tax rate of return on the tax-favoured 
investment activity will be caused by the tax-induced inflow of investment 
capital into that sector and an associated 'bidding-up' of factor prices and 
reduction of product price(s) as output expands. The extent to which the 
incidence of the tax-privilege is reflected in higher factor prices, versus 
a lower product price(s), is crucially dependent upon the relative magnitudes 
of the price elasticities of supply of factors and the price elasticity of 
demand of the product(s). 
Immediate expensing, combined with tax-deductibility of debt interest 
payments, represents the most extreme form of accelerated depreciation and in 
so far as this is the only tax-privilege, the lower bound of the equilibrium 
gross-of-tax rate of return is zero. And in practice, this lower bound would 
not be attained, since the maximum rate bracket under a progressive income 
tax is always less than unity. However, immediate expensing may be combined 
with other forms of tax-concessions such as investment allowances and partial 
(or full) tax-exemption of income from the favoured source. In these circum-
stances, it is quite conceivable for the composite value of tax-concessions 
applying to the favoured investment activity to be so great that competition 
between high-bracket investors will cause the equilibrium gross-of-tax rate 
of return to be negative. A negative gross-of-tax rate of return occurs when 
n 
the undiscounted value of the total cash-receipt stream (~ Nk ) is less than k=l 
the cost of the investment outlay. The associated positive private net-of-
tax rate of return for high-bracket taxpayers is attributable to the composite 
present value of tax-deductible allowances plus exemptions significantly 
exceeding the initial cost of the investment outlay. 
Existing progressive income taxes, in countries like Australia and 
the United States, very roughly approximate the Samuelson model. But they are 
not uniformly applied to all sources of capital income and tax-privileges of 
varying magnitudes apply to favoured investment activities. In these circum-
stances, it is to be expected that competition between high-bracket taxpayers 
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for tax-sheltered investments will, in the long-run, reduce gross-of-tax 
rates of return on the most highly favoured activities to an equilibrium level 
at which they are unprofitable areas of investment for all individuals except 
those in the highest tax brackets. 
The lower tax payments associated with tax-favoured investments do 
not, therefore, provide a true measure of tax incidence. The lower tax payments 
are offset, in equilibrium, by lower gross-of-tax rates of return which high-
bracket taxpayers sacrifice when investing in tax-sheltered investments, in 
order to maximize their net-of-tax incomes. The tax-induced shifting of 
capital and resources into sheltered investments and the resultant lowering 
of pre-tax rates of return - via adjustment of factor and product prices - to 
an equilibrium level at which net-of-tax rates of return on favoured and non-
favoured investments are equalised for high-bracket taxpayers, are all part 
of the real incidence of tax-privileges. 
Harberger (1962), Baumol (1970), and others, argue that the gross-
of-tax rate of return on an investment may be used as a measure of society's 
evaluation of the investment. If this measure is accepted, then it can be 
argued that tax-induced divergences in the levels of gross-of-tax rates of 
return between different investment activities are a direct manifestation of 
an inefficient allocation of resources. Since overall returns to society 
could be increased by transferring capital from activities yielding low pre-
tax rates of return to those yielding high pre-tax rates of return. 
Underlying the above line of argument, among other things, is the 
tacit assumption that a discriminatory income tax policy is not being used to 
correct for non-tax market distortions. A detailed discussion of this topic 
and the related theory of the second best is outside the scope of this paper. 17 
17 So also, is a discussion on government policies which seek to stimulate 
the general level of capital expenditures throughout the economy. If 
tax policy is used to achieve this goal, instruments should be selected 
which do not alter the structure of the effective relative costs of capital 
goods with varying economic lives, and which do not discriminate between 
low-bracket and high-bracket firms. 
17 
However, most appraisals of the income tax legislation generally dismiss the 
argument that the concessions and exemptions contained in existing legislation 
are explicitly designed to correct for specific non-tax market distortions. 
With regard to the United States income tax legislation Simons (1938, p.2l9) 
and Bailey (1974, p.1158) both argue, and in this writer's view persuasively, 
that the special concessions and exemptions contained in the legislation are 
essentially the product of covert political bargains and compromises between 
special interest groups, and that they have induced a gross misallocation of 
resources. IS It seems reasonable to presume that, at least in part, a similar 
explanation accounts for the extremely complex and piecemeal Australian income 
tax legislation. Be that as it may, when genuine non-tax market distortions 
do occur it is most unlikely that the progressive income tax will provide the 
most efficient and equitable policy vehicle for correcting them. 
The major non-corporate sector is the farm sector, and both in the 
United States and in Australia this sector has received extremely favourable 
tax treatment, although the extent of the concessions varies markedly between 
different farming activities and many do not receive significantly favoured 
tax treatment. Whatever arguments may be put forward, that in the absence of 
offsetting policies to stimulate investment levels of investment and output 
in certain farming activities would be below the 'social optimal', the use 
of incentives (concessions) the value of which is directly linked to the 
size of an individual's marginal tax bracket cannot be justified in the author'S 
view. 
Such a policy gives rise to market forces which over the long-run 
will exert continuous pressure on low-bracket farmers to move out of those 
farming activities which receive substantial tax-privileges. To the extent 
1 S In addition,some tax-concessions were almost certainly completely unfore-
seen at the time of drafting the income tax legislation. Indeed, some 
controversy still surrounds the definition of a 'neutral' income tax base 
with respect to economic activities like timber-growing, mining, growing 
vines for wine production, and growing fruit and nut trees. Moreover, it 
may be argued that for some economic activities it would be too costly 
to administer the 'ideal' income tax base. 
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that low-bracket farmers respond to these tax-induced economic pressures, 
their place will be taken by high-bracket farmers and so-called Pitt Street 
(Australia) and Wall Street (U.S.) farmers, that is, high-bracket investors 
whose primary sources of income are outside agriculture. 19 Finally, it should 
be made clear that the above effects are due to the value of the tax-concessions 
being tied directly to the progressive rate structure of the personal income 
tax. There are, of course, tax instruments, such as an investment credit 
which provides a direct credit against the payment of taxes and which is 
therefore independent of a firm's rate bracket. Providing there is adequate 
provision for carry forward and for carry-back of losses, an investment credit 
will not discriminate between low and high-bracket taxpayers. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In a pioneering paper Brown (1948) was the first to show that if all 
investment outlays were permitted to be immediately expensed, a tax on business 
income would not distort the structure of optimal investment decisions. The 
tax would clearly have enormous administrative advantages since it would avoid 
difficult problems of measuring depreciation. But the tax effectively excludes 
interest from the tax base and thus represents a tax on pure profits and if 
it were to be applied to all noncorporate investment it would radically change 
the base of the progressive personal income tax base. There is a widespread 
consensus that the most equitable definition of income on which to base an 
income tax, is that which defines it as being income from aZZ sources. And 
on equity grounds it would be quite unacceptable to exclude interest income 
earned on capital from the tax base and thereby convert the personal income 
tax into a tax on labour income and on pure profits. Though it is well known 
that with interest income included in the income tax base individuals' saving-
19 This assumes, of course, that tax-conce~sions can be written off against 
taxable income from any source. In practice, the constraints against 
doing this are fairly negligible. 
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consuming decisions will be distorted, since the tax lowers the effective 
interest rate on which individuals base these decisions. 
If this distortion is accepted as being an inevitable price of 
imposing an income tax, then following Samuelson (1964) there is a reasonable 
consensus that both from an equity and an efficiency viewpoint the appropriate 
concept of capital income is that which defines it as being income net of true 
economic depreciation. If the concept of true economic depreciation (and 
appreciation) were universally applied under a general progressive personal 
income tax, optimal investment decisions would not be distorted, as they would 
be independent of the tax rate to which each individual is subject. Existing 
progressive income taxes, in countries like the United States and Australia, 
roughly approximate the Samuelson model, but only in so far as standard tax 
depreciation formulae provide an approximate measure of true economic depreci-
ation and the tax is evenly applied. But in practice, the progressive income 
tax is not applied uniformly, particularly with respect to the treatment of 
depreciation, to all sources of capital income and some favoured areas of 
investment receive substantial tax-privileges that are directly linked to the 
size of an individual's tax-bracket. 
In general, we would expect two major economic effects to arise from 
the application of a progressive income tax which discriminates between invest-
ment activities. In the first place, with competitive resource allocation, 
pre-tax rates of return on tax-favoured investment activities will tend to-
wards equilibrium levels lower than those obtaining on ordinarily taxed invest-
ments. The lower pre-tax rates of return on tax-favoured investments is the 
'sacrifice' made by high-bracket taxpayers in order to maximize their net-of-
tax incomes. In the second place, because the tax-privileges are more valuable 
to high-bracket taxpayers than to low-bracket taxpayers, competition between 
investors in the former group for tax-sheltered investments will put constant 
pressure on low-bracket taxpayers to move out of those areas of economic 
20 
activity which receive substantial tax-concessions. Low-bracket taxpayers will 
obtain higher after-tax incomes by investing in ordinarily taxed investments 
which can be expected, ceteris paribus, to have higher pre-tax rates of return. 
This, of course, raises very serious equity issues. In addition, in the 
absence of non-tax market distortions which are being corrected by a discrim-
inatory income tax policy, tax-induced divergences between pre-tax rates of 
return on different economic activities represents an inefficient allocation 
of society's capital, since overall returns could be increased by transferring 
capital from uses with low pre-tax rates of return to those with high pre-tax 
rates of return. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EFFECTS OF TAX DEPRECIATION POLICY 
AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES ON OPTIMAL 
EQUIPMENT REPLACEMENT DECISIONS 
[ 
Effects of Tax Depreciation Policy and Investment 
Incentives on Optimal Equipment 
Replacement Decisions* 
ANTHONY H. CmSHOLM 
A model is developed to analyze the effects of income tax policy on the optimal timing of 
replacement for farm machinery. The impact of some forms of tax investment incentives on 
optimal replacement age was found to be substantial, while the influence of different tax 
depreciation methods is minimal. 
Key words, income tax policies; optimal replacement; farm machinery. 
T AX POLICY has been widely used by govern-ments as a means of influencing firms' in-vestment decisions. The focus of this paper 
is on one particular aspect of taxation and invest-
ment decisions, namely the influence of tax policy 
on optimal replacement decisions for farm ma-
chinery. 
In an important contribution to the theory of 
capital replacement , Preinreich [14] argues that 
the optimal service life of a machine cannot be 
determined in isolation from the economic life 
of each machine in the chain of future replace-
ments extending as far into the future as the 
firm 's planning horizon. Preinreich proposes that 
the firm should maximize the net present value 
of all future replacements, where the net present 
value is defined as the present value of aggregate 
earnings from all future machine replacements 
less the present value of the aggregate costs of all 
future machine replacements. 
While it was perhaps natural to develop the 
theory of capital replacement in terms of profit 
maximization, this objective commonly poses 
severe problems of measurement owing to the 
difficulty of identifying the returns attributable 
to the use of a particular machine. The conven-
tional method of overcoming this problem is to 
reformulate the profit maximization problem as 
one of cost minimization. Smith [16, Ch. 5] 
argues that in the absence of technological change 
in equipment, the replacement decision cannot 
affect either price or output. When a firm's price-
output decisions are independent of its replace-
* Giannini Foundation Paper No. 37 7. The author is 
grateful to the Journal's anonymous reviewers for help-
ful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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ment decisions, cost minimization and profit 
maximization are completely separable. 
The replacement model used in the present 
study assumes that firms aim to minimize the 
present cost of obtaining a constant flow of ma-
chine services over an infinite planning horizon. 
A stationary technology is assumed in which 
machines are replaced by machines of identical 
type , under conditions of certainty . 
The paper is divided broadly into two main 
parts . In the first section a discrete-time replace-
ment model incorporating income tax policy is 
developed , and the implications that the model 
holds for tax policy and optimal replacement 
decisions are discussed. In the following section 
the model is applied to a case study of the 
effects of recent changes in Australian income 
tax legislation on optimal replacement ages for 
farm tractors . Additionally, some comparisons 
are drawn between Australian and United States 
income tax legislation pertaining to investment in 
farm machinery. 
A Discrete-Time Replacement 
Model With Tax 
Replacement studies have variously used both 
continuous and discrete-time period models . The 
replacement model is represented here in terms 
of discrete-time variables, since this model is 
well adapted to real world problems involving 
short-lived assets of the type analyzed here. With 
a discrete-time model it is necessary to make 
some arbitrary definitions with respect to the 
point, within a discrete period, when costs (in-
cluding tax payments) are incurred and replace-
ment may occur. Both costs and replacement 
are defined here to occur at the end of each an-
nual period. 
Since the replacement problem, in the absence 
of taxation effects; is well covered in the economic 
literature, attention is now given to developing a 
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model which incorporates taxation. 1 The follow-
ing notation will be used: 
n = the replacement age measured in years; 
r = the firm's after-tax discount rate ; 
M o = the acquisition cost of a new machine ; 
Mn = the resale value of a machine aged n 
years ; 
Rk = the machine operating cost in year k; 
Dk = the amount of a depreciation allowance 
in year k; 
I = the amount of an investment allowance ; 
T = the firm 's rate of income tax ; 
Qn = the after-tax present value of the stream 
of costs for a single machine ; 
and 
V n = the after-tax present value of the stream 
of costs for an infinite chain of identical 
machines, each replaced at age n years.2 
The most significant features of an income tax, 
with respect to its influence on optimal replace-
ment decisions, are the time pattern of the tax-
deductibility of depreciation and the presence of 
any special investment incentives.3 As a point of 
departure for developing a "with-tax" replace-
ment model incorporating these features, an ex-
pression is required for the after-tax present value 
of the stream of costs for a single machine. The 
relationship is 
(l) Qn = (Mo - Mn[1 + r] -n) 
n 
+ 1- T(!R k [l +r] - k) 
k=l 
n 
- T(!Dd1 + r] - k) 
k = 1 
n 
+ T([! Dk - Mo + Mn][l + r] -n) . 
/,- 1 
1 Papers published in this] ournal on the economics of 
replacement include Burt [2], Chisholm [4], Faris [8], 
Perrin [13], and Winder and Trant [19] . For further 
studies which provide useful insights into the replacement 
problem, see Burt [1], Dean [6], Dillon [7, Chap. 3], 
Hirshleifer [11, Chap. 3], Lutz and Lutz [12, pp. 101-
114], and Terborgh [18] . 
2 Both a firm's after-tax discount rate and its rate of 
income tax are assumed to be constant over time. 
3 Equation (1) includes a term for an investment 
allowance that permits a specified proportion of the cost 
of a new machine to be deducted from taxable income in 
the year of its acquisition. This investment incentive is 
separate from, and additional to, the depreciation al-
lowance. It differs from the United States investment 
credit which provides a direct credit against the payment 
of taxes and which is independent of a firm's rate of in-
come tax. 
The first term on the right-hand side of (1) 
specifies the present capital cost of a machine 
which is replaced at age n years. The second term 
defines the after-tax present value of cumulative 
operating costs. The following two terms define , 
respectively, the present value of the tax savings 
from an investment allowance and the deprecia-
tion allowance. The final term is a balancing 
charge adjustment. Conventionally, a balancing 
charge adjustment is made when a divergence oc-
curs between resale value and depreciated book 
value at the time of asset disposal. If the resale 
value exceeds the depreciated book value, the 
"excess depreciation" is added to taxable in-
come.4 Conversely, if the resale value is less than 
the depreciated book value, the loss may be de-
ducted from that year's taxable income. 
Assuming now an infini te planning horizon, the 
after-tax present value of the stream of costs for 
a perpetual chain of machines, each replaced at 
age n, may be defined as: 
(2) V,,=Qn+ Vn(1 + r)-n. 
Solving relation (2) for Vn gives 
(3 ) Q .. V -------
fl- l -( l +r)-1O 
The optimal replacement interval could be 
determined by calculating the values of V" for 
the complete set of feasible replacement ages and 
selecting the minimum value. However, to ana-
lyze the effects of tax policy on optimal replace-
ment decisions, it is necessary to derive a more 
complete replacement criterion which incorpo-
rates the marginal conditions required for an 
optimum. 
A replacement model with marginal criteria 
Marginal conditions for optimal replacement 
can be derived from the following two inequali-
ties : 
(4) 
(5) 
V,,::::;; Vn +1 , 
Vn ::::;; V"_l 
which must hold for n an optimum.5 
Substituting (3) in the right-hand side of (4), 
one obtains 
4 The option of having a balancing charge adjustment 
deducted from the tax depreciation base of the replace-
ment asset, thus reducing future depreciation deductions, 
is not considered in the present study. 
5 The general procedure for deriving marginal condi-
tions for optimal replacement in the form of two ine-
qualities was developed hy Burt [ 2]. 
= 
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Qn +l 
V :0::::: - -----;----:---:-:--:-
n", 1 _ (1 + r) - (n+l) 
or the following equivalent inequality, 
V" ~ Q,, +1 + V,,( 1 + r)-(n+1). 
Finally, substi tuting (2) into the above inequal-
ity and rearranging terms gives 
(6) Q" 'l.l - Qn~V,,( I+r)-n 
- V,,(1 + r)-(n+l). 
Substituting (1) in the left-hand side of (6) 
gives 
11 
+ 1 - T(l R k [1 + r] -It) 
"-I 
n 
- T(I [1 + r] -1) - T (l Dd 1 + r] -k) 
k~ 1 
- T(Dn -,- J[1 + r]-[n +l]) 
+ TUEn+ l] [1 + r]-[n+l])] 
- [Mo~M,,(1 +r)-n 
n 
T 1 - T(l Rd 1 + r] -k) - T(I [1 + r] -1) 
k= l 
It 
-T(lDd 1 + r]-k)+ T([Bn][l+r] - n)] 
"=1 
n 
where E" = (1 Dk - Mo + M n), which is the k=1 
undiscounted balancing charge adjustment. 
. ~anceling li.ke terms of opposite sign and di-
Vldmg both sIdes of the inequality of (7) by 
(1 + r) - (" + 1) gives 
(8 ) M n(1 + r) - Mn +1 + 1 - T(R"+I) 
- T (D"+ I) + T(B"+ I) - T(En[1 + r]) 
~ V,,( 1 + r) - Vn . 
Rearranging terms on both sides of the in-
equality of (8) yields 
(9) 1 - T(Rn+1 ) + (Mn - M n+1 ) 
+ rMn - T(D" +I) 
+ T(B"+ 1 - Bn[1 + r]) ~ rV". 
Applying similar algebraic operations to (5), 
one can derive: 
Am. J. Agr. Econ. 
(10) 1 - T(Rn) + (Mn_ 1 - M n) 
+ rMn _ 1 - T(Dn) 
+ T(En - E n- d1 + r]) ~ rVn. 
The optimal policy for replacement is therefore 
defined by the double inequality 
(11) 1 - T(Rn+ d + (M" - M n +1 ) + rM" 
- T(Dn+ I) + T(E"+1 - E,,[1 + r]) 
~ rV" ~ 1 - T(R,, ) 
+ (M "_ 1 - M ,,) + rMn _ 1 
- T(D,, ) + T(E n - E" _ 1 [1 + r]). 
The optimal policy is to continue to hold the 
current machine until the marginal cost of hold-
ing the machine for a further year exceeds the 
amortized cost, rV n, which in turn exceeds the 
marginal cost incurred in the preceding year. 6 At 
this point, the marginal cost with respect to time 
(machine age) most closely approximates the 
average cost per unit of time, i.e. , the amortized 
cost. 
In empirical applications, probably the best 
method of determining the optimal replacement 
age is to evaluate the middle expression of (11) , 
for n = 1, 2, 3, . . . ; and select the integer value 
of n for which the amortized cost is a minimum. 
Substituting from (1) and (3) into the middle 
expression of (11) , the complete relationship for 
the amortized cost is 
(12) r rV" = -:-----,-------,----
1 - (1 + r)-n 
[(Mo-Mn[1 +r] - n) 
n 
+ 1- T(l Rdl + r] - k) - T(I[1 +r]-I) 
k = J 
n 
- T(lDd l + r] -k) 
" = 1 
" + T([lDk- M o+ M n][ 1 +r] - n)] . 
h: ~ l 
6 The main differences between (11) and the cor-
responding before-tax replacement criterion are additional 
terms for depreciation and the balancing charge adjust-
ment on both the right-and left -hand sides of (11) and 
the incorporation of these effects plus the influence of 
the investment allowance in the middle expression. A 
sufficient condition for there to be only one value of n 
which satisfies ( 11 ) is that starting from n = 1, V" is 
monotone decreas ing to some point n = k and thereafter 
monotone increasing. This condition will not always be 
met, and in empirical work it will usually be necessary 
to evaluate V n for the complete set of feasible replace-
ment ages, 
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It follows from relations (11) and (12) that 
the influence of the separate components of tax 
policy on optimal replacement decisions can be 
assessed by determining the functional relation-
ship between the annuity value of an investment 
allowance (and a depreciation allowance) and 
replacement age. 
Consider first an investment allowance of 
amount J, which is written off against taxable in-
come at the end of the first year of a machine's 
life. From equation (12) the after-tax annuity 
value of an investment allowance (denoted J*), is 
(13 ) r J*= . (J[I+r]-l)T. 
1 - (1 + r) - n 
The value of the annuity factor in relation (13) 
is inversely related to the value of n, and it is 
thus clear that the value of J* will also vary in-
versely with n.7 It follows that if the annuity 
value of the tax saving from an investment al-
lowance is a decreasing function of replacement 
age, an investment allowance will induce a bias 
towards shorter optimal replacement intervals. 
Determination of the effect of the time pattern 
of tax-deductible depreciation on optimal replace-
ment age is a more difficult task, because it is 
necessary first to define a "neutral" depreciation 
allowance which can be used as a basis for com-
parison. For this purpose the author drew upon 
a fundamental theorem of tax-rate invariance 
established by Samuelson [15, p. 604]: 
If, and only if, true loss of economic value is 
permitted as a tax-deductible depreciation ex-
pense will the present discounted value of a 
cash-receipt stream be independent of the rate 
of tax. 
Based upon this theorem, a depreciation sched-
ule (henceforth termed a neutral depreciation 
allowance) which allows the actual annual de-
cline in asset value to be deducted from taxable 
income in the year it is incurred is used as a basis 
for comparison.8 
7 It can be seen both from inspection and from tabled 
r 
values of the annuity factor, , that its 
l -( l + r) - n 
value (and therefore 1*) is monotone decreasing for 
n = 1, 2, 3, .... 
8 Some economists, for instance Smith [171 , have pro-
posed that neutral tax depreciation write-off rules would 
permit all capital outlays to be fully expensed- that is, 
a policy of 100 percent immediate depreciation regardless 
of the economic life of an asset. The conflict between 
Samuelson's [15] and Smith's conclusions may be ex-
plained by the fact that Smith's analysis implicitly as-
sumes that a firm's before- and after-tax discount rate are 
In the latter part of the application of the 
model which follows , the effect of alternative de-
preciation allowances on the replacement decision 
is assessed by evaluating the absolute difference 
between the annuity value of a neutral deprecia-
tion allowance and the annuity value of the 
particular depreciation schedule under considera-
tion, for n = 1, 2,3, . ... 9 
An Application 
In 1973 two important changes were made to 
the income tax legislation pertaining to invest-
ment in farm machinery in Australia.10 First, an 
investment allowance of 20 percent of machi ne 
cost, deductible from taxable income in the year 
of purchase of a new machine, was removed. 
Second, an accelerated depreciation schedule, 
which allowed the cost of farm machinery to be 
written off over five years at the rate of 20 
percent per annum, was replaced with a "stan-
dard" depreciation schedule allowing a 15 per-
cent per annum write-off over the first six years 
and a 10 percent write-off in the seventh year. 
To illustrate the effects of these changes in 
income tax policy on optimal replacement de-
cisions, the replacement model is applied to sur-
vey cost data for a farm tractor. The estimated 
annual operating costs and resale values for a 
farm tractor with an acquisition cost of $3, 100 
are given in Table l .ll Applying the replacement 
model derived earlier to this data, the optimal 
replacement ages are evaluated for various com-
identical. Samuelson, on the other hand, explicitly assumes 
that under a neutral income tax the after-tax discount 
rate will always equal (1 - T) times the before-tax dis-
count rate. I consider Samuelson's interpretation to be the 
correct one. 
9 From equation ( 12) I define the annuity value of a 
depreciation allowance-net of the balancing charge ad-
justment-as 
r 
" 
----- (l4 Dk (1 + r) - k] 1 - (1 + r) - It k= 1 
n 
Multiplying this expression by T, I obtain the net value 
of the annuity to a particular firm . 
10 These tax changes were first announced by the 
Australian Federal Treasurer in the 1973-74 Budget 
Speech . 
II Table 1 is based on farm survey data of tractor costs 
obtained from a study made by Harrison [10]. Both 
Harrison's study and a separate study by Glau [91 
examine the problem of the optimal timing of replacement 
of farm equipment under an income tax. In neither study, 
however, was a satisfactory methodology given for rigor-
ously analyzing the effects of different tax policies on 
optimal replacement. 
( 
t 
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Table 1. Operating costs and resale values 
for a fann tractor 
Re- Tax 
place Deduct-
at ible Cumu-
End Oper- Actual lative 
of aling Resale Depre- Capital 
Year Costs Price ciation Cost 
472 2508 592 592 
2 557 2235 273 865 
3 529 1992 243 1108 
4 636 1775 217 1325 
674 1582 193 1518 
6 826 1410 172 1690 
7 546 1257 153 1843 
8 612 11 20 137 1980 
9 808 998 122 2102 
10 798 889 109 22 11 
11 805 793 96 2307 
binations of rates of discount and rates of income 
tax. The optimal replacement intervals for both 
the before and after tax change situations are 
given in Table 2. 
The results show that before the tax change, 
the optimal replacement interval was sensitive to 
both a firm's rate of discount and its rate of 
income tax. Higher rates of discount are associ-
ated with longer optimal replacement intervals, 
while higher rates of income tax are asso-
ciated with shorter optimal replacement intervals. 
After the tax change the optimal replacement age 
remains sensitive to a firm's rate of discount but 
is no longer influenced by the rate of income' tax. 
After the tax change the optimal replacement 
ages are in fact identical to those which would 
obtain with a neutral depreciation schedule. A 
comparison of the before and after tax change re-
sults enables us to assess the impact of the tax 
reform on optimal replacement decisionsJ2 The 
most striking observation is that the combined 
removal of the investment allowance and the 
accelerated depreciation allowance has substan-
tially increased the optimal replacement age of 
tractors for farmers in high tax brackets. For a 
50 percent rate of income tax for instance the 
. " 
optimal replacement age increases from one to 11 
years. 
. 1~ The above analysis is in the nature of partial equi-
lib.num theory, since tbe structure of secondhand tractor 
pnces .IS assumed to remain constant. An extension of the 
analysIS would be to construct a model of the market for 
new and secondhand tractors and examine simultaneously 
the . ~ffe~ts of changes of tax policy on the structure of 
eqUilibnum tractor prices and optimal replacement For 
a study on the secondhand market for farm mach: 
see Candler [3). mery, 
Am. ]. Agr. Econ. 
Table 2 , Optimum replacement intervals 
(years)* 
Discount 
Rate Marginal Income Tax Rate 
(percent) (percent) 
0 12.5 25 50 
0 8 (8) 8 (8) 3 (8) 1 (8) 
5 11 ( 11 ) 8 ( 11) 8 (11) 1 (11) 
7.5 11 (11) 11 (11) 11 (11) 1 (11) 
10 11 (11) 11 ( 11) 11(11) 1 (11) 
* The figures without and within parentheses in the 
body of the table show the optimal replacement intervals 
before and after the tax change, respectively. 
Further insight into the influence of the tax 
change on optimal replacement strategies can be 
gained by separating the effect of the removal of 
the investment allowance from the effect of the 
removal of the accelerated depreciation allow-
ance. This separation is achieved by calculating 
optimal replacement ages for a tax policy which 
allows accelerated depreciation, but which has no 
investment allowance. The optimal replacement 
ages for this situation are identical to those given 
in parentheses in Table 2. Thus the changes in 
optimal replacement ages shown in Table 2 derive 
solely from the removal of the investment allow-
ance. 
To draw some comparisons between the Aus-
tralian and United States income tax legislation 
and to allow further testing of the sensitivity of 
optimal equipment replacement decisions to tax 
policy, the replacement model was also used to 
examine the current United States tax situation. 
The main features of the current United States 
income tax legislation, as it relates to investment 
in farm machinery, are an investment credit; a 
choice between several forms of depreciation 
write-off including some accelerated forms of 
depreciation; and an additional first-year depre-
ciation allowance. In addition, and in contrast t~ 
the former tax situation in Australia, there are 
strict rules governing the minimum number of 
years (useful Ii fe) that an asset must be held by 
a firm to quali fy for the above forms of favorable 
tax treatment.13 
Using the data in Table 1, and assuming a 50 
percent rate of income tax, optimal replacement 
13 A detailed description of U. S. tax policy relating to 
investment in farm equipment is contained in [20). In my 
analysis, I assume that U. S. farmers accurately predict 
the futUre resale (salvage) value of their equipment when 
calculating tax-deductible depreciation, so that there is 
no balancing charge (recapture) at the time of its dis-
posal. 
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ages were determined under the United States 
straight line and the sum of the years-digits 
methods of depreciation respectively, both with 
and without the investment credit and the ad-
ditional first-year depreciation allowance. For all 
of the above combinations, the optimal replace-
ment ages were identical with those given in 
brackets in the right-hand side column of Table 
2, i.e., under the current "standard" Australian 
depreciation allowance. In effect, the strict eli-
gibility rules which allow assets to qualify for 
favorable tax treatment only if they are held by a 
firm for certain minimum time periods nullify any 
incentives that may otherwise be given towards 
more rapid replacement. 
Finally, as was discussed earlier in the paper, 
a more precise measure of the influence on re-
placement of the time pattern of tax-deducti-
bility of depreciation can be obtained by evaluat-
ing absolute differences between the annuity 
value of a neutral depreciation allowance and the 
annuity value of the particular depreciation 
schedule under consideration, for each feasible 
replacement age. Using the data in Table 1, the 
above calculations have been made for a number 
of alternative forms of depreciation. The results 
are presented in Table 3. 
The procedure for assessing the direction of the 
effect of a particular method of depreciation on 
replacement age may be illustrated by considering 
the most extreme form of accelerated deprecia-
tion, namely an immediate 100 percent deprecia-
tion allowance. From Table 3 it can be seen that 
the annuity value of this depreciation allowance 
exceeds that of a neutral depreciation allowance 
for all values of n. The absolute difference be-
tween the annuity values of the two depreciation 
schedules is, however, a decreasing function of n. 
Hence, an immediate 100 percent write-off policy 
induces a bias towards shorter replacement in-
tervals. This situation does not apply, however, 
with all forms of accelerated depreciation, as can 
be seen from the results for the former Australian 
accelerated depreciation allowance, where the 
bias is in the opposite direction. 
It is apparent from the results given in Table 3 
that there is no simple general rule for predicting 
the direction of bias on replacement age of a par-
ticular method of depreciation. Perhaps more im-
portant is the fact that in no instance was the 
magnitude of the bias stemming from a particular 
method of depreciation of sufficient size to change 
the optimal replacement age.14 
14 It is apparent, though, from some of the large dif-
Conclusions 
A replacement model has been developed to 
analyze the effects of the time pattern of the tax 
depreciation policy and special investment incen-
tives, on optimal farm equipment replacement 
decisions. A case study application of the model 
to analyze the effects of recent changes in 
Australian income tax legislation showed that 
the combined removal of a 20 percent invest-
ment allowance and an accelerated depreciation 
allowance substantially increases the optimal 
tractor replacement age for high tax bracket 
farms. Separation of the influence of the invest-
ment allowance from that of the accelerated de-
preciation aIlowance indicated that the impact of 
the tax change on optimal replacement age was 
solely attributable to the removal of the invest-
ment allowance. 
The main indications emerging from a rather 
more restricted application of the model to 
United States tax policy were that due largely to 
the rules preventing assets receiving favorable 
tax treatment from being turned over too rapidly, 
the current tax policy would not appear to influ-
ence significantly the optimal farm machinery re-
placement decisions. 
Evaluation of the relationship between the 
annuity value and replacement age for each of a 
number of alternative feasible depreciation 
methods- with the same annuity relationship for 
a neutral depreciation allowance-indicated that 
changes in the time pattern of the tax-deducti-
bility of depreciation will in general have only 
minimal influence on optimal replacement de-
cisions. 
Finally, it may be observed that the original 
policy goal of the Australian investment allow-
ance was to stimulate the use of new and up-to-
date equipment in primary production [5, p. 23] . 
While this policy goal was probably to some ex-
tent achieved, it is not desirable from either an 
equity or efficiency viewpoint to provide an in-
centive the size of which is directly linked to a 
firm's marginal tax bracket. In this respect an 
investment credit which is independent of a 
firm's marginal tax bracket would appear to be a 
superior form of investment incentive. 
[Received April 1974 and revised July 1974.] 
ferences between the annuity values given in Table 3 
that regardless of the timing of replacement, the impact 
of different methods of depreciation on the after-tax an-
nuity cost of machine services can vary substantially. 
r--. 4s 
Table 3. Annuity values for various depreciation methods relative to a neutral depreciation allowance 
Former U. s.a 
Australian Sum of the 
Accelerated Former Y ears-Digi ts Total 
Deprecia tion Australian Current U . S. Method Plus Depreciation 
Replace Plus Accelerated Australian Straight Additional U. S.b Immediate at Time 
at End Investment Depreciation Standard Line First-Year Investment 100 Percent of Asset 
of Year AUowance Only Depreciation Depreciation Depreciation Credit Depreciation Disposal 
620 0 0 0 310 0 
2 288 1 -6 -7 282 -26 
3 204 12 -3 -12 26 264 -46 
4 170 26 5 -14 21 25 1 -59 
5 156 40 12 -17 35 238 -72 
6 153 56 21 -19 20 30 228 - 82 
7 148 64 30 - 23 21 40 218 -92 
8 144 70 38 -25 21 37 210 -100 
9 139 73 44 -28 21 34 203 - 107 
10 135 75 48 -31 21 32 197 -113 
11 129 75 50 -34 20 30 191 -119 
a An asset must be held by a firm for at least three years to qualify for the sum of the years-digits method of depreciation and a period of at least six years to 
qualify for a 20 percent additional first-year depreciation aUowance . For n ~ 3 the differences between the sum of the years-digits method only and neutral depreciation 
was negligible. 
b An asset must be held for at least three years for a firm to receive any investment credit and at least seven years to receive the full investment credit. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INCOME TAXES AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS 
THE LONG-LIFE APPRECIATING ASSET CASE 
INCOME TAXES AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS: THE LONG-LIFE 
ApPRECIATING ASSET CASE 
Anthony H. Chisholm* 
Australian National University 
University of Cali fornia 
In this paper a neoclassical tax incidence model is 
used to analyze the effects of alternative methods of taxing 
income derived from products whose production process is long-
lived. Forestr y is selected as a classic case . Compared with 
a "neutral " income tax~ two other types of income tax~ which 
appr oximate those currently applying to the forestry sectors 
in Australia and the United States~ respectively~ bias produc-
tion toward longer growth periods~ increase land (site) values ~ 
and depress timber prices . 
The general concern of this paper is with the taxation of long-lived 
appreciating assets, such as growing trees for timber and the aging o f wine. 
The taxation of income that accrues from growing timber is of importance i n 
itself and also because growing trees have traditionally been used as a 
classic point input-point output example in the literature on capital theory . 1 
* The research described in this paper was carried on by the auth or wh ile 
a Visiting Associate and Research Associate on the Giannini Foundation 
of Agricultural Economics, University of California, Davis and Berkeley, 
respectively. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the 1974 
annual meeting of the American Agricultural Economics Association. The 
author is grateful to Daniel Bromley and Mason Gaffney for helpful 
comments on the earlier version. 
The author's (Chisholm 1966) analysis of the optimal rotation problem in 
the absence of taxation effects is given in a supplementary Appendix . 
The term "timber", as used in this paper, is synonymous with wood fiber 
in all its uses. 
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Particular attention has been given to the problem of the optimal rotation 
or growth period. This problem has, for instance, been analyzed in the 
absence of taxation influences by Gaffney (1960), Chisholm (1966), and 
Hirshleifer (1970). The first detailed study analyzing the effects of 
various forms of taxation on the optimal maturity period was made by Gaffney 
(1967).2 Gaffney's framework for analysis and conclusions was later vigor-
ously attacked in a paper published in this Jour nal by Thomson and Goldstein 
(1971). 
It is not the purpose here to provide a detailed critique of these 
papers. Rather, using a differential tax incidence model, a fresh approach 
to the problem is taken. This is done in the belief that a large part of 
the conclict between the above writers may be attributed partly to their 
attempting to analyze the impact of various forms of taxation on optimal 
growth periods, without considering simultaneous effects on factor and 
product prices within the forestry sector, and partly because they do not 
adequately specify the alternative situations in which they are making 
comparisons. 
The plan of this paper is as follows: First, I define a neutral 
income tax which, if applied uniformly over all sectors of the economy, has 
the characteristics that the before-tax and net-of-tax present discounted 
valuations of all investments, and hence optimization decisions,are indep-
endent of the tax rate to which each firm is subject. Second, I define two 
additional types of income tax which approximate the current federal income 
taxes in Australia and the United States, respectively, as they apply to the 
forestry sector. The equation defining the net present value of an infinite 
2 Gaffney's first paper (1967) was followed by an extended treatment of 
the topic published during 1970-71. Gaffney considered the influence 
of taxation of income derived from both appreciating and depreciating 
assets. The present paper considers the case of long-lived apprec-
iating assets only. For a recent analysis of tax policy and the deprec-
iating asset case, see Chisholm (1974). 
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sequence of timber harvests and the optimal rotation cycle is given for 
the before-tax and the net-of-tax situation for each type of income tax. 
Third, using a differential tax incidence procedure, I analyze the economic 
effects of substituting alternative forms of the income tax in the forestry 
sector. Fourth, a numerical example is given to illustrate the conclusions 
that emerge from the preceding qualitative analysis. The paper ends with 
some concluding remarks and an Appendix in which the relationship between 
my approach to the problem and the papers by Gaffney and by Thomson and 
Goldstein are discussed. 
I. A NEUTRAL INCOME TAX 
The definition of a neutral income tax (henceforth termed an accrued 
income tax) used in this study follows directly from a fund amental theorem 
of tax-rate invariance established by Samuelson (1964, p.604). The 
essential characteristics of the income tax base may be stated as fo1lows: 3 
1. Current receipts and current outlays (i.e. outlays which make 
their full contribution to production within a single year) 
should be subject to tax and deductible from taxable income, 
respectively, at the time they are incurred. 
2. The true loss of economic value of an asset should be allowed 
as a tax-deductible depreciation expense as it accrues. 
3. The increase in the real value of an appreciating asset should 
be subject to tax as it accrues. 
Applied to a point input-point output forest growth model, the 
accrued income tax would allow planting and establishment costs to be ded-
ucted from taxable income at the beginning of each rotation and tax the 
3 This definition of a neutral income tax is also the one proposed by 
Gaffney (1967 and 1970-71). Other economists who have proposed this 
concept of the income tax base include Haig (1921), Simons (1938), 
Vickrey (1947), and Musgrave (1967). 
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value of the annual growth increments as they accrue. 4 A uniformly applied 
accrued income tax has the crucial property that the net-of-tax rate of 
return on all investments equals i (1 - t), where i and t denote the before-
tax rate of return and the rate of tax, respectively. In other words the 
proportion of the gross rate of return, siphoned off to the government as 
taxation, is constant for all investments; and the opportunity cost of 
capital to firms is thus reduced in precise proportion to their tax rate. 5 
Of course, any form of income tax which taxes the interest income 
earned on capital has an inherent bias against aggr egate savings and as soc-
iated capital formation, as compared with a consumption, or wealth tax, 
since it lowers the e ffective interest rate on which rational individuals 
base their saving-consuming decisions. The important point is that, for 
any given level of aggregate capital formation, a uniformly applied accrued 
income tax will, in a perfect capital market, have no distorting influence 
on the allocation of capital between alternative avenues of investment. 6 
4 
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It may be argued that it is administratively too costly to apply an 
accrued income tax to forestry because it would require an annual val-
uation of growing timber. Also, it may be claimed that, due to imperfect 
lending markets, the payment of taxes before the income is actually 
realized,would cause severe liquidity problems for some timber growers. 
However, under an accrued income tax, it is not essential that the tax 
be collect ed before the income is realized. If for administrative or 
any other reasons the tax can be collected only upon realization of the 
income, an interest adjustment charge could be added at this time. The 
pr esent value of the cumulative tax payments would then be equal regard-
less of whether the tax was paid on an annual accrual basis or in a lump 
sum at the time the trees were felled. 
Given perfect markets and full tax deductibility of interest charges on 
all investment financed by borrowing, the gross rate of return on invest-
ments will be equated with the market rate of interest. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to analyze, within a 
macroeconomic framework, the effects that a general income tax (and the 
associated government expenditure that it finances) may have on an 
economy's time path of aggregate private capital formation and the 
market rate of interest. 
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II. PRESENT VALUES 
The equations for determining the net present value of an infinite 
sequence of forest harvests for the before-tax situation and for each of the 
alternative income tax regimes are given in this section of the paper. An 
annual discrete time period model is used since this model would seem to 
best accord with the annual income tax accounting period of the real world. 
The following notation will be used in the models: 
S: before-tax present value (site value), 
S*: net-of-tax present value (site value), 
V: undiscounted value of each harvest (stumpage value), 
n 
C: establishment cost incurred at the beginning of each rotation, 
o 
Gk : value of the annual growth increment for the kth year, 
i: before-tax rate of discount, 
r: net-of-tax rate of discount, 
t: rate of tax, 
n: rotation period measured in years. 
The equation defining the before-tax net present value for an 
infinite sequence of harvests is 
(1) 
to 
(2) 
Assuming constant values for both V and C , equation (1) simplifies 
n 0 
S 
V - C (1 + i)n 
n 0 
(1 + i)n - 1 
The net present value S, of the trees, determines the site value of 
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the land on which they grow. 7 And the excess of S over the opportunity 
cost of the land in its next best alternative use, e.g., grazing livestock, 
represents pure rent attributable to the forestry enterprise. The length 
of the rotation cycle, n, which maximizes S, may be viewed as a tradeoff 
between size and frequency of harvests. 8 In practice, probably the simplest 
way of solving for the optimal value of n is to calculate the values of S 
for the complete set of feasible growth cycles and select the maximum 
value. 9 
Equation (2) may now be modified to incor porate an accrued income 
tax as given below: 
(3) S* 
v - t 
n 
(1 + r)n - 1 
The first bracketed term and the following term in equation (3) 
specify the values of the cumulative tax payments on the annual growth 
increments and the net-of-tax establishment costs, respectively , both com-
pounded forward to the year of timber harvest. 10 
7 
8 
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For simplicity, it is assumed here that the only product of forest land 
is wood fiber. In practice, forest lands will also commonly provide 
recreational amenities as a joint product. 
The economic choice of an optimal growth period assumes particular import-
ance for forestry as the production of wood fiber is unique among crops 
in its flexibility with regard to the timing of harvest. 
Though additional insight into the problem is obtained when a marginal 
replacement criterion is formulated: See, for instance, the marginal 
replacement criterion as defined by equation (7) $ in Chisholm (1966) . The 
modified form of equation (7) which incorporates the effects of an accrued 
income tax is: (V +1 - V )(1 - t) ~ i(l - t)V + c (1 - t) + A*(l - t). 
n n n n 
Compared with the before-tax marginal replacement criterion, under an 
accrued income tax all terms are reduced in exact proportion to the rate 
of tax and the choice of the optimal rotation period is thus not 
influenced by the tax. 
The taxable income assessed at the end of the first year of a forest's 
life, Gl' is equal to the value of the one-year-old forest less the cost 
of planting. While for simplicity of exposition, a point input-point output 
forest model is used here, the treatment of intermediate outlays, e.g. 
prunings, under an accrued income tax is in principle quite straight-
forward. Intermediate outlays should be tax deductible in the year in 
which they are incurred,since it is at this point in time that such expend-
itures will increase the value of the forest and thus taxable accrued 
income. 
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If equations (2) and (3) are applied to a set of forest growth 
data, the value of S will equal S* for all values of n, providing that a 
net-of-tax discount rate, r, equal to i (1 - t), is used in equation (3). 
That is to say, under a general accrued income tax, the discounted present 
valuation of all investments in timber production (and elsewhere) will be 
independent of the tax to which each firm is subject, and the tax will 
not therefore affect the choice of the optimal growth period for a part-
icu1ar tree species nor will it influence the planting choice between short-
and long-maturing tree species. II 
The second type of income tax to be considered - currently app1y-
ing to the forestry sector in Australia - allows planting costs to be 
"immediately expensed" but delays taxing forest income until it is rea1-
ized at harvest. The equation defining S* under an income tax that permits 
immediate expensing (henceforth termed a fuZl - expensing income tax) is 
(4) S* 
V (1 - t) - (1 - t)[C (1 + r)n] 
n 0 
(1 + r)n - 1 
The final type of income tax considered (henceforth termed a 
realized income tax) differs from the above income tax in that planting 
costs must be capitalized and deducted from realized income at the time 
of harvest. 12 The equation for S* under a realized income tax is 
V (1 - t) + tC - C (1 + r)n 
(5) S* n 0 0 
(1 + r)n - 1 
Comparing equations (3), (4), and (5), it is now clear that the only 
differences between the three types of income tax arise from differences in 
11 
12 
It is assumed that the tax rate to which a firm is subject is constant 
over time. Under a progressive income tax, this implies the existence 
of comprehensive income-averaging provisions. 
This, essentially, is the form of federal income tax applying to the 
forestry sector in the Unites States which is commonly referred to as 
a net severance tax. However, the preferential capital gains tax rates, 
which apply to most timber production in the United States, are not 
considered in the present paper. For a discussion of this topic, see 
Meade (1965). Property taxes also have important implications for 
forestry in the United States; see, for example, Trestrai1 (1969). 
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the t imi ng of the tax deductibility of costs and/or the taxing of income. 
Compared with an accrued income tax, both a full-expensing income tax and, 
to a lesser extent, a realized income tax confer an effective tax subsidy 
which sterns from their more generous timing provisions. 
III. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE TYPES 
OF INCOME TAX ON FORESTRY 
The analysis in this section of the paper is based on the following 
assumptions: the initial (benchmark) situation is one in which a prop-
ortiona1 accrued income tax is applied uniformly over all sectors of a 
closed economy; all markets are perfectly competitive, and market re1ation-
ships, under any given tax regime, are expected to hold constant over time; 
and, with the exception of land, adjustments in the size of the forestry 
sector induced by a tax change do not appreciably affect factor or product 
prices in other sectors. 
Consider now the substitution in the forestry sector of a fu11-
expensing income tax for the accrued income tax while maintaining the 
accrued income tax elsewhere. It follows from the above assumptions that 
prior to the tax change, in the absence of differential risk, both the 
before-tax and net-of-tax rates of return on capital will be equated at 
the margin in all sectors. Immediately following the tax change, the net-
of-tax rate of return in the forestry sector will exceed that elsewhere. 
This, in turn, will give rise to market forces which will lower the before-
tax rate of return in forestry to a point where the net-of-tax rate of 
return is once more equal between sectors. 13 The market adjustment will 
occur through tax-induced changes in the prices of factors used in forest 
13 The general approach taken here and, in particular, the assumption 
that market forces will operate to equate the net-of-tax rate of 
return between uses of capital is similar in spirit to that which is 
now especially associated with the names of Harberger and Mieszkowski; 
see, for instance, Harberger (1962) and Mieszkowski (1972). 
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production and/or changes in the price of timber. Given that the supply 
of both labor and capital (net- of-tax) to the forestry sector is assumed 
to be perfectly elastic with respect to price, land is the only factor 
whose market price can be affected by the tax change. 
Two polar cases regarding the supply of land to the forestry 
sector may be distinguished. First, the supply of land to forestry is 
perfectly inelasti c , and, second, it is perfectly elastic . In the first 
case, the full incidence of the tax change will be reflected in higher 
site values for forest land. The site values for forest land will be bid 
up to the point at which the net-of-tax return for forestry is equa l to 
that elsewhere. A windfall capital gain is thus conferred upon owners 
of forestry land at the time the tax change is announced. 14 
Assuming that the tax change applies only to trees planted after 
its announcement, there will be an incentive to bring forward the harvest-
time of growing trees which were planted prior to the tax change since 
the opportunity cost of the site (land) is now higher. For trees planted 
after the tax change, however, a full-expensing income tax will induce a 
bias toward longer rotation cycles. The distortion is most easily 
explained by considering equations (2) and (4) and assuming initially that 
a firm uses a net-of-tax discount rate equal to the before-tax discount 
rate, r, to calculate values of S* for alternative values of n. Using 
equation (2) it is then possible to rearrange equation (4) in the following 
form: 
(6) S* S (1 - t). 
It is clear from equation (6) that imputed site values, for all 
values of n, would be reduced by an amount exactly proportionate to the 
14 It is assumed that, when a tax change is announced, investment plans 
are made on the expectation that the new tax will be permanent. 
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tax rate if a constant discount rate, equal to the before-tax rate of 
return, was used for both the before and net-of-tax evaluations. The approp-
riate net-of-tax discount rate, r, to use in equation (6) is, however, 
lower than the before-tax rate, i, since in equilibrium it must equal the 
net-of-tax return elsewhere. And when the correct (lower) rate of discount 
is used, the impact on S* will be more favorable for longer rather than for 
shorter maturity periods. 
Consider now the opposite polar case in which the supply price of 
land to the forestry sector is perfectly elastic. The higher net-of-tax 
return for forestry resulting from the tax change will provide an incent-
ive to increase the land area planted to trees. The area of new land 
planted to trees will depend on the expected price elasticity of demand 
for timber. In the new long-run equilibrium, the price of timber will 
have decreased to a level just sufficient to yield a net-of-tax return 
equal to that in other sectors. The full incidence of the tax change is 
thus reflected in lower timber prices in the long run. 
It was shown in the preceding discussion that a change to a full-
expensing income tax in the forestry sector with an inelastic land supply 
caused the imputed site values, S*, to increase proportionately more for 
longer rather than for shorter maturity periods. It then follows that, 
when the supply of land to forestry is perfectly elastic, the lowest prices 
for timber which are just compatible with earning a net-of-tax return to 
forestry equal to that obtainable elsewhere will also be biased toward longe r 
maturity periods. 
In reality, of course, we would expect the supply of land to the 
forestry sector to be neither perfectly elastic nor inelastic. In these 
circumstances the incidence of the tax change will be partially reflected 
in an increase in the site values of forest land and longer rotation cycles 
and partially in an expansion of the land area planted to forests and lower 
7 
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long-run timber prices. 
The economic effects of substituting a realized income tax for the 
accrued income tax in the forestry sector are, in all essential aspects, 
similar to those analyzed above for the full-expensing income tax. From 
equations (2) and (5), the equivalent constant discount relation for the 
realized income tax, i.e., the analogue of equation (6), may be expressed 
as 
(7) S* S (1 - t) - tC . 
o 
The additional term that appears on the right-hand side of the 
above relation is also independent of n. Thus, by analogous reasoning to 
the full-expensing income tax case, it can be seen that when the correct 
(lower) net-of-tax discount rate is used, the impact of a realized income 
tax on S* will also be more favorable for longer maturity periods. In 
the following section of the paper, a hypothetical numerical example is 
constructed which illustrates the conclusions reached in this section. 
IV. A NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION 
Consider a plot of forest land which under an accrued income tax, 
has a site value, S*, of $50 and a planting cost of $25 for establishing 
each rotation. To highlight the impact of a tax change on site values 
and the choice of an optimal rotation cycle, the example is structured so 
that under the accrued income tax, all maturity periods (to a maximum 
rotation period of 50 years) are equally profitable. The forest grows at 
a constant annual compound rate just sufficient to provide a gross rate 
of return of 10 percent on both the initial planting outlay and the site 
value. A tax rate of 50 percent is assumed, and the corresponding net-of-
tax discount rate used by private timber growers is therefore 5 percent. 
Following the earlier procedure, it is initially assumed that the 
supply of land to forestry is perfectly inelastic. Using equations (4) 
1 
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and (5), the incidence on site values of substituting a full-expensing 
income tax and a realized income tax, respectively, for the accrued income 
tax has been evaluated for various maturity periods. Probably the most 
striking point to emerge from the results, which are given in Table 1, is 
the magnitude of both the tax-induced bias toward longer maturity periods 
and the associated increase in site values. For a 50-year rotation cycle, 
a change in the timing only of taxing income and the tax deductibility of 
production costs results in an approximately eightfold increase in site 
values. The comparatively small differences between imputed site values 
for the full-expensing income tax and the realized income tax indicate 
that the major influence stems from the postponement of the taxation of 
income until realization at harvest. The differences in the timing of 
the tax deductibility of planting costs have a comparatively small effect 
on site values. 
a 
Table 1 
Imputed Site Values for Different Rotation Periods With 
Full Incidence of Tax Change on Site Values 
Site values a 
Maturity Stumpage 
period value Full-expensing Realized 
income tax income tax 
years dollars 
1 32.50 63 50 
5 70.79 70 58 
10 144.53 83 70 
15 263.29 98 85 
20 454.56 117 105 
25 762.60 142 130 
35 2,057.68 213 200 
50 8,754.31 404 392 
Under the initial accrued income tax, the imputed site value is 
$50 for all maturity periods. 
Source: Calculations based on hypothetical example. 
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To determine the incidence of tax changes on long-run timber prices 
when the supply of land to forestry is perfectly elastic, it is first nec-
essary to derive modified forms of equations (4) and (5). These modified 
equations in which stumpage value appears on the left-hand side of the res-
pective relations are given below: 
(8) 
and 
(9) 
V 
n 
V 
n 
S*[(l + r)n - 1] 
(1 - t) + C (1 + r)n o 
S*[(l + r)n - 1] + C 
o 
(1 - t) 
(1 + r)n - tC 
o 
Equations (8) and (9) are then solved for n = 50 since it is known 
that after the tax changes, this will be the most profitable maturity period 
and that the corresponding site value will be $50. Having derived the 
stumpage values for a 50-year maturity period, the stumpage values for shorter 
maturity periods can be determined quite simply. IS The derived stumpage 
values for both the full-expensing and realized income taxes are given in 
Table 2. The imputed site values for n < 50, which are also shown in Table 
2, were calculated by substituting the derived stumpage values back into 
equations (4) and (5) and solving for S*. It is apparent from the results 
given in Table 2 that the reduction in stumpage values, which exceeds 80 
percent when the full incidence of a tax change is on timber prices, is 
comparable with the increase in site values when the full incidence of the 
tax change is on site values. 
15 Stumpage values for values of n < 50 were derived by multiplying the 
original stumpage values, shown in Table 1, by the ratio (for n = 50) 
of the new over the original stumpage values. For example, for the 
full-expensing income tax, the ratio is 1,333.43/8,754.31. 
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Table 2 
Imputed Site Values for Different Rotation Periods With 
Full Incidence of Tax Change on Timber Prices 
Full-expensing Realized 
Maturity income tax income tax 
period 
Stumpage Site Stumpage 
value value value 
years dollars 
1 4.95 < 0 5.92 
5 10.78 < 0 12.90 
10 22.01 < 0 26.33 
15 40.10 < 0 47.97 
20 69.24 1 82.83 
25 116.16 7 138.95 
35 313.42 19 374.93 
50 1,333.43 50 1,595.12 
Source: Calculations based on hypothetical example. 
V. CONCLUDING REYARKS 
Site 
value 
< 0 
< 0 
< 0 
< 0 
< 0 
< 0 
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The main thrust of this paper has been expository, and there are 
clearly a number of directions in which the perfectly competitive comparative-
statics model used here could be extended. Some care, therefore, should be 
exercised in drawing policy recommendations. In the real world we would 
expect, ceteris paribus ~ the before-tax rates of return to be lowest in those 
sectors most favorably treated under existing income tax legislation since it 
is the net-of-tax rate of return between sectors that competitive market 
forces will equate. In the absence of nontax market distortions, which are 
being corrected by a discriminatory tax policy, tax-induced divergences 
1 
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between before-tax rates of return represent an inefficient allocation of 
society's capital since overall returns could be increased by transferring 
capital from uses with low before-tax yields to those with high yields. 16 
Under current income tax legislation in both Australia and the United States, 
long-lived investments in land-intensive enterprises tend, in general, to be 
more lightly taxed than short-lived investments. And in forestry where the 
production cycle is typically extremely long, the effective income tax burden 
and also, we would expect, the before-tax rate of return are particularly 
low. Assuming there are no nontax market distortions, the efficiency goal of 
equal before-tax rates of return between sectors and uses of capital could be 
attained by simultaneously removing all tax subsidies, that is to say, by 
applying the accrued income tax uniformly over all sectors. 
Actual policy decisions on tax reform tend, however, to be made in a 
piecemeal fashion, and we know from Lipsey and Lancaster's theory (1956) of 
the second best that a change toward the conceptual ideal in one sector may 
worsen rather than improve efficiency if a "first best" situation does not 
exist elsewhere. It is important, therefore, that when tax reform is being 
considered for forestry, due cognizance be given to the prevailing tax treat-
ment of other agricultural activities which will commonly provide the best 
alternative use for resources currently employed in forestry. Incentives 
to shift resources to Pareto-inferior uses to minimize the tax will be com-
pletely removed only when the tax on each use of resources is equal to the 
tax on their best alternative use. 
16 Baumol (1968 and 1970) uses this line of reasoning within the context of 
selecting an appropriate social discount rate for evaluating public invest-
ments. This question is particularly pertinent to forestry because gov-
ernments tend to be large producers and compete with private enterprise 
in the production of wood fiber. The return from public investments is, 
of course, not taxed. Therefore, to achieve the "correct" balance between 
public and private investment in forestry, the appropriate discount rate 
for making public investment decisions is that which equals the before-
tax rate of return on the resources in their best alternative use. 
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APPENDIX 1 
I consider here the relationship and crucial differences between 
my approach to the problem and the approaches taken by Gaffney and by 
Thomson and Goldstein. l ? 
The whole focus of Gaffney's analysis is on the impact of various 
taxes on the rate of turnover of capital, that is to say, in the appreciat-
ing asset case, the impact of taxes on optimal maturity periods. His model 
assumes an initial situation in which the pretax internal rate of return is 
constant for the full continuum of feasible maturity periods. The bias on 
the optimal maturity period, induced by a particular tax, if any, is meas-
ured by the variation of the after-tax internal rate of return associated 
with differences in the length of the maturity period. Given the constant 
pre-tax internal rate of return, an increase in the after-tax internal 
rate of return, as the maturity period is lengthened, denotes a tax-induced 
bias toward longer maturity periods and vice versa. 
If I interpret the assumptions underlying Gaffney's approach to the 
problem correctly, his standard for comparing each of the after-tax sit-
uations is a tax-free economy. Each of the taxes is then, in turn, assumed 
to be imposed on all sectors of the economy. Moreover, it is implicitly 
assumed that forests grow on marginal land which has a zero site value and 
that product and factor prices within the forestry sector remain constant 
and are not influenced by the imposition of a tax. Ideally, of course, to 
compare a tax-free economy to an economy "with tax" would require the use 
I? The author is grateful to Mason Gaffney for allowing him to read some 
unpublished research work which has been helpful to the author in 
preparing the final version of the Appendix. After the present paper 
was completed Mason Gaffney also brought to the author's notice a good 
study by Sunley (1972) on Federal tax subsidies to the United States 
timber industry. While the present paper is concerned solely with 
alternative types of income taxes, it should be noted here that Gaffney 
and Thomson and Goldstein also analyze the case of a gr oss tax imposed 
on the value of the timber harvest. They conclude, and I consider 
correctly so, that a gross tax with no tax deductibility of planting 
costs causes a bias toward longer maturity periods. 
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of a complete macroeconomic model of budgetary incidence. 
Despite substantial differences in our approach to the problem, a 
comparison of the results given in Table 3 indicates that there is a broad 
area of agreement between Gaffney and myself with respect to the impact of 
various taxes on the optimal maturity period. Most importantly, we are in 
agreement that a uniformly applied accrued income tax will not distort 
investment decisions. We are also in agreement that a realized income tax 
induces a bias toward longer maturity periods. 
Table 3 
Effect of Taxes on Maturity Period 
Type of Thomson Chisholm Gaffney and Income Tax Goldstein a 
Accrued Neutral Neutral Not Neutral 
Full expensing Increase Neutral Neutral 
Realized Increase Increase Neutral 
a The full-expensing income tax is equivalent to Thomson and 
Goldstein's income tax which permits the compounded value of 
planting costs to be deducted from the income realized 
at harvest. The realized income tax corresponds to their 
net tax. 
Sources: Gaffney (1967 and 1970-71); Thomson and Goldstein 
(1971). 
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Our differing conclusions for a full-expensing income tax stem from 
Gaffney's use of an internal rate-of-return criterion and the fact tha t, 
when the impact of this tax on the forestry sector is being analyzed, it is 
assumed, at least implicitly, that the tax is imposed on all sectors of t he 
economy. Given this assumption, together with the implicit assumption that 
forests grow on marginal land with a zero site value, it then follows that, 
regardless of the nominal tax rate, the "effective"tax rate is zero in the 
sense that the pre- tax and after-tax internal rates of return are identical. 
I, on the other hand, explicitly assume that an accrued income tax 
is applied to other sectors when I analyze the impact of a full-expensing 
income tax on the forestry sector. In these circumstances, competitive mar-
ket forces will equate the net-of-tax rate of return in forestry with that 
in other sectors which have an accrued income tax. And the bias I obtain 
toward longer rotation periods stems from the use of this lower net-of-tax 
discount rate. 
The results given in Table 3 show that the conclusions reached by 
Thomson and Goldstein conflict sharply with my conclusions. These differ-
ences, I believe, can be traced to a crucial assumption contained in Thomson 
and Goldstein ' s analysis (1971, p.27) which they make no attempt to defend, 
namely, the before-tax and net-of-tax discount rates are identical . If it 
is accepted that the appropriate before-tax and net-of-tax discount rates 
to evaluate investments in forestry are those which measure the before-tax 
and net-of-tax rates of return on the best alternative use of the resources, 
there would appear to be two situations in which it could be argued that the 
use of a constant discount rate is justified. 
The first is one in which the particular tax under consideration is 
assumed to be imposed on the forestry sector onl y and is not imposed on other 
w 
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sectors which compete with forestry for resources. The second situation is 
one in which a tax is imposed uniformly on all sectors but is confined to a 
small tax jurisdiction (e.g., a regional or state tax) so that the net-of-tax 
supply price of capital is independent of any tax changes within the part-
icular jurisdiction. 
The first case is simply not relevant since a federal income tax 
which taxes the interest earned on capital is, in fact, imposed on other sec-
tors. The second situation is probably relevant for some state taxes in the 
United States, although, if this is the situation Thomson and Goldstein had 
in mind, they did not say so in their paper. If a state that is unable to 
influence the net-of-tax supply price of capital were to impose a full-
expensing income tax, it can be seen from equation (6) that all site values 
will be reduced proportionately by an amount equal to the rate of tax. All 
land in forestry before the tax will remain in production after the tax and, 
furthermore, the tax will not influence the choice of the optimal maturity 
period. A similar conclusion also holds for the imposition of a realized 
income tax except that it is now apparent from equation (7) that some imputed 
site values may become negative, and any such land will be taken out of 
production. The tax though does not affect the choice of the optimal maturity 
period. The results obtained by Thomson and Goldstein are thus quite valid 
for the above set of circumstances. As I interpret Gaffney, however, he is 
concerned with taxes imposed uniformly over a whole economy and not just a 
small tax jurisdiction within an economy. A substantial part of Thomson and 
Goldstein's criticism of Gaffney's work is, therefore, in my view, unjust-
ified; and I believe they have considerably underestimated Gaffney's contrib-
ution to this area of research. 
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APPENDIX 
Criteria for Detennining the Optimum 
Replacement Pattern 
ANTHONY H. CHISHOLM 
This article is an attempt to clarify some confusion that has been apparent 
in the literature of agricultural economics in recent years with respect to 
providing a criterion for determining the optimum replacement pattern 
for long-lived assets. In particular, for appreciating assets of the type rep-
resented by growing timber, the previous criteria have generally overlooked 
3n important item of marginal cost: namely, the interest on thc total rev-
enue obtainable from the sale of the asset. These criteria have hence pro-
vided a replacement pattern which is longer than the the optimum. 
I N AN ARTICLE which appeared in this journal, Faris [2] presented a criterion for determining the optimum duration of the production period 
for enterprises that are of a sequential nature. The Faris criterion was sub-
sequently criticized by Winder and Trant [5], who put forward two alterna-
tive criteria. However, in his reply [3] Faris maintained that Winder and 
Trant's criticism did not invalidate the general principle of optimum re-
placement as set forth in his initial paper. In my opinion this controversy 
was not satisfactorily resolved; it is my belief that both Faris in his original 
paper and Winder and Trant in their critical note overlooked an important 
component of the marginal cost of an increment of time. The aim of this 
note is to use the forestry example given by Faris [2, pp. 761-764] for the 
purpose of illustrating this point and helping to clarify the issue. The perti-
nent portion of the original data given by Faris and also some additional 
information based on this data are summarized in Table l. 
I make no claim to originality for the conclusions reached in this note, 
since they can be fairly simply derived from the classic Faustmann formula 
of forest economics. Gaffney [4] has published a very comprehensive study, 
based largely on Faustmann's approach, in which he critically reviews most 
of the techniques that have been proposed from time to time for determin-
ing the financial maturity of an asset. It is apparent from this controversy, 
however, that some confusion still exists with respect to defining marginal 
cost within the context of the forest-rotation type of replacement problem. 
The following definitions by Winder and Trant will be used in this note: 
n is the duration of a production period; 
v is the gross revenue per period; 
c is the variable cost per period;1 
1 Both c and f embody appropriately compounded interest charges that permit costs to be 
compared with revenues at the same point in time. 
ANTHONY H. CmsHoLM is a research fellow in the Faculty of Agricultural Eco-
nomics of the University of New England, Australia. 
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Table 1. Production costs and revenues per acre for timber production 
2 3 4 5 6 7' 8b 9 10 11 12 
Establish- Present Amortized Present Average Annual Marginal 
Age of ment Marginal Average value present value of annual increment Interest cost with 
trees Total and Net net net of net value of total net increment in total on total respect to 
(years) revenue running revenue revenue revenue revenue net revenue in total revenue as revenue time 
costs revenue revenue a percent 
of capital 
value iV.+C. 
(V.) (f+c) P MNR ANR PNV A PNV* eN tlV/V iVa +A* 
30 $174.00 $ 95.83 $ 78.17 $19.94 $ 2.61 $ 32.21 $1.64 $ 54.78 $33.60 9.82% $10.26 $16.52 
40 510.00 143.69 366.31 21.55 9.16 112.30 4.85 161.95 25.00 4.57 16.43 22.69 
43 585.00 16l. 03 423.97 18.05 9.86 118.94 4.96* 165.32 22.50 3.70 18.23 24.49 
45 630.00 173.48 456.52 15.68 10.14 120.72 4.92 164.12 21.00 3.28 19.22 25.48 
46 65l. 00 179.98 47l. 02 14.50 10.24 120.93 4.88 162.70 18.50 2.76 20.09 26.35 
48 688.00 193.58 494.42 1l.11 10 .30 119.65 4.74 157.85 16.50 2.34 2l.14 27.40 
50 721. 00 208.01 512.99 8.68 10.26 117.02 4.55 151.60 14 . 00 1.89 22.26 28.52 
53 763.00 231.32 531.68 5.00 10.03 110 .99 4 . 21 140.27 12.00 l.56 23.07 29.33 
54 775.00 239.56 535.44 3.76 9.92 108.52 4.08 136 . 11 
• The methods used for deriving columns 1-7 are given by Faris (2). 
PNV 
b The figures given in column 8 are derived from the formula PNV* = PNV + 
(1 +i)D-l 
::l. if- ~ - 5 _ iii - - _ I diE....§, !'; iif :=3 -~ 
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f is the fixed cost per period, and may be regarded as the cost of initiating a 
production period; 
P is the net payoff of each period, i.e., (v-c-f); 
i is the ruling market interest rate for outside borrowing and im'estmen t; 
r is the time-preference discount rate; 
A is the amortized present value of net revenue;2 
A * is the maximum amortized present value of net revenue; 
PNV is the present value of net revenue from a single production period;3 
and 
PNV* is the present value of net revenue from a perpeLual sequence of 
production periods. 
In terms of these definitions, the Faris criterion is 
(1) dP -- = A* max dn ) 
where do = 1. That is, according Lo Faris, "The optimum lime to )'eplace 
is when the marginal net revenue from the pre,<:ent enterprise is equal to 
the highest amortized present value of anticipated net revenues from the 
enterprise immediately following" [2, pp. 761-762]. Applying this cri-
terion to the data given in Table 1, Faris concluJes that the optimum time 
to cut the present stand of timber is at the end of the fifty-third year. 
Winder and Trant [5], in formulating their criteria, make a careful dis-
tinction between opportunity costs and time preference. They state that 
opportunity costs refer to alternalive income-earning possibilities, and that 
these costs are considered in both their criteria, whereas Lime-preference 
proper4 is preference for income in one time-period rather than another, 
and is considered only in the second criterion. 
Their no-time-preference-proper criterion is 
(2) dv 
p dc 
dn dn n 
That is, the aim should be to maximize profit per unit of time, which 
requires equating the marginal net rate of profit pel' unit of time to the 
average net rate of profit per unit of time. According to this criterion the 
optimum time to cut the present stand of timber is at the end of tbe fOl'ly-
eighth year. 
'The amortized present value A=P[i!(l+i)n-l] 
a For long-lived assets, such as forest rotations, continuous discounting is in many ways 
preferable to annual discounting; however, in order to conform with the notation used in the 
articles under discussion, an annual discounting procedure is adopted. 
• It should be noted that Faris used the term time preference to denote opportunity costs or 
alternative income-earning possibilities. It appears that Winder and Trant's definition of time 
preference corresponds to what Faris referred to as "discounting for risk and uncertainty." 
L 
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Winder and Trant's time-preference-proper criterion is 
(3) 
r 
A*=P-----(1 + r)n - 1 a max. 
According to this criterion the optimum time to cut the present stand of 
timber is at the end of the forty-third year. 
Winder and Trant conclude that, of the two criteria, the one maximizing 
net profit per unit of time in the absence of time-preference proper appears 
to be more imporLant than the one embodying time-preference proper 
[5, p. 950 J. They reach this conclusion because according to their definition 
time preference is simply preference for income in one time-period rather 
than another and as such is not related to opportunity costs (or alternative 
income-earning possibilities). 
We may begin with a general premise which appears to be fairly uni-
versally accepted, namely that the aim in replacement problems is to 
select the particular production period which over a specified planning 
horizon will yield the maximum net present value of future profits. From 
this deceptively simple criterion arises the real problem of correctly speci-
fying all the cost elements, both actual and opportunity. There appears to 
be complete agreement that the fixed and variable costs which are actually 
incurred should be compounded at an appropriate interest rate to permit 
comparison of costs and returns occurring at different points in time. The 
point that appears to have been overlooked by the previous authors is that 
not only does the money sunk in fixed and variable costs have an oppor-
tunity cost, but so also does the money tied up in the appreciating asset 
(i.e., the growing trees). This is perhaps best illustrated if we look at the 
total-revenue column in T able 1. It is apparent that if the 46-year-old 
stand were harvested immediately, $651.00 would be released for consump-
tion or for some other investment. Hence, if we assume a return of :3 per-
cent on outside investment, the stand should be left unharvested only so 
long as the value of its annual increment in growth is at least as high as that 
which could be obtained if the stand were cut and the money released. If 
the $651.00 were released, the annual interest at :3 percent would amount 
to $19.53. On the other hand, if the stand were left uncut, the average 
annual value of the growth increment6 between the forty-sixth and forty-
eighth year would be $18.50. Hence, on the grounds of the annual interest 
on the total revenue obtainable from the sale of the trees alone, it is un-
economic to leave the stand unharvested beyond the forty-sixth year. The 
Faris determination and the first criterion proposed by Winder and Trant 
would therefore appear to be invalid. 
6 An indication of the rate of return on the money tied up in the trees is given in column 10, 
where the annual increment in total revenue is expressed as a percentage of the capital value 
of the trees. 
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It is suggested that the following criteria, or any modified form thereof, 
provide the optimum duration of a production period. First, it should be 
stressed that these criteria incorporate the following elements of marginal 
cost with respect to time: (a) the annual running cost ($1.30 in Faris's 
example), (b) the interest on the total revenue obtainable from sale of the 
asset, and (c) the amortized value of net returns from the following rota-
tion. 
The net-present-value criterion provides the solution to the problem if the 
aim is to select Lhe production period which maximizes the net present value 
for a perpetual sequence of production periods, and not, as has sometimes 
been advocated, to choose the single production period having the maxi-
mum net present value. Assuming a time horizon of t production periods, 
we may express this criterion as 
(4) PNV* = PI + P2 , ••• , + P t (1 + i)n (1 + i)21l (1 + i)tn a max. 
For a perpetual sequence of production periods, this equation may be 
expressed as 
(5) PNV PNV* = PNV + -=-----~ [(1 + i)n - 1] a max. 
From Table 1, column 8, it can be seen that a perpetual sequence of rota-
tions, each 43 years long, provides a maximum net present value6 of 
$165.32. The maximum net present value for a single production period 
($120.93) occurs at the end of the forty-sixth year. 
Where Ph P 2, ••• P t are equal, as assumed in this example, the preced-
ing criterion can be redefined as follows: 
(6) A* = P-----(1 + i)n - 1 a max. 
This is equivalent to the time-preference-proper criterion given by Winder 
and Trant. However, I consider that this formula emobdies, not time-pref-
erence proper, as defined by Winder and Trant, but rather all the relevant 
opportunity costs of the resources tied up in the production process. 
There are a number of closely related criteria which illustrate the relevant 
opportunity costs of continuing the present production period. For example, 
if we adopt a marginal-revenue-equals-marginal-cost (with respect to time) 
criterion, the equation is 
(7) 
8 Clearly, ma."{imizing the net present value will provide the same optimum-length produc-
tion period as maximizing the cumulative profit at some terminal point, providing that the 
interest earned on the "throw-off" at the end of each production period is taken into account. 
t 
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where V n is total revenue from sale of the timber at age n (column 1, 
Table 1) and en is the annual running cost at age n ($1.30 in the example). 
A comparison of columns 9 and 12 in Table 1 on the basis of this criterion 
indicates that the optimum length of the rotation is 43 years. Equation (7) 
is only approximate and is more precisely given as a double inequality:7 
(8) Vn+1 - Vn - Cn - iVn ~ A* ~ Vn - Vn- 1 - en - 1 - iVn - l . 
Faris's contribution in providing a statement of a dynamic criterion for 
replacement should not be overlooked. Apparently his error stemmed from 
his definition of marginal net revenue. His verbal statement is, however, 
valid when marginal net revenue is defined correctly as t.V -iV n -cn. 
7 I gratefully acknowledge the referees' comments on this note and in particular their 
bringing to my attention a paper written subsequently to this note, giving the form of the 
double inequality of equation (8). See Burt [1, esp. p. 832]. 
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A comparison is made of a number of income averaging proccdurcs on 
the basis of selected perfomlance criteria. The main conclusion which 
emerges is that the Australian income averaging procedure, curreutly 
applied to primary producers, has a number of defects. Several of the 
alternative income averaging procedures reviewed are jndged to be 
superior to the current Australian system. 
It is well known that the interaction of an annual tax accounting period 
and a fixed progressive rate scale causes taxpayers with unstable annual 
incomes to pay more taxes over a span of years than those receiving 
the same total income in equal annual amounts. This fact has significant 
implications with respect to both equity and resource allocation, and has 
led to a number of proposals for supplementing the automatic averaging 
period of one year by some procedure for inter-period averaging [12, 
14]. In Australia, due to the particular instability of income derived 
from primary production, primary producers may use a five-year moving 
average income to detennine the rate of tax applicable to their current 
year's income [3]. This paper aims to compare this averaging system 
with a number of alternative procedures. 
The main focus of the paper is on income averaging for primary 
producers. It is clearly inequitable, however, to discriminate between 
unstable incomes according to their source. Primary producers do not 
have a monopoly on earning unstable incomes, viz. authors, entertainers, 
Miss Worlds, etc. Some consideration is therefore given to certain aggre-
gative effects of particular income averaging procedures, which would 
arise if they were applied to all taxpayers with unstable incomes. 
The need for some system of averaging for unstable incomes can 
be argued both on the grounds of equity and resource allocation. Whilst 
the most widely accepted notions of equity, as embodied in the ability-
to-pay concept, do not point unambiguously to an ideal time period 
for measuring income, most writers agree that mere irregularity of the 
income flow is unlikely to increase an individual's ability to pay tax. 
A related equity problem arises if the rates of income tax are changed 
from time to time, as part of a government's stabilization policy. Com-
pared with a taxpayer with a stable annual income, a taxpayer whose 
income fluctuates directly with tax rate changes pays more tax, while one 
whose income fluctuates inversely with rate changes pays less tax. 
A somewhat distinct group of problems arises from the fact that, in 
practice, the partitioning of a flow of income into separate annual 
periods is achieved by the use of a number of essentially arbitrary rules 
* This paper reports on an aspect of a research project which has been 
partly financed by the Rural Credits Development Fund of the Reserve Bank. 
The author would like to thank his colleagues for their comments and sug-
gestions. 
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for determining when income from appreciating and depreciating assets 
is realized. This creates opportunities for taxpayers to influence the 
timing of their tax payments, by adjusting the date at which income is 
realized. For instance, a taxpayer may seek to reduce his tax burden 
by adopting a system of do-it-yourself averaging. Alternatively, if the 
scale of tax rates is changed in accordance with economic conditions, 
a taxpayer may speculate on these changes by realizing a higher taxable 
in come in years when rates have been reduced, and conversely. Finally, 
the assessment of income tax on realized income, rather than accrued 
income, provides an incentive for taxpayers to postpone the realization 
of income from appreciating assets, and thus their tax liability, thereby 
effectively obtaining the use of an interest free loan.1 
The opportunities that taxpayers will have for influencing the timing 
of their tax burden are greatest when the income tax base includes 
realized income from all appreciating and depreciating assets. However, 
the present Australian income tax, which is commonly thought of as 
excluding most capital gains, still provides opportunities for shifting the 
realization of income. 2 The reduction in the tax burden achieved by 
shifting income over time is inequitable, as it favours taxpayers who 
are in a position to manipulate the timing of their taxable income. 
The equity arguments in favour of some system of income averaging 
are reinforced by the potential distortion in the allocation of resources. 
Without some averaging procedure, investments yielding an unstable 
income flow are discriminated against. The optimum pre-tax farm 
enterprise combination, or farm development plan, will thus not neces-
sarily be the post-tax optimum. Quite apart from the direct distortion 
of resource allocation, there is likely to be a misallocation of effort, 
as attempts are made to incorporate this aspect of taxation into decision 
making. 
Criteria for Comparing Income A veraging Procedures 
A necessary prerequisite for a comparison of alternative income 
averaging procedures is the specification of the desirable characteristics 
1 From a theoretical viewpoint, the most interesting proposal for income 
averaging has been made by Vickrey [13]. The proposal is for a cumulative income 
averaging scheme, and is based on the presumption that the correct base for an 
income tax is accrued income, including all capital gains and losses, and that 
the relevant period for averaging is the lifetime of the taxpayer. The primary 
objective of the scheme is to eliminate the incentive to realIocate income among 
years, and in particular, the postponement of the realization of capital gains. The 
scheme involves a fairly complicated procedure of interest rate adjustments 
aimed at causing taxpayers with equal earning resources to report the same 
total income, and pay the same discounted value of tax payments, regardless of 
the time that income is realized for tax purposes. From an administrative view-
point the procedure has several major defects. Partly for this reason, and also 
because there is no indication that a complete capital gains tax will be introduced 
in Australia in the foreseeable future, Vickrey's proposal is rejected as a practical 
alternative to the more rudimentary 'short-period' averaging procedures discussed 
in this paper. None of these procedures reduce the incentive to postpone the 
realization of capital gains. 
2 For instance, a farmer has some degree of flexibility in timing the realization 
of income from appreciating assets in the form of livestock, or a farm forest. 
Even for products with a production cycle of less than one year, income may 
be shifted between accounting periods when the normal sale date coincides 
with the end of a financial year. Similarly, farmers may alter their timing of tax 
payments by adjusting maintenance expenditure on depreciating assets such as 
fences and farm buildings. 
C2 
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of an averaging system, The following criteria have been adopted as a 
basis for comparing the relative performance of alternative income 
averaging procedures. 
(i) The total tax payment for an unstable annual income should be 
approximately equal to that for a stable income of the same 
average magnitude. 
(ii) Annual tax payments should be responsive to current income 
without lag. In particular, any given annual tax payment should 
not exceed the tax that would have been due under a simple 
annual progressive tax. 
(iii) Tax revenue should be responsive to modification of the rates 
without lag. 
(iv) There should be no benefit to be gained from shifting income be-
tween years in response to actual, or expected, modification of 
the rates. 
(v) The averaging procedure should not impose an unreasonable 
administrative burden, or lead to difficulty of taxpayer compliance. 
The above requirements need some elaboration. First, most writers 
on the topic agree that, from an equity viewpoint, some kind of averaging 
is required for unstable incomes because the annual accounting period 
is too short a period on which to base tax progession. 3 There is also 
reasonable consensus that period equity should be the primary objective 
of income averaging, and that the period for measuring income should 
be related to the economic horizon of the taxpayer. Results from em-
pirical work aimed at determining the economic horizon of individuals 
vary. Some work seems to indicate that the economic horizon of the 
consumer with respect to adjusting their actual consumption and savings 
patterns to changes in income are of the order of three to seven years. 
On the other hand, other work suggests that savings and consumption 
patterns are related to the sum of current and expected discounted 
earnings over a lifetime. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that 
proposals for income averaging fall into one of two distinct groups; 
lifetime averaging, and averaging over a period of three to seven years. 
In the present paper the comparison has been confined to 'short-period' 
averaging procedures. Even if averaging should ideally be over a tax-
payer's lifetime, it seems to the writer that administrative considerations, 
particularly the problem of inflation, would make it difficult to adopt 
a period of greater than, say, seven years. 
Second, compared with an annual progressive tax, some averaging 
procedures have the undesirable characteristic of substantially reducing 
the tax burden in high income years whilst increasing it in low income 
3 It is interesting to note that under a regressive income tax scale smaller 
tax payments would be made for a varying annual income than for a stable 
income of the same total size. Only under a proportional income tax does the 
way in which income is distributed over time, and thus the period over which it 
is measured, become unimportant. It should also be pointed out that most writers 
do not distinguish between different forms of unstable income. Goode [6], 
however, asserts that the case for averaging is strongest with respect to income 
received in one year for effort extending over several years, and for cyclical 
fluctuations. He argues that on equity grounds the case is weak with respect to 
movements from one normal income level to another, and for sllstained upward or 
downward trends in income. No attempt has been made in this paper to distinguish 
between different forms of unstable income. 
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years. This reduces the counter-cyclical flexibility of an annual pro-
gressive tax, and imposes hardship on the taxpayer in years of low 
income. The fact that added taxes may be paid in some years, and 
substantially lowered taxes in other years, also creates problems when 
taxpayers are leaving or entering the tax jurisdiction. Ideally the pro-
portional reduction in tax payments in low income years, resulting from 
averaging, should be at least as great as those in high income years. 
Third, in recent years modification of the tax rates has, in a number 
of countries, become an important counter-cyclical device. In Australia 
the schedule of rates of income tax was unchanged over the period 
1954-70. However, over the past decade a system of rebates and levies, 
expressed as a percentage of income tax, has been developed. Applying 
or removing this levy, or rebate, has generally been regarded as one 
of the most successful recent innovations in the development of counter-
cyclical taxation policy in Australia. The ability of an averaging system 
equitably to allow a rapid and predictable response to tax rate adjust-
ments is thus important, particularly if income averaging were to be 
extended to all taxpayers . 
Fourth, speculative shifting of income in response to modification of 
the rates is clearly inequitable. 4 Moreover, it makes it more difficult for 
a government to predict the impact of rate changes . 
Fifth, apart from computational simplicity, the administrative burden 
will be reduced if averaging is optional, and there is some simple 
eligibility rule in terms of some minimum tax saving and/ or income 
fluctuation. A defect of optional averaging is that it can sometimes 
interact with rate changes to unduly favour a taxpayer. For instance, 
a taxpayer may withdraw from averaging in a year of low income which 
coincides with the imposition of a tax levy, and re-enter the following 
year. Any inequities that this introduces would need to be balanced 
against the lighter administrative burden of optional averaging, as com-
pared with compulsory averaging. 
A lternative Income A veraging Procedures 
Income averaging procedures may be based on the historic income 
of the taxpayer, his expected future income, or both. The former are 
more numerous and may be grouped into three broad classes; the block 
average, the moving average, and the cumulative average. 5 Income ad-
justment accounts (IAA) provide the main system of forward averaging. 
In addition to these averaging procedures there is a partial averaging 
device in the form of carry-over of negative net taxable incomes. This 
is aimed at reducing the penalties imposed on income fluctuations 
immediately above and below zero net taxable income. It is these fluctua-
tions that face the steepest rise in progressive rates and thus incur the 
4 The benefit to be gained by a taxpayer on a high marginal tax rate from 
successfully speCUlating on tax rate cbanges is greater than may be anticipated. 
For instance, the postponement of realization of income for one year in order 
to obtain a 5 per cent tax rebate, provides a taxpayer having a 60 per cent 
marginal tax rate, with a post-tax yield of 7·5 per cent. To achieve a post-tax 
yield of 7·5 per cent on an ordinary taxed investment, tbis taxpayer would require 
an investment with a pre-tax yield of approximately 19 per cent. 
5 The block average is sometimes called a simple average and the cumulative 
average a progressive average. 
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greatest tax penalty. It is considered that all averaging procedures should 
allow the carryover of negative taxable incomes. 
The performance of each averaging procedure has been tested by 
applying it to a range of hypothetical, and actual, income series data. 
For purposes of illustration, the application of the various averaging 
procedures to the estimated averagc taxable income of sheep farms in 
the High Rainfall Zone of New South Wales, over the fifteen year period 
1952-53 to 1966-67, are given in Table 1.6 The averaging procedures 
are now considered with respect to each of the proposed desirable 
attributes of an averaging system given earlier. An attempt has been 
made to summarize the main results in Table 2. For each criterion, the 
performance of each averaging procedure has simply been classified as 
good, fair, or poor. There is, of course, an inevitable subjective element 
in making such a simple and explicit classification, and Table 2 should 
be interpreted in conjunction with the discussion on the various averaging 
procedures. 
The Block Average 
The block average is conceptually the simplest form of averaging. 
Taxes are paid annually upon each year's income in the usual way. 
At the end of the averaging period, the total income for the averaging 
period is determined and pro-rated equally over the period. The tax 
of each year is then recomputed, at the rates applicable in each year, 
and these taxes are totalled. This total is then subtracted from the total 
tax actually paid in respect of the averaging period and the difference 
assessed against, or refunded to, the taxpayer. Normally the taxpayers 
will receive a refund. With changing tax rates, however, it is possible for 
a taxpayer realizing a high income in low rate years, and vice versa, to 
pay less tax than a taxpayer with a stable income. The block of years 
to be averaged does not over-lap, thus each year enters the averaging 
computation only once. 
A number of writers on this topic have proposed that taxpayers should 
be able to block average their incomes [2, 4]. It was usually argued that, 
to reduce the administrative burden, qualifying restrictions based on 
attaining a specified minimum income fluctuation, and/or minimum 
tax saving, should be imposed. In the case of the proposal made by 
Downing, et al. [4], averaging is restricted to taxpayers whose income 
in a given year is 20 per cent, or more, below his average income over 
the past five years. 
Under a block averaging procedure the condition of period equity is 
completely fulfilled, irrespective of whether annual income fluctuates 
around a stable mean, or is characterized by a sustained upward or 
6 The net farm income data was obtained from The Australian Sheep Industry 
Survey (1962-67) published by the B.A.E. [1], and by private communication 
with the B.A.E. A sum of $2,000 covering all tax deductible items for a married 
man with two children, including life insurance and interest on farm debt, has 
been deducted from the net farm income figures to provide an approximation to 
taxable farm income. It should be stressed tha t thcse figures are presented for 
purposes of illustration only. The average variability of the individual farm 
net incomes would bc greater than the variability of the average net farm income. 
However, this does not necessarily apply to taxable incomes because farmers tend to 
adopt a do-it-yourself averaging system by incurring, for instance, high repairs 
and maintenance expenditures in high income years and conversely. 
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Income ...... 
Five- Five- Five-Year Movi ng Averages N.Z. Depos- Seven \0 
-...l 
Taxable Annual Year Downing's Year Income ited in Year ...... 
Year Income Progres- Block Block Cumu- Adjust- Income Block 
sive Average Average lative ment Adj ust- Average 
TaxCn ) Average Type I Type II Type III Type In * Type IV Account ment 
Account 
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ 
1 6,192 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,005 1,548 1,626 
2 4,446 933 933 933 904 1,265 933 922 922 933 576 1,056 933 
3 2,224 267 267 267 95 875 267 126 126 267 312 -198 267 
4 2,970 454 454 454 404 757 407 432 432 454 454 0 454 
5 6,572 1,791 1,449 1,791 1,700 946 1,250 1,705 1,705 1,449 1,112 1,643 1,791 
6 1,072 64 64 -165 64 596 174 - 128 -192 -1,211 312 -1,350 64 
7 1,086 66 66 66 66 403 157 -25 -69 -33 336 -1,433 -851 Z 8 3,010 466 466 466 363 447 457 466 465 484 466 0 466 (") 
9 1,8 16 181 181 181 181 385 258 159 159 145 336 -703 181 0 
10 1,956 209 103 209 206 176 193 206 195 405 336 -563 209 ~ 
tTl 
11 3,766 694 694 694 694 290 470 609 675 450 576 376 694 ..., 
12 9,660 3,307 3,307 3,307 3,014 787 1,880 2,826 2,825 2,449 2,094 2,415 3,307 ;,. 
13 1,739 167 167 167 -223 701 322 27 27 57 280 -544 167 X 
14 35 0 0 -1,064 -663 588 0 -442 -361 -419 280 -2,247 -1,512 
15 4,312 885 -473 885 873 739 817 874 856 1,158 885 0 885 
Total Tax 
Payments 11,110 9,304 9,817 9,304 10,581 9,211 9,383 9,301 9,304 9,360 8,681 
(b) 19 ·4 0 5 · 5 0 13·7 -1 ·8 ·9 0 
(7- 37) ( -14-8) (-16--128) (- 6-41) (-23- 5) (- 37- 9) 
(c) 28·0 7 ·2 13 ·1 7 ·2 21 ·9 6 · 1 8·1 8·2 7·2 0 
(21-34) (1-13) (10- 16) (1-13) (-6-51) (0- 12) (7- 9) (6-10) (7-8) 
Notes 
(a) The tax calculations are based on the schedule of rates operating five-year block period exceeds that payable on a constant income 
for the financial year ending June, 1970. within the block period. For instance, with the Type I moving 
(b) The unbracketed figure in each column is the percentage additional average, the tax paid over the third five year period is 16 per cent 
,J:>. tax for the fifteen-year period, compared with the tax payable if less than for a constant income, whilst it is 128 per cent greater for 
annual income was constant within each of the five-year block the second five-year period. 
...... 
periods. The bracketed figures are the minimum and maximum (c) As for (b), except it is assumed that income should be measured 
percentage amounts, respectively, by which the tax paid for a over block periods of seven years. 
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Relative Performance of Alternative Income Averaging Procedures :> Z 
Five- Five-
Annual Year Downing's Year 
Performancc Criteria Progressive Block Block Cumu-
Tax Average Average Iative 
Average 
Fluctuating annual income Poor Good Fair Good 
Sustained upward income trend Poor Good Poor Good 
Sustained downward income trend Poor Good Fair Good 
Response to current income Good Fair Fair Good 
Response to modification of rates Good Fair Fair Good 
Inequities and specu lation arising from 
rate modifications Poor Good Fair Good 
Administrative burden Good Fair Good Fair 
F ;;'*il~_~i-_,i :; g-%-ff ij,7 Ii;-E !fie ~2- ::-~.:. f! ~ ~ E I-!:!i k 
Moving Averages 
Type I Type II Type 111 Type 111* 
Poor Fair Good Good 
Fair Good Fair Fair 
Poor Poor Good Good 
Poor Poor Good Good 
Poor Poor Good Good 
Poor Poor Good Good 
Fair Fair Fair Good 
Type IV 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Fair 
Fair 
Fair 
Fair 
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downward trend. The response of the payments to current income is the 
same as for an annual progressive tax, except that the taxpayer receives 
a refund every fifth year. From the taxpayer's viewpoint the lumpy 
nature of the tax rebates, and the relatively long waiting period before 
they are received, is undesirable. The latter defect could be met by 
adding an interest adjustment factor to the refund. 
Staggered entry would probably be required if all, or a large propor-
tion, of taxpayers were permitted to block average their incomes. If all 
taxpayers began block averaging at the same point in time, tax refunds 
would be bunched and would introduce an element of inflation in the 
years in which they were paid. Over time, however, as new taxpayers 
entered the jurisdiction and old ones left, the bunching problem would 
be reduced. With an established block averaging system, in which the 
bunching problem had been overcome, tax revenues would be responsive 
to modifications of the rates without lag. Moreover, there would no 
longer be any benefit to be gained from shifting income in response to 
modification of the rates. The administrative burden would be reasonable. 
For each taxpayer a record would need to be kept of the year in 
which his current block average began, the cumulative taxable income, 
the cumulative tax paid, and the tax rates ruling for each year of the 
averaging period. 
The Cumulative Average 
Under a cumulative averaging system the total sum of taxes paid 
over the averaging period equals the total taxes that would have been 
paid had the cumulative average income been received in equal annual 
amounts. The tax due in the current year is determined by mUltiplying 
the cumulative average income by the tax rate applicable in each year 
of the averaging period, summing these figures, and subtracting from this 
amount the total taxes already paid. Unlike the block average, the 
income of a particular year enters into the average repeatedly. Unlike 
the moving average, the most remote year in last year's average is not 
dropped from the current year's computation. 
A cumulative averaging procedure is particularly appropriate for 
long averaging periods, and it is this procedure which is usually recom-
mended by advocates of lifetime averaging. For equal averaging periods, 
a cumulative average gives similar results to a block average. The main 
difference being that an adjustment is made every year to the tax payable 
under the cumulative average, and not simply a lump sum adjustment at 
the end of the period. The present value of tax rebates to the taxpayer 
is thus greater. 
The tax payment is particularly responsive to current income. The 
tax payment in any year will not exceed the tax that would have been 
due with no averaging. The change in tax revenue resulting from modifi-
cation of the rates, in the form of a constant percentage rebate or levy, 
will be low in years of high income and high in years of low income, 
as compared with no averaging. This is due to the percentage rebate, 
or levy, being imposed on the cumulative average income rather than 
the current year's income. Providing this is realized by the government, 
the tax rate can be adjusted accordingly. Too, a cumulative average 
substantially reduces the incentive to speculate on rate modifications, 
44 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS APRIL 
as these are based on the cumulative average income which will usually 
respond only slightly to changes in current income. The only information 
that would be required to be carried forward from the preceding year 
would be the cumulative income and the cumulative taxes paid. With 
rate modifications it would also be necessary to keep a record of the 
tax rates applying in each year. 
Moving Averages 
There are a number of types of moving averaging procedures. Their 
common feature is that they all utilize a moving income base. 
Type I 
The Type I moving average computes the tax payable each year on 
the basis of the average income for the current year and the prcceding 
years of the averaging period. That is, tax on the income for the first year 
of the averaging period would be paid. The tax for the second year would 
be based on the average taxable income for the two years and so on. 
This procedure would be continued for the period of time established 
as the averaging period whereupon the first year would bc dropped and 
the current year added. The procedure was introduced in the State of 
Wisconsin in the late 1920s, but due to a number of serious defects 
is now only of historic interest. Thc most notable defects are that it 
can result in very high tax payments being due in low income years, 
and that the tax paid over the averaging period may differ substantially 
from the tax paid on a stable income of the same total size. 
Type II 
This is the averaging procedure currently applied to primary pro-
ducers in Australia. The moving average income is used to determine 
the effective rate at which current income is taxed. The effective tax 
rate is derived by dividing the average income for the five year averaging 
period into the tax payable on the average income. The tax due in the 
current year is computed by multiplying the current year's income by 
the cffective tax rate. Under the present Australian system the full 
benefits of averaging apply only to primary producers whose current 
taxable income and average income over the five year period are both 
less than $16,000. Averaging is optional. However, under the present 
law once a primary producer has elected to average and then subse-
quently withdrawn from the scheme, he cannot elect to re-enter. 
Averaging can only commence when a taxpayer's taxable income of one 
year is equal to, or greater than, the taxable income of the previous year. 
That previous year then becomes the first year of the moving average. 
Primary producers are also currently permitted to carry forward negative 
taxable incomes for an indefinite period and then write them off against 
future income. 
The Type II moving average fulfils the requirement of period equity 
reasonably well when differences between the average income of suc-
cessive five year block periods are small. When there are significant 
differences between the average income of successive five year block 
p~riods, the total tax paid on the fluctuating income, over each period, 
WIll not be equal to the tax on a steady income of equal size. For income 
streams characterized by a downward trend, the total tax paid will 
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always exceed both the tax payable on a constant income of the same 
average magnitude, and the tax that would have been payable with no 
averaging . 
For an upward trending income, the total tax payments under the 
Type II moving average will never exceed those which would have been 
paid with no averaging. The total tax payments may be less, or greater 
than, the total tax payable on a stable income. In contrast to the situa-
tion with a downward trending income, the effective tax rate applied 
to the current year's income will always be less than the annual pro-
gressive tax rate. The tax penalty imposed on upward trending incomes 
will thus always be reduced. Usually the total tax payment will still 
be greater than that on a stable income. It is feasible, however, 
when income rises rapidly from a zero or low level that the tax penalty 
will be overcompensated for. Other weaknesses inherent in this averaging 
system derive from a common cause, namely the undue lag in the re-
sponsiveness of current tax payments to changes in income. This causes 
the tax payments in low income years to be greater than they would have 
been in the absence of averaging, thus impairing the built-in flexibility 
of the annual progressive tax, and accentuating the hardship facing 
individual taxpayers in these years. Conversely, in high income years 
the tax payments will usually be considerably lower than with no 
averaging. 
When rate modifications are in the form of rebates or levies based 
on a constant percentage of annual tax payments, as is currently the 
situation in Australia, the lag between current tax payments and changes 
in income will also cause a lag in the responsiveness of tax revenue to 
rate changes .. Moreover, the inequities arising from changing tax rates 
and fluctuating incomes, and the benefits attained from shifting income 
between years, are only slightly reduced under this averaging procedure. 
The administrative burden is slightly greater than for the block average. 
Type III 
With a Type III moving average the current tax payment is derived 
from two components. The first component is the simple moving average, 
that is, the tax payable on the moving average income at the current 
rate. The second component involves an adjustment factor. This is 
determined by multiplying the marginal tax rate on the moving average 
income by the difference between it and the current year's income. If 
the current year's income exceeds the moving average income the adjust-
ment factor will be positive, and is added to the first component to 
derive the current tax payment. Conversely, when the current year's 
income is less than the moving average income, the adjustment factor 
is subtracted from the first component. 
The Type III moving average fulfils the requirement of period equity 
at least as well as the Type II moving average when differences between 
the average income of successive five year block periods are small. 
This is due to the moving average income fluctuating only slightly in 
response to changes in current income. The marginal tax rate will, 
therefore, be fairly stable. Its application to deviations from the moving 
average income results in positive deviations being taxed at approximately 
the same rate as is used for computing the tax adjustments for negative 
deviations. Where a five year period with a low average income follows 
a high average income period, the total tax paid in the low income 
46 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS APRIL JI 
period will usually be equal to, or less than, that paid on a stable 
income. This is in contrast to the undesirable feature of the Type II 
moving average, whereby the total tax paid in a low income period 
will usually be significantly greater than what would have been paid 
with no averaging. 7 
With trend incomes the results are the converse of those for the 
Type II moving average. For downward trends in annual income the 
total tax payments will be substantially less than with no averaging, but 
usually not less than the tax on a stable income of the same total size. 
The total tax payable on an upward trending income, whilst always 
less than with no averaging, will be greater than that for a constant 
income of the same average magnitude. 
The Type III moving average maintains the built-in flexibility of the 
annual progressive tax to a significantly greater extent than does the 
Type II moving average. Generally the Type III moving average will 
result in a proportionately larger decrease in tax payments in low 
income years than in high income years. With an unchanging rate scale 
the tax payment in any year will never exceed the tax that would have 
been payable with no averaging. With a changing rate scale the current 
tax payment may exceed that payable with no averaging if a low 
income year, following several high income years, coincides with a 
substantial increase in the rate scale. In general, however, when the 
current year's income is significantly below the moving average income, 
the tax payment for that year will be substantially below the tax payable 
with no averaging. This is in direct contrast to the Type II moving 
average. 
The inequities, and incentive to shift income, arising from the inter-
action between changes in the rate scale and a fluctuating income stream, 
can be largely overcome by applying the fluctuating component of the 
tax rate to the moving average income, rather than to the current in-
come. The incentive to shift income to years in which the tax scale 
was expected to be lowered would be significantly reduced, since such 
income shifts would have a comparatively small effect on the moving 
average income. To achieve the same adjustment in tax revenue from the 
rate modification, it would be necessary to impose a higher levy in high 
income years and provide a lower rebate in low income years, compared 
with the situation where the fluctuating component of the tax rate is 
applied to the current year's income. The administrative burden is 
comparable with the Type II moving average. 
Type 1Il* 
The administrative burden of the Type III moving average could be 
substantially reduced by using a weighted moving average income. [8, p. 
352-3]. This could be based on a system of weights which gradually 
decreases the influence of old income. For instance, the income for 
each year could be given a weight which is a constant proportion of' 
the weight assigned to the income of the succeeding year. Eacht 
weight may, for example, be four-fifths of the weight attached to the: 
income of the succeeding year. Under this system the older incomes: 
.7 For instance, over the low income years 6-10 given in Table 1, the total tax p~idl 
Wlth no averaging is $986, whilst $1,239 tax is paid under a Type II mOVln~ 
average. 
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have a continuously decreasing influence on the average income 
until their effect is negligible. The weighting coefficient, which is 
the ratio between successive weights, can probably most easily be 
determined by deciding what percentage of the total weight should 
be attached to income of, say, the preceding five years. A weighting 
coefficient of between 0·70 and 0·80 gives results which approximate 
reasonably closely those obtained with the Type III moving average. 
In Table 3 the weights for a weighting coefficient of 0'70, 0·75 
and 0·80 are given. A weighting coefficient of 0·75 has been used for 
the net income data for the N.S.W. High Rainfall Zone. This system 
of weighting simplifies the calculation of the average income and 
minimizes the data which need to be carried forward. Once the weighted 
average has been calculated it contains all the relevant past income 
data and is the only infonnation which needs to be carried forward. 
TABLE 3 
Averaging Weights for Various Weighting Coefficients 
Weights by Years 
Weight for income of present year, t 
Weight for income of year L, 
Weight for income of year t_, 
Weight for income of year L , 
Weight for income of year L, 
Total weight for the income of the 
most recent five years 
Type IV 
Weighting Coefficients 
w=0·70 w=O·75 w = 0·80 
0·300 0·250 0 ·200 
0·210 0·188 0·160 
0·147 0·141 0 · 128 
0·103 0·105 0 · 103 
0 ·072 0·079 0082 
0 ·832 0763 0673 
This averaging procedure combines a moving income base with the 
block averaging procedure. Annual tax payments are calculated in each 
year according to the block average procedure, but the income base is 
now a moving average. With respect to period equity, the results are 
identical to those obtained with block averaging and cumulative averag-
ing. Unlike the block average, whereby tax relief is received in a lump 
sum at the end of each block period, the Type IV moving average 
provides annual tax adjustments. This procedure, however, has the un-
desirable characteristic of causing tax payments in some years to be 
significantly greater than they would be in the absence of averaging. 
The cumulative average appears to give results which are at least as 
good in some respects, and better than the Type IV procedure in all 
other respects. 
Income Adjustment Accounts 
The foregoing averaging devices have all used the income history of 
the taxpayer to determine his current tax liability. Income adjustment 
accounts (IAA) allow a taxpayer to take into account his prospective 
income in the determination of his current tax liability, It permits a 
taxpayer to allocate part of his current income to a non-interest-bearing 
government account. The deposit is deductible from the tax assessable 
income of the year for which the deposit is made, and is added to the 
taxable income in the tax year in which it is withdrawn. An IAA may 
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currently be used by primary producers in New Zealand [11, p. 293], 
and was also proposed by the Canadian Royal Commission as a com-
plement to the block average [2, 9]. The Canadian Royal Commission 
saw an IAA as a supplement to averaging devices based on historic 
income. An IAA would be inadequate as the only form of relief because 
it does not provide any benefit to taxpayers who are experiencing steady 
increases in income, or to those who suffcr unexpected declines in in-
come. Use of an IAA would thus be made mainly by taxpayers who 
received large lump sum receipts, and by taxpayers who could foresee 
sharp drops in their income in future years. IAA would be particularly 
relevant then when the income tax base included realized capital gains 
and losses, and to people with very peaked earnings. 
If farmers could accurately predict their future income stream, the 
post-tax income stream with an IAA would be more stable than with any 
other form of averaging. This is because an IAA is the only averaging 
procedure which involves the actual transfer of income from periods 
of high to periods of depressed income. Part of the reason for intro-
ducing IAA would appear to be to stimulate saving in high income 
years. Tllis, for example, is a clear aim of the Commonwealth Drought 
Bond scheme introduced in Australia in 1969. This is a form of IAA 
which has very restrictive eligibility rules, and is confined to primary 
producers who derive the bulk of their income from grazing sheep and 
cattle.8 
Farmers will not usually be in a position to predict their future 
income stream with the accuracy required to use the IAA successfully 
as the only form of income averaging. Moreover, there is an opportunity 
cost of the interest forgone on the deposits in an IAA which is not 
incurred with the other averaging devices. The main argument against 
the payment of any interest, even at a nominal rate, is that it would 
provide an IAA with an unfair advantage over banks and sinlilar 
institutions.9 
It would be possible to speculate on rate modifications with an IAA. 
For instance, if a taxpayer predicted a reduction in next year's rates 
he could deposit a large sum at the end of the current financial year 
and withdraw it at the beginning of the following financial year. Such 
speculation could largely be overcome by stating that deposits cannot 
be withdrawn within twelve months of when they are made. The ad-
ministrative burden would be reasonably light as neither the government, 
nor the taxpayer, would need to keep extensive records of the taxpayer's 
previous returns. 
Concluding Comments 
In the judgement of most writers on the topic, the primary function 
of income averaging should be to attain period equity. That is, over 
s. An anaysis of the likely effects of the Commonwealth Drought Bond Scheme 
has been presented by Glau [5]. 
9 The Commonwealth Drought Bonds currently carry a nominal yield of 
3 per cent as they are specifically aimed at stimulating saving for drought, flood 
or fire, rather than as an income averaging device per se. However, when they 
are legitimately redeemed before maturi ty for one of the above reasons they 
operate in a similar fashion to an IAA. They do not operate in the same way 
as an IAA when the I::londs are redeemed at maturity (ten years). In this case 
the bond holder receives the face value plus accrued interest, less an amount 
equal to the tax saving made when the bond SUbscription was allowed as a 
deduction from assessable income. 
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some specified period, equal taxes should be paid on incomes of equal 
total size, regardless of how the income is distributed over the period. 
In the absence of income averaging, the size of the additional tax pay-
ments caused by an unstable income flow is determined by the magnitude 
of the variance of taxable income, and its mean level [7, 10]. For the 
;, ~~~ Australian progressive rate scale, the additional tax payments are pro-;il~j) portionately greater for low mcan incomes than for high mean incomes. ;; in b- This is because the rate of change of the marginal tax rate is greater I~I;~ at lower than at higher income levels. 
A detailed study of the variability of individual Australian farm in-
,,;wari) comes has not been undertaken in the present study. The B.A.E. data Jl~ciJs for the sheep industry [1] suggests that, compared with stable incomes 
of equal total size measured over a period of five to seven years, it ~dl. ~e would be fairly common for sheep farmers to incur additional tax 
.barl) payments of 15 to 25 per cent if there were no income averaging. And 
\~:~~ in some instances additional tax payments of 30 per cent, or more, 
FriOOs would be incurred. If the aim is to define an averaging period such 
nUl)- that the average income for successive block periods is reasonably 
iJc~Ie comparable, the period should not be less than five years. For the par-
D:Jlclit ticular income data presented in Table 1, a seven-year period appears 
d L\A the most appropriate. The averaging procedures reviewed could all quite 
rr.rnary readily be applied over averaging periods ranging from two to seven 
~(~ ano years. One of the main problems arising with longer averaging periods 
is the changing real value of money. 
; \1JlI! Regardless of the relative weighting given to the performance criteria 
,-1ll~ listed in Table 2, Downing's block average and Types I and IV of the 
)J;tl~~ moving average, are judged to be inferior forms of avcraging. Also, 
b ~ net due to the lower administrative cost, Type 111* moving average appears 
ta£amit superior to Type III. Thc present comparison is therefore restricted to 
it ~oulo one between the block average, the cumulative average, and Types II 
,;roi~ and III* moving average. 
The condition of period equity is completely fulfilled by the block and 
2lIIM cumulative average, and reasonably well met by the Type 111* moving 
\ 1316 average. The main defect of the Type II moving average (current Aus-
~Jl leal procedure) arises when there is a sustained downward income 
!l ~udt trend, or when a block period with a low mean income follows a high 
I (inDO, income block period. In both of these situations the tax payments 
1I: ao· usually be substantially above those that would have been paid 
e:Jl:t!, no averaging. 
l\P'!,IS The response of tax payments to current income is best maintained 
the cumulative average and the Type 111* moving average. It is also 
well maintained by the block average, the main disadvantage 
the lumpy nature of the tax rebate. The Type II moving average 
lpe:rtclrrrls badly on this count. It will be fairly common for a given 
tax payment to significantly exceed that paid under the simple 
progressive tax. Moreover, in contrast to the other procedures, 
Type II moving average provides only a sman reduction in the in-
've to speculate on rate modifications. 
On the basis of the performance criteria adopted in this paper, and 
ven any reasonable weighting of the desirable attributes of an ave rag-
system, the block average, cumulative average, and Type 111* 
average are a1\ considered to be superior to the current Australian 
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averaging procedure. The overall difIerence in performance between 
the former three averaging procedures is comparatively small. The main 
disadvantage of the block average compared with the other two pro-
cedures is the lumpy nature of the tax rebate. The cumulative average 
is slightly better than the Type lIP moving average with respect to 
period equity, but has a greater administrative burden. 
With respect to forward averaging procedures, it is desirable that a 
taxpayer should be allowed to carry forward negative taxable incomes 
and balance them against future positive taxable incomes. It is unlikely 
that primary producers would be able to predict fluctuations in their 
future income stream with sufficient accuracy to make an IAA adequate 
as the sole form of averaging. However, it would be a useful supplement 
to an averaging procedure based on historic income, if a government 
seeks to stimulate savings in high income years and to reduce annual 
fluctuations in farmers' spending income; or if income averaging was 
extended to all taxpayers with variable incomes. 
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CHAPTER 6 
A NEGATIVE INCOME TAX AND LOW 
INCOME FARM FAMILIES 
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A NEGATIVE INCOME TAX AND LOW 
INCOME FARM FAMILIES* 
A. H. CHISHOLM 
Australian National University 
An efficient procedure is proposed for making welfare payments to low 
income farm families. This is a negative income tax. It uses the income 
tax system for linking directly transfer payments to income needs, without 
unduly adverse effects on resource allocation. The negative income tax 
proposal is considered in relation to rural adjustment and reconstruction. 
In Australia over recent years, low farm incomes have generated con-
siderable adjustment pressures in the mral sector. Concomitant with the 
deterioration in economic conditions in the mral sector, total Common-
wealth financial grants to the sector have increased from $160m. in 
1966-67 to an estimated $380m. in 1971-72.1 Although traditional 
subsidies on farm outputs and inputs have maintained their relative 
importance, the introduction of a general rural reconstruction programme 
in 1971, marked a significant shift in Commonwealth Government rural 
policy. It seems likely that downward pressures on farm income will be 
maintained, and that rural adjustment and reconstruction will be a major 
feature of rural policy during the 1970s.2 
At present, Commonwealth financial grants to the rural sector are not 
linked directly to the income needs of farm families. Rather, their in-
cidence is usually the reverse. The focus of this paper is on a procedure 
for making income transfers to farm families whose income needs are 
greatest from a welfare viewpoint. Negative income tax (NIT) uses the 
income tax system as a vehicle for making income-conditioned transfers 
to low income families. Already a fonn of NIT has been suggested by 
Schapper [22]. However, no attempt has been made to consider alterna-
tive forms of NIT, problems of designing a NIT suitable for farm 
operators, and the general place of NIT in the continuing process of 
rural adjustment. 
The relevance of this paper to the Australian rural sector rests on the 
untested hypothesis that there are a significant number of low income 
farm families. 3 It is argued that many of these are at present 'trapped' 
* The paper has benefited from constructive suggestions made by a referee, and 
discussions I have had with R. L. Mathews, C. A. Tisdell, C. Walsh, and various 
members of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, especially A. G. Cuthbertson. 
The research was partly financed by the Rural Credits Development Fund of the 
Reserve Bank. I am solely responsible for the views expressed. 
1 Derived from [1, Table No. 12, p. 22]. Income tax concessions are excluded. 
2 It is estimated [1, p. 9] that aggregate real farm income in 1970-71 was the 
lowest since 1944-45. Although some increase in farm income is anticipated for 
1971-72, downward pressures on income are expected to continue [1, p. 26], especi-
ally for producers in the wheat, dairy, sugar and horticultural industries, who will 
be affected by the entry of the u.K. into the E.E.C. 
3 The data necessary to test this hypothesis-the pooled income of individual 
farm family units, including income derived from off-farm sources-is unavailable. 
However, McKay [17] has estimated that, in the early 1960s, approximately one 
102 
1(; 
bayku 
nt1e) Ie 
~ucld il 
lirnuDI' 
1O.lI!8n 
Fod 
!cWlDiCi 
~j~~; 
OC(u;JK 
cot; In 
81,:eql 
IJOCrual 
al,je1lU 
3(~U:\lt{ 
incoJlllc 
~our' ~ 
r~~I;\i 
b I~e 
mla mG 
I~. ~~ 
:iJDm, 
Jl:ooe1 
iU r:. 
CIi,lnS~ 
beer 
oladon. 
~l1D re~~ 
loraeltr 
are \:ei, 
iOnalcln 
w 
1972 NEGATIVE INCOME TAX 103 
in agriculture, in the sense that their welfare would be permanently lower 
if they left their farms immediately. For most of these farm families NIT 
would provide temporary relief until they attained adequate income in 
farming, or in an alternative occupation. For those with no opportunities 
to attain adequate income, transfer payments would be permanenU 
NIT and Rural Adjustment 
For the purpose of relating NIT to rural adjustment,5 three groups of 
low income farmers may be distinguished. Those who are without pros-
pect of earning an adequate income either in farming or in an alternative 
occupation, given their physical and mental capacity, managerial and 
other skills, and net worth. 'Those who are without prospect of earning 
an adequate income in farming, but who consider they have occupa-
tional alternatives. And those who consider they can eventually achieve 
an adequate income in farming, by methods such as debt reconstruction, 
acquisition of more land, change of farm activities, and supplementary 
income acquired through part-time off-farm work. These low income 
groups will henceforth be referred to as groups one, two and three, 
respectively. 
In the process of rural adjustment, farmers are continually moving 
into and out of these low income groups. They eventually leave their 
farm,6 reattain an adequate income, or become 'permanent' low income 
farmers. At any time, many farmers will be uncertain to which low 
income group they belong, due to deficiencies in information. Uncertainty 
will be particularly high when a rapid deterioration of economic con-
ditions occurs. 7 In these circumstances, a period of several years may 
be required for a farm family to decide and implement its best course 
of action. Time is required to search for information and to evaluate it 
with regard to the profitability of alternative farm activities, opportunities 
for debt reconstruction and acquisition of more land. If these prospects 
are bleak, more time is required to seek information regarding occupa-
tional alternatives, job retraining opportunities, and the general con-
third (80,000) of Australian farms regularly earned less than $2,000 per annum, 
for their owner's labour, management and capital. Given the recent trends in 
aggregate net farm income and the number of farm operators, the number of 
farms with incomes below $2,000 would have since increased [1 , pp. 9-11], unless 
a very marked change in the income distribution pattern has occurred . See also 
Davidson [6] . 
McKay's estimates do not account for income derived from 'off-farm' sources, 
and the comparison of farm with non'-farm incomes is fraught with difficulties. It 
may be noted, however, that the age pension for a married couple with two 
dependants (i.e. equivalent to a family of four) effectively guarantees their annual 
income will not be less than $2,000; and that the minimum annual wage equivalent 
for a male adult in N .S.W. is approximately $2,700. 
4 It. is out~ide the scope of this pape: to justify a Government policy providing 
a mlDlmum lllcome guarantee to a partIcular group in society, suffice to note th at 
all employees have such a guarantee in the form of minimum wage legisla tion and 
unemployment benefits. For a discussion of policies to redistribute losses caused 
by 'economic progress' see Schultz [23]. 
5 Here, knowledge of the general process of rural adjustment is assumed. See, 
for instance, Heady [15] . 
6 The best indicator available, of the decline in number of farm operators, is 
for male owners, lessees or sharefarmers working permanently on rural holdings 
[3 , p. 27] . These have decreased by 12 ·7 per cent over the period 1967 to 1971. 
7 For example, the 1970-71 drop in wool prices. 
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sequences of what could be a major change in occupation and family 
location. Search for information on job alternatives will probably require 
more time when, as at present, unemployment is high. Finally, if a 
decision to leave farming is made, it may then take several years to 
negotiate a sale, or to lease the property. 
Consider the introduction of a NIT with the following features. A 
NIT transfer would be made to farmers in group one until they were 
eligible for an age pension, or moved out of the group. For farmers at 
present in groups two and three, NIT would be temporary, and must be 
known to be temporary, so that adequate pressures to adjust are main-
tained. For instance, a possible condition is that no farmer would be 
entitled to more than three annual NIT transfers, unless in the opinion 
of the authority there were exceptional circumstances. This would ensure 
that NIT would not encourage low income farm families to remain in 
agriculture indefinitely. 
NIT and Resource Allocation 
NIT may affect work-leisure choices, risk-taking, the rate that farmers 
enter and leave the low farm income category, and the occupational 
choices of those leaving farming. The former effect is discussed separ-
ately, and the other influences are considered here. 
NIT may influence decisions made by families not at present in the 
low farm income category. Both for potential entrants to farming, and 
for farmers at present with adequate incomes, NIT would change the 
after-tax probability distribution of expected future income from farm-
ing.8 By increasing the mean and reducing the variance of expected farm 
income, it may encourage potential low income families to enter agri-
curture, and discourage farmers, who at present have adequate income 
but have some probability of becoming low income farmers, from leaving 
agriculture. For the first category, it could be stated that no family enter-
ing agriculture, subsequent to the introduction of NIT, would be eligible 
for transfers unless Government approval for entry had been obtained. 
For farmers in the second category, the effect would be unlikely to be 
very marked, because they would not anticipate receiving more than 
three NIT transfers. 
For farmers in groups one and three, the significant resource allocative 
effect of NIT would be its influence on the work-leisure choice. For 
group two farmers, however, NIT may also influence the rate at which 
they would leave their farms and their choice of occupations. Consider 
first the situation where NIT delays the exit of farmers from farming, 
but does not alter the 'post-adjustment' resource allocation. Assume 
also, that there are no divergences between private and social returns 
from alternative resource allocations, before NIT. The economic cost to 
society of the delay in adjustment caused by NIT would be equal to the 
present value of the difference between the actual returns on farmers' 
labour, land, and capital for the period of delay, and that which would 
have obtained in the absence of NIT. 
It was suggested previously that a period of several years may be 
required by some farmers to make and implement a decision to leave 
. 8 ~I1: may similarly affect the choice of farm activities, when the probability 
dlstnbutIon of expected returns from alternative activity combinations intersects 
the NIT range. 
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their farm. If a farmer is not given this time due to foreclosure by his 
creditors, his welfare may be permanently lowered; either because the 
realized value of farm assets would be less under conditions of forced 
sale, or because his new occupation would be inferior to the one he 
would have chosen, given more time. 9 
For both of these situations the fanner may be prepared to borrow 
more credit to buy time to negotiate more favourable terms of sale, or 
to select his 'best' future occupation. If, however, the only collateral he 
could offer for credit is his own human capital, embodying the expected 
capitalized value of his prospective earnings outside agriculture, he will 
usually be unable to obtain a loan. There is, here, a case of market 
failure similar to that for persons with negligible net worth, apart from 
their human capital, who seek to invest in retraining themselves for a 
new occupation. The market failure is that commercial lenders will not 
usually accept human capital as collateral for a loan, and society would 
probably not permit it. Yet from society's viewpoint, the risk of these 
prospective earnings outside agriCUlture being unrealized is negligible. 
NIT and Rural Reconstruction 
NIT could be made independent of the existing rural reconstruction 
programme: 10 or it could be linked to the programme. For instance, NIT 
transfers to farmers in groups one and two could be made conditional 
upon agreement to have their property purchased for amalgamation, 
under conditions previously agreed to by government and farmer. A 
farmer in group one, at the discretion of the authority, could be given 
the opportunity to retain his home and a few acres. 
With respect to group two farmers, a government may permit a NIT 
to operate for a period after they leave their farm. This action may be 
taken to encourage persons who are not eligible for the Commonwealth 
retraining scheme to train for a new occupation while working part-time. 
Alternatively, it may be considered that some farmers view migration 
as being a high risk, while the risk from society'S viewpoint is negligible. 
Finally, the Commonwealth Government, having embarked on a pro-
gramme of rural reconstruction, may begin gradually to dismantle the 
existing high levels of protection to some rural industries,11 on the 
grounds that it induces an inefficient resource allocation and has a re-
gressive incidence. This action, however, would increase adjustment 
pressures. NIT would ameliorate these pressures for marginal producers, 
who would have to make the most substantial adjustment. 
Form of aN IT 
The different forms of NIT, and their likely economic effects, have 
9 See also, in this regard, the BAE statement that some farmers who may have 
benefited from rural reconstruction may be forced to take irrevocable action be-
cause of immediate pressures [2]. 
10 I do not discuss the principles of a general rural reconstruction programme. 
See Edwards [8], Harris [13], and Mauldon and Schapper [18]. 
11 Even when the most generous allowance is made for 'second-best' arguments 
of the type advanced by Gruen [12], it is clear that the existing level of protection 
to some rural industries causes an inefficient allocation of resources. For instance, 
the dairying industry. 
C 
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been a subject of discussion in the economic literature over recent !,~ars.12 
All NIT plans contain three basic. elements: a guarant.eed Illln~mum 
income paid by crovernment; a negative tax schedule relatmg the Slze of 
the NIT transfetto the earned income of the tax unit; and a break-even 
income at which NIT ceases. 
Assuming a proportional ne~ative tax rate, t, specifying the r.ate of 
decline of the NIT transfer as mcome from other sources, Y., nses; a 
guaranteed minimum income, Y g; and a break-even income, Y b, the 
NIT transfer is given as: 
(1) NIT = Yg - tYs' 
The break-even income at which NIT transfer ceases is 
(2) 
Thus a low income family would receive a direct income grant from 
government. This grant would be reduced as earned income increases, 
but usually by less than the full amount of the increase. The reduction 
in the grant represents a tax on earned income. A limiting case of NIT, 
commonly referred to as an income maintenance or poverty gap plan, 
sets a minimum guaranteed income to the tax unit. If earned income is 
below this guaranteed level, the difference would be made up by transfer. 
The effective marginal tax rate on additional earnings below the guaran-
teed level would be 100 per cent, and the income gain from the surrender 
of leisure would be zero. Such an expropriatory tax rate is likely to 
induce considerable leisure-work substitution effects.13 
All income transfer schemes have these adverse substitution effects to 
some degree; unless transfers are independent of income status, and thus 
correspond to lump-sum taxes. One such lump-sum transfer procedure 
would be to give all families-including high income families-a grant 
equal in size to the guaranteed minimum income. The budget cost of this 
scheme would, however, be prohibitive. The marginal tax rate that is set 
for a NIT thus reflects a trade-off between the magnitude of the adverse 
leisure-work substitution effects and the budget cost of the programme. 
NIT and Work Effort 
The decision-making unit's response to a tax induced change in its 
earned income is usually analysed in terms of substitution and income 
effects. The positive marginal rates of ordinary income taxation reduce 
the opportunity cost of a unit of leisure time, and thus produce a sub-
stitution effect adverse to income-producing effort. Positive average rates, 
however, reduce the aggregate net return for such efforts, causing an 
income effect which operates in the opposite direction. Therefore, it is 
impossible a priori to say whether the imposition of an income tax, or 
12 A good introduction to NIT is given in Green [10]. The effects of a general 
and permanent NIT on farm operators have been discussed by Meyer and Saupe 
[19]. In a recently published paper, Bawden [4] discusses some interesting pre-
liminary results of a rura l experiment with NIT in the United States. For a dis-
cussion of various aspects of NIT see [5, 7, 9, 16,2 1,24,26]. 
13 The present tapered means test for age pensions has the essential features of 
a NIT. For the pension transfer itself, the effective margin al tax rate is 50 per 
cent. However, when this is combined with the age allowance income tax schedule, 
the 'true' marginal tax rate can be as lligh as 100 per cent. Tax induced dis-
incentives to work are much less significant for the aged. 
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an increase in the rates of an existing income tax, will increase or de-
crease work effort.14 
The NIT under discussion is negative only in terms of the direction 
of the aggregate income transfer. Although the average rate is negative, 
a positive marginal tax rate is applied to earned income. With NIT then, 
both income and substitution effects would operate towards reducing 
income-producing effort. Farmers have more opportunities than most to 
vary their income-producing effort. It is expected, therefore, that a NIT 
having a very high marginal tax rate could substantially reduce work 
effort in low income families. 15 NIT would influence the on-farm work 
of the owner operator and other family members, and also lessen the 
effort made to find part-time off-farm work. 
The impact of NIT on work effort is important in two respects. First, 
the substitution effect, arising from the change in the relative prices for 
leisure and earned income is allocatively distorting, assuming that there 
is a Pareto optimal resource allocation before NIT. It is likely that some 
farm families who would be eligible for a NIT transfer are paying income 
tax. However, the marginal tax rate, and hence the substitution effect, 
would be much less than with NIT. A second consideration is the effect 
of lowered income-producing effort on earned income, and the aggregate 
NIT transfer made to low income families. The lower the earned family 
incomes resulting from reduced work effort, the higher the budget cost 
of maintaining a given guaranteed family income. Alternatively, if the 
budget cost of NIT is held constant, the lower the minimum family 
income guarantee. 
Tax Unit 
In this proposal, the tax unit for NIT is the farm family which would 
be eligible for a NIT transfer when its pooled income is less than the 
break-even income. 
Adoption of a family tax unit raises the problem of definition. Here, a 
family consists of an adult nucleus, plus any other persons claimed as 
members by the adult nucleus. For the purpose of qualifying for NIT, 
the adult nucleus could be any married couple, or any person over the 
age of 21 years.1G Persons who are not eligible to form part of the adult 
nucleus may be claimed as members of the family unit, providing they 
receive more than one half of their support from the adult nucleus. 
These members need not necessarily reside on the farm to be included 
in the family unit for NIT. 
No person could be a member of more than one family unit, nor 
could any adult qualify as a separate unit and receive NIT while remain-
ing economically a part of a unit with adequate income. Also, no person 
for whom an exemption is claimed on an ordinary income tax return 
could be included as a member of a family unit claiming a NIT transfer. 
14 For an analysis of the effects of ordinary income tax on work effort see 
Musgrave [20] . 
15 The underlying assumption is that leisure is a normal good. It is conceivable 
that leisure, for some individuals, may be an inferior good. For instance, a NIT 
transfer may change an individual's ' life-style' in such a way so as to increase 
their 'taste' for income relative to leisure, causing less leisure to be consumed. See 
Green [11 ]. 
16 In exceptional circumstances a person under 21 may be granted adult status 
for NIT, e.g. an orphan farm operator. 
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The income of all members, from all sources-except intra-family unit 
transfers-would be aggregated to determine the size of NIT transfer. 
Another problem is to specify the absolute level of the guaranteed 
minimum income, and its relationship to family size and composition. 
Although in the following section a specific NIT schedule is given, it is 
only illustrative. From a welfare and equity viewpoint, guaranteed mini-
mum incomes should be neutral among families of different size. For 
instance, a family of four should be given just enough more than a family 
of three to maintain an equivalent standard of living. This would require 
the guaranteed minimum income to rise with family size, although not 
proportionateiy, as there are economies of scale in family consumption. 
Illustrative NIT Schedule 
Attempts to avoid adverse substitution effects of a NIT give rise to 
unavoidable trade-off conflicts. As already shown, all NIT plans con-
tain three basic variables; a guaranteed min.in1.um income, a NIT rate 
schedule, and a break-even income. The conflicts arise because any two 
of the three basic variables determine the third. Thus the objective of a 
high guaranteed minimum income, combined with a NIT rate that keeps 
low the disincentives to work, is not compatible with a low break-even 
income. The high break-even income resulting from such a plan means 
that NIT transfers would be made to many non-low income families, 
and that the budget cost of the programme would be high. In the illustra-
tive NIT plan outlined below, an attempt is made to achieve balance 
between these trade-offs, and to link the NIT schedule with the ordinary 
income tax schedule. 17 
A guaranteed minimum income of $600 for a single adult is arbitrarily 
chosen. For larger family units, the guaranteed minimum income is 
determined by adding to this amount the tax deductions for dependants 
allowed under the ordinary income tax. Table 1 summarizes the situation 
for a fanlily of four, assuming a 50 per cent proportional NIT rate, and 
a minimum guaranteed income of $1,276. The NIT plan is illustrated 
in Figure 1. Y is the total family income before tax and DY is the total 
disposable income after tax. The line OED shows the relationship be-
TABLE 1 
Effects of a NIT for a Family of Four 
Before Tax Positive NIT After Tax Average Marginal 
Family Tax Transfer Family Tax Rate Tax Rate 
Income Liability Income 
(Dollars) (Dollars) (DoHars) (Dollars) (Per cent) (Per cent) 
0 0 1,276 1,276 -co 50·0 
500 0 1,026 1,526 -205 ·2 50·0 
1,000 0 776 1,796 - 77 ·6 50·0 
1,500 0 526 2,026 35 ·1 50 ·0 
2,000 0 276 2,276 13 ·8 50·0 
2,500 0 26 2,526 1 ·0 50·0 
2,552 0 0 2,552 0 50 ·0 
3,000 224 0 2,776 + 7 ·5 50·0 3,128 228 0 2,940 + 9·2 22·6 3,500 373 0 3,127 + 10 ·7 25 ·0 
1 7 This NIT system is similar to that proposed by Tobin et af. [24]. 
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tween DY and Y under the ordinary income tax, for a married couple 
with two dependent children, assuming a single tax return in which the 
wife and children are claimed as full dependants. 
The line OED has a slope of 1, for incomes below $1,092, because 
the faniily would pay no tax if its income were below this level. The line 
then takes on successively lower slopes as income rises and higher pro-
gressive tax rates apply. The total tax on any given income is the vertical 
difference between OED and the 45 0 line. 
With NIT, the relationship ACD is substituted for OED. Families 
without income receive a NIT transfer of $1,276. All families with 
incomes below the break-even income of $2,552 receive a NIT transfer. 
Families with incomes between $2,552 and $3,128 pay lower tax pay-
ments than they would under the ordinary schedule. Families with in-
comes above $3,128 are not affected by NIT. It is necessary to include 
families in the NIT plan with incomes somewhat above the break-even 
income level to avoid confiscatory marginal tax rates. If the ordinary 
income tax schedule is applied to all incomes above $2,552, a family 
with an income of $2,553 would pay a tax of $174 and have a disposabJe 
income of $2,379. The additional dollar of earned income would cost 
l 
110 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS AUG. 
the family $173. This is avoided by extending the NIT schedule to 
where an equivalent tax is paid under it, and under the ordinary income 
tax schedule. 
NIT Base 
Administration of a NIT would be simplified if the base used for the 
ordinary income tax were adopted. However, given the basic welfare 
aim of NIT, this concept of taxable income is unacceptable. A NIT 
should be based on economic 'well-being'. This may be broadly thought 
of as a function of the flow of goods and services over which a family 
has command. The most important determinant of this flow is current 
annual income. But this is not a simple and unambiguous concept. 
Adjustments need to be made to the existing definition of taxable income 
to provide a more equitable measure of command over a flow of goods 
and services. These adjustments, and the question of the time period 
over which income should be measured, are outlined in Appendix 1. 
We now consider the question of whether positive net worth provides 
a command over goods and services that is not reflected in current in-
come, and whether there should be an offsetting tax on net worth. 
Offsetting Tax on Net Worth 
Underlying the proposals for reduced NIT transfers to low income 
families with positive net worth is a presumption that asset holdings 
provide command over goods and services additional to the annual in-
come. One method of taking this into account is to impute a return to 
net worth assessed at fair market value. Actual money income from 
asset holdings is subtracted from imputed income and the difference--if 
positive--is added to the income base. In effect, this procedure adds to 
the income base, income arising from such factors as the imputed rental 
to owner-occupied dwellings, psychic income, and unrealized capital 
gains. 
Apart from difficulties of accurately estimating the market value of 
farm assets, there is the problem of distinguishing between returns to 
farm labour and to farm capital. If the return to farm assets is not fully 
netted out before imputed income is added, there will be double counting 
of returns to net worth. This difficulty does not appear to justify the use 
of imputed income to net worth for the purpose of NIT assessment. Also, 
the main argument for using imputed income, namely that money in-
come provides an underestimate of 'true' income, has been considerably 
weakened by the proposed adjustments to taxable income. 
A separate argument for including net worth in the assessment of a 
NIT relates to the potential to consume net worth. The implication is 
that low income families with positive net worth should contribute to 
their own support through dis-saving some of their wealth. Weisbrod 
and Hansen [25] have considered problems of measuring the economic 
'well-being' of a consumer unitIs Although they do not discuss a NIT, 
their work is relevant. They suggest that the economic 'well-being', Yt*, 
of a consumer unit in time period t, is the sum of current annual income 
Yt (which is net of the yield on net worth),19 and the annual lifetime 
18 For a good discussion of the problem of measuring the economic 'well-being' 
of farm families see Hathaway [7]. 
19 To avoid double counting of net worth. 
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annuity value of current net worth NWt.An; where An is the value of an 
n year annuity whose present value is $1. Thus, Yt* = Yt + NWt.An. 
Economic 'well-being' is the income obtainable in period t if net worth 
is converted to yield a lifetime flow. The annuity value will be a function 
of net worth, life expectancy, and the rate of interest used for the con-
version. For any given interest rate, the greater the net worth of the 
unit, and the shorter its life expectancy, the greater will be the annual 
annuity. 
For the purposes of NIT, any proposal to add the annuity equivalent 
of net worth to current income would need to show that conversion of 
net worth to an annuity is both possible and desirable. Possibilities for 
coverting net worth in the form of farm assets into income for con-
sumption, without selling the farm, are extremely limited. The major 
possibilities are to use farm assets as collateral to borrow from financial 
institutions, and to reduce farm maintenance expenditure.20 These limited 
opportunities, and possible difficulties of estimating market values of 
farm assets, probably preclude including net worth at the time NIT 
transfers are made. To avoid the possibility of families with substantial 
net worth claiming a NIT transfer an upper limit on net worth could 
be specified, above which NIT transfers would not be made, regardless 
of the family income. 
If it is inappropriate to have an offsetting tax on net worth before 
sale of the farm, the question arises whether NIT transfers should be 
refunded at the time of sale. NIT transfers would then be an interest-
free loan. Schapper's [22] NIT proposal is restricted to group one low 
income farmers, and is conditional upon the farmer giving government 
first refusal of the property in the event of intended sale. The total NIT 
transfers would be repaid at this time, or eventually from the estate. 
There is probably a stronger argument for these farmers to contribute 
to their own support through dis-saving of net worth, than for other low 
income farmers . Their life expectancy will tend to be shorter and the 
lifetime annuity equivalent of their current net worth , for any given net 
worth, therefore higher. The aggregate NIT transfer they receive will 
also be greater. 
If both group one and two farmers were required to repay NIT trans-
fers, the latter would be discriminated against in relation to groups one 
and three. Group one is favoured because the present value of repay-
ments, per dollar of NIT transfer, will usually be much lower, due to a 
longer time lag before repayment, and the third group because they do 
not sell their farms. 
The most equitable alternatives are probably to make NIT a perma-
nent grant for all groups; an interest-free loan for group one, and a grant 
for groups two and three; or a loan for all groups, with repayment of 
NIT transfers from farmers' estates. 
Concluding Comments 
As a welfare programme, NIT has a number of features . It is directed 
specifically at low income farm families. It provides help in its most 
useful form, cash. It makes the cost to society explicit. NIT would not 
20 A farmer could also obtain an effective annuity, while maintaining mana. 
gerial control of the farm , if he sold the farm and leased it back from the 
purchaser. 
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discriminate between the various sectors within the rural sector. Although 
NIT will have some adverse effects on resource allocation, these are 
likely to be minimal. The NIT would fit into the present income tax 
system, and it could be administered by the Commonwealth Department 
of Taxation. 
Personal Deductions 
APPENDIX I 
Income Base for NIT 
Ordinary income tax allows deductions for dependants and certain 
personal expenditures. Deductions for dependants would be incorporated 
into NIT; via the guaranteed nlinimum incomes for families of varying 
sizes. The deduction of non-discretionary personal expenditures (e.g. 
hospital and medical) should continue under NIT because it would allow 
maximum response to the welfare position of individual families. 
Gross Income 
Ideally, the NIT base would include the aggregate money income, 
income-in-kind, and imputed income, of the family unit. Money income 
would include earned income, gifts and inheritances received from per-
sons outside the family unit, payments from government, and realized 
capital gains. Income-in-kind, i.e. farm products grown for home con-
sumption, is recorded in the ordinary tax return. Probably the greatest 
source of untaxed imputed income is the imputed rental from owner-
occupied homes. Exclusion of this item under NIT is unlikely to dis-
criminate significantly between farm families, given the predominance of 
owner-occupied homes on farms. 
Business Expenditures 
Under the ordinary income tax, primary producers may claim a 20 per 
cent investment allowance on most new plant and equipment, write-off 
depreciating assets at an accelerated rate, and deduct the full amount of 
many capital outlays in one year. To prevent farmers with adequate 
'real' income from claiming a transfer, the 20 per cent investment allow-
ance would be excluded, and normal depreciation only allowed under 
NIT. Also, with NIT, a distinction would be made between expenditure 
required to maintain production, and capital expenditures incurred for 
improving future earning prospects. The former would be deductible, 
the latter would not. Thus all developmental expenditures leading to 
assets, which given moderate maintenance expenditure do not depreciate, 
would be completely excluded under NIT. With ordinary income tax, 
thes~ expenditures-for instance most land improvements--can be im-
medIately expensed. Finally to prevent some farmers claiming NIT while 
accumulating unrealized capital gains through build-up of livestock num-
bers, these increases would be valued at market prices, and not at a 
nominal cost price valuation. 
Income Averaging 
In direct c~)lltrast to an ordinary J?rogressive income tax, families who 
have annual IOcome that fluctuates III and out of the NIT range would 
benefit in relation to those with a stable income of the same total size. 
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Apart from the instability of farm incomes caused by such factors as 
drought and fluctuating prices, farmers may influence the size of their 
annual income by adjusting the timing of their sales and expenditures. 
To prevent families with high average annual incomes claiming NIT, 
a cumulative averaging system is proposed. The present averaging pro-
cedure for primary producers is unsuitable for NIT, because it responds 
too slowly to current income. Under the cumulative procedure, the size 
of the initial NIT transfer would be based on the preceding year's income. 
At the end of the following year, the average of the two years' income 
is calculated. The NIT transfer, or tax payment, that would have been 
received over the two-year period on this average income is then 
measured. The NIT transfer or tax payment at the end of the second 
year is the difference between the previously calculated amount and the 
size of the first NIT transfer. This procedure would then be repeated 
for an averaging period of not more than five years. Averaging would 
be compulsory. Negative annual income would be treated as zero in the 
year incurred, and the losses carried forward and written off against 
future income. Thus, NIT would not provide a guaranteed minimum 
annual income when net farm income was negative. 
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'Everything I like is either illegal or immoral, pollutes the environment, or 
increases the population'. 
[R. A. Lewin, Bioscience, 19, 1969, p. 584] . 
Our economic perspective of the pollution problem characterizes that 
problem as involving a conflict between the consumption of two broad 
classes of goods-physical (or produced) commodities and the direct 
consumption of 'clean environment'. After considering the relative 
merits of market and political decision-making processes used to achieve 
appropriate social choices between the consmnption of physical goods 
and 'clean environment', we focus on the alternative policy options for 
pollution control. The main conclusion we reach is that, in general, fiscal 
instruments (taxes and subsidies) are a more efficient means of control-
ling pollution than the widespread use of regulations or other legal 
instruments. 
Introduction 
An ever-increasing popular and technical literature has been con-
cerned with persuading us that mankind is on the brink of ecological 
disaster. However seriously one ultimately takes this threat, it seems 
difficult to contemplate the pressures of population growth, the rapid 
exploitation of known reserves of exhaustible resources, and the appar-
ently perceptible deterioration in the quality of the natural environment 
without some disquiet. And judging by the attention devoted to these 
matters in the economics literature, the economics profession at large 
regards them as enormously important. 
The purpose of this paper is to submit to examination just one of 
these problems-that of environmental quality disruption. From the start, 
however, it has been obvious that the task of providing a comprehensive 
coverage of all aspects of even this one problem would be quite impos-
sible except in terms of largely meaningless generalizations. The environ-
mental quality problem as a whole is just so complex that policy dis-
cussion requires some way, initially, of breaking it down into 
manageable components, which can ultimately be brought together again 
to form a consistent total perspective. In this spirit, we have chosen to 
focus on only one (albeit a particularly important) aspect of environ-
mental quality disruption-the so-called problem of pollution. 
* This paper has evolved from a more wide-ranging paper which was presented 
to the Annual Conference of the Australian Society of Agricultural Economists 
held at the Australian National University in February 1973. Order of author-
ship for the present paper was decided by tossing several coins. 
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In doing so, it is probably desirable to indicate, at the very outset, 
just where we see the pollution problem as such fitting into the wider 
context. Basically, we regard the general problem of environmental 
quality disruption in a growing economy as a compound of three 
related, but distinguishable, phenomena-increasing pollution, increas-
ing congestion, and an increasing demand for recreational and other 
services provided directly by a clean environment. It is clear that these 
can be viewed as quite distinct matters-at least at the conceptual level. 
Congestion may worsen, without any change in pollution levels or the 
demand for clean environment per se. Likewise, technological changes 
may influence pollution levels without affecting congestion or preferences 
for environmental services. And tastes for environmental services may 
alter while congestion and pollution levels stay constant. 
In practice, though, the distinction may be extraordinarily difficult to 
maintain. An increase in population size, or income per head, will 
generally involve a simultaneous increase in pollution levels and demand 
for environmental services; an increase in pollution levels may increase 
the observed demand for environmental services (e.g. trips to national 
parks), even when the underlying preferences for environmental services 
remain unchanged. (In the latter case, we observe a move along the 
demand curve rather than a shift in it). Needless to say, it may be 
difficult (and, incidentally, quite wrong in some cases) to deal with 
these effects separately. Nevertheless, some such distinction seems 
necessary if the topic is to become manageable, and we shall endeavour 
to emphasize, wherever it seems relevant in the discussion, the essential 
interdependence of the various dimensions of the total problem, without 
actually concerning ourselves with questions of congestion or conserva-
tion as such. 
Our primary objective has been to provide a broad conceptual 
economic framework, within which the pollution problem might be 
analysed and appropriate means of reducing the impact of pollution 
on society's well-being discussed. The need for such a framework seems 
to us to be extreme. Although much has been written on the pollution 
question-particularly, recently-most proceeds on a relatively ad hoc 
basis, and many of the more fundamental questions are skated over or 
completely ignored. We have, by way of contrast, attempted to start 
at first base with the question 'what is the economic dimension of the 
pollution issue'? and to proceed logically from there to identify that 
aspect of the issue which makes it a social problem, and through this 
to the ultimate question of what we should do about pollution. 
In no sense is this paper to be considered as a review of the literature. 
It is both less than, and (we hope) more than, that.l It is less, because 
there are many issues aired in the literature which we have ignored 
(and possibly even a number that we have overlooked). It is more, 
because it involves an attempt to re-think the fundamental questions 
and to present the answers (in so far as we have found any) in a novel 
and hopefully stimulating form. In this way, our aim is that the frame-
work set out here should prove useful to those who are familiar with 
1 We must, nonetheless, admit that our thinking has been influenced by the 
contributions of Dales [7J, Ayres and Kneese [1J, Parish [10] and Coase 
[6J. This is by no means a complete list, and we indicate other important SOUTceS 
as we make use of their ideas. 
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much of the relevant literature, as well as to those who are not; and 
to those who are economists as well as to those who are not. 
Regrettably perhaps, this paper has no explicitly agricultural orienta-
tion. The reason for this is simply that we considered that the conceptual 
exercise we have undertaken here needed to be conducted first. The 
extremely interesting question of how the pollution problem bears on the 
rural sector-and indeed the more general question of the optimal 
location of polluting industries, which we hardly do justice to here-
must remain for a logically and temporally subsequent discussion. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section I we attempt to derive 
an economic perspective of the pollution problem. In section II, we are 
concerned to discuss the extent to which the economic problem of pollu-
tion requires political intervention because the market fails to solve 
it-and further, the extent to which the political mechanism can be 
expected to achieve what the market cannot. Section III presents a 
discussion of alternative pollution control procedures available to govern-
ments and attempts to outline appropriate criteria for policy choice. 
Section IV presents the conclusions. 
I 
Pollution as an Economic Problem 
The fundamental economic problem, or at least the problem with 
which economists have traditionally concerned themselves most, is that 
of maximizing society's welfare in the face of various constraints-
constraints imposed both by the natural world, and by man's limited 
knowledge of the ways in which the natural world can be manipulated 
to achieve society's ends. 
One of the most basic constraints prevailing (although one which , 
until recently, has received little explicit attention from economists) 
is that implied by the law of Conservation of Mass. This law insists 
that processes of production and consumption can, via chemical 
and physical change, modify but never destroy the matter used in those 
processes. In other words, except to the extent that re-use is feasible 
(and economical) , production-consumption activities inevitably in-
volve the conversion of productive inputs (including oxygen from the 
atmosphere) into an equivalent mass of non-productive residuals that 
must somehow be disposed of. 
It perhaps needs to be emphasized in this connection that it is 
consumption, and not production , which is the ultimate objective of 
economic activity: production processes exist, not as ends in themselves, 
but merely to satisfy individuals' demands for physical consumption 
goods. Thus, while production activities no doubt typically generate a 
larger volume of more objectionable waste products than consumption 
activities do, nevertheless all disposals can ultimately be seen as arising 
from a multi-stage process in which naturally occurring matter is trans-
formed, firstly into a form in which it is amenable to consumption, and 
then via the consumption process itself into some other form in which it 
is generally not consumable. It is consumption therefore which provides 
the rationale for all economic activity-and hence society's demand for 
physical consumption goods which is ultimately responsible for the need 
for residuals disposal. 
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Once this point is admitted, it is clcar that that view of the pollution 
problem, quite common in popular discussion, which seeks to categorize 
individuals into two mutually exclusive classcs-the wicked polluters 
on thc one hand, and the deserving polluted on the other-and sees 
the pollution problem as arising out of the moral degeneracy of the 
former group, is in fact hopelessly misguided, It is, more seriously, 
dangerously confusing. The truth of the matter is that all consumers 
contribute to pollution by the very act of consumption: firms pollute, 
not because they derive fiendish delight from doing so, but because the 
individual consumers of their products pay them to.2 In this sense, it 
is not a case of 'them' against 'us', but us against ourselves-and it 
saves a lot of misplaced indignation to realize that this is so. 
Until quite recently, residuals disposal docs not secm to have been 
widely regarded as posing a serious problem-in economic, or any 
other, terms. That this is so is presumably attributable to the fact that 
such disposals had not interfered at all significantly with other produc-
tion and consumption activities which individuals wishcd to pursue. 
Disposal is, of course, effected simply by the discharge (either deliber-
ately or as the result of natural processcs) of the unwanted residuals 
into the atmosphere (as gases or waste energy), into the waterways 
(as sewage, or as industrial residuals suspended or dissolved in water), 
or onto the land (as rubbish, scrap, junk, garbage and so on). And over 
some range, the basic assimilative capacity of these media can handle 
such discharge. That is to say, the environment at large is capable of 
transporting, dissipating, diluting, degrading or storing to some extent all 
types of residual generated by man's production/consumption activities, 
though its capacity to do so may be affected by natural phenomena 
(temperature, wind-speed and stream flow variations, for example) or 
by deliberate human intervention (such as augmenting stream flows, 
treating residuals before discharge, or such relatively simple things as 
building higher chimney-stacks).3 Up to a point, the natural qualities of 
the environment thus provide us with a means of disposing of residuals 
in an essentially costless fashion. Beyond that point, however, there 
begins to emerge a conflict between man's use of the environment as a 
sink for residuals disposal, and such other uses for it as he may have. 
Once recognized, the precise nature and extent of this conflict needs 
to be specified. And this is not necessarily a trivial exercise, in part 
because the nature of the 'other uses' of the environment are not clearly 
or completely specified, but also because hard facts, and even convincing 
theories, are in short supply. However, it is clear that an almost endless 
list of potential or actual damage caused by residuals could now be 
compiled, ranging from potential threats to man's existence, through 
scarcely Jess potentially devastating (though less specific) threats of 
ecological instability, right down to relatively minor damage to buildings 
and the like. In other words, apart from providing a sink for residuals, 
the natural environment provides a variety of other services which con-
2 We are not suggesting that consumers actually pay firms to pollute. But 
operating in a world where legal and other constraints are imperfect, it is demands 
for products and their consumption which lead to pollution. 
• We might also observe that the natural processes are not always rapid, and 
occasionally they may in fact be detrimental to human well-being (e.g. the 
'natural' production of ozone and nitrogen dioxide from motor vehicle exhausts). 
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tribute directly to indi viduals' satisfactions, and over a substantial-and 
practically relevant range, the use of the environment as a sink conflicts 
with these other uses. If we term these other uses, somewhat loosely, as 
elements in the demand for a 'clean environment', the conflict to which 
we are referring can be characterized as a conflict between the consump-
tion of two broad classes of goods-physical (or produced) commo-
dities, which necessarily involve the creation of residuals, and the direct 
consumption of 'clean environment' . 
Of course, this is something of a simplification, since some commodi-
ties may require 'clean environment' not only as a disposable medium, 
but also as an input in their production processes. (For example, some 
chemical processes may require pure water for the appropriate chemical 
reactions to occur). This complicates, but does not alter, the basic 
problem: it implies simply that some goods may be highly com ple-
mentary in production with the good, 'clean environment', and presum-
ably some others highly substitutable. It is convenient at this stage how-
ever, to retain our conceptually simple two-good model. 
Once pollution is recognized as the manifestation of an inevitable 
conflict between two typcs of consumption activity, the reconciliation 
of that conflict emerges as the central problem for society. A choice 
has to be made between the consumption of physical commodities and 
the consumption of clean environment, and the crucial question is how 
that choice might best be made. 
Under at least one fashionable conccption of economics, such choices 
are viewed as being the central subject matter of the discipline, and, it 
must be admitted, it is rather comforting for the economist to be able 
to point out that for him the pollution problem emerges as one 
amenable to quite standard economic rcasoning. This is not, in any 
sense, to belittle the magnitude or importance of the pollution problem, 
nor even necessarily to claim that the economist's techniques are ade-
quate for the task in hand, but merely to point out that, looked upon 
in this way, it is apparent that there is nothing inherently more difficult 
about the pollution problem than many others to which the economist 
has applied his doubtful expertise. 
II 
Pollution as a Problem of Social Choice 
To recognize a social problem as a question of choice does not 
necessarily identify it as one requiring an explicitly social choice-i.e. 
one demanding the explicit application of public policy. 
Many-indeed perhaps most-social choices are not made explicitly 
as such. Rather, they emerge as the summation of the outcomes of a 
large number of decentralized market decisions. And we know that 
there is nothing inherently inefficient about such decentralization of 
decision-making; indeed, quite standard and widely applied theorems of 
welfare economics state that in many cases the resulting choices are the 
best conceivable ones. In such cases, co-ordination of decisions is 
achieved neatly, and at least cost, by the market mechanism. 
On the other hand, it is equally clear th at some choices are not 
appropriately left to the co-ordinating forces of the market or, at least, 
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it is not obvious that market solutions represent the best or least-cost 
solutions. In these circumstances the social choices may be made, or 
may require to be made, explicitly as social choices through a political 
mechanism of some sort. 
But it is not immediately apparent that choices made in a political 
context will better represent 'the aggregate desires of society': the 
question of whether the political mechanism makes better choices than 
the market mechanism depends on a number of things, including the 
precise form of the political decision-making process, and the nature 
of the commodity over which the choice is being exercised. For example, 
the very characteristics which disrupt the smooth working of the market 
mechanism may also preclude efficient choices being exercised through 
the political mechanism. 
Thus, in focussing on the pollution 'problem' from a policy viewpoint, 
we might ask two sorts of questions-firstly, what are the characteristics 
of pollution that are likely to make it difficult for the market to make a 
satisfactory allocation of resources to the output of 'clean environment'; 
and secondly what are the characteristics of the political mechanism 
as an allocator of resources to alternative uses, and to what extent is 
its performance in this context likely to be superior to (or different 
from) the market's? 
Market Failure 
In the case of pollution problems, what appears likely to result in 
failure of decentralized market processes to ensure an ideal choice 
between the competing uses of the environment is the fact that such 
problems are characterized by externality. Externalities are often said to 
arise whenever the well-being of one economic unit is affected by the 
activities of other units-that is, whenever utility and/or production 
functions exhibit interdependencies.4 However, from the viewpoint of 
identifying the existence of externality with the failure of the market 
mechanism to make appropliate (allocative) choices rather more is re-
quired than mere interdependence. Clearly many activities involve inter-
dependencies, but not all of them involve market failure problems. Indeed 
the very existence of markets depends upon the existence of interdepen-
dencies, for it is the function of markets to internalize the interdependen-
cies. In simple terms an example of what we have in mind is the observa-
tion that our welfare is increased by the productive activities of others, 
but at the margin we pay for their products what they are worth to us, so 
that the marginal social contribution of their activities is matched by 
the payments they receive. It is only when appropriate compensation is 
not forthcoming-when interdependencies are not internalized-that 
externalities exist. More precisely externalities exist whenever decision-
makers do not take into account relevant costs or benefits of their 
actions, which benefits and costs, if they were taken into account would 
result in different, and socially preferable, choices being made. 
The application of these notions to the economic probrem of residuals 
disposal is, however, perhaps not so obvious as it might at first seem. 
Certainly to the extent that externalities do exist they can be associated 
• The externalit y problem is examined in detail in Coase [6] and Buchanan 
and Stubblebine [4]. 
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with interdependencies between the production/consumption of physical 
goods (which involves residuals disposal) and the consumption of 
'clean environment'. By the same token, what exists is not a single 
interdependence, but a compound of inter-related interdependencies 
which we could classify according to environmental media involved 
(atmosphere, lithosphere or hydrosphere) and/or according to ultimately 
affected 'parties' (humans, animals, plants or inanimate objects). How-
ever, we cannot immediately conclude that we are faced with problems 
of externality, for up to a point the market permits, and indeed positively 
encourages, adjustments by individual economic units which resolve or 
mitigate the conflict of demands. For example, individuals may make 
their demands for a clean environment effective by changing their resi-
dential location, or by installing air cleaning or conditioning devices in 
their homes, and will do so if this constitutes their least-cost response 
to the interdependencies. Moreover, to take another related example, 
those individuals who demand pollution-free food or water provide .a 
stimulus through the profit motive to others to produce commodities 
which will satisfy these demands, as witnessed by the availability of 
bottled 'pure' water and of 'uncontaminated' foods. 5 
What is characteristic of these adjustments is that they involve 
attempts to internalize the interdependencies at the point where residuals 
appear as an unwanted input into other production/consumption activi-
ties, rather than at ,the point where the residuals arise as an inevitable 
output (by-product) of the production or consumption of physical goods. 
The extent of such adjustments is of course limited in the first place by 
technical feasibility considerations, and ultimately by their economic 
viability, and if adjustments above and beyond these seem to be econ-
omically desirable the emphasis must be shifted to tackling residuals 
disposals at source, where they occur simultaneously with the produc-
tion and consumption of physical goods. However it is at this point that 
market inefficiencies-genuine externality problems-are most likely 
to emerge since adjustments of this sort inevitably involve cooperative 
agreements among the relevant individuals in circumstances where such 
cooperation seems likely to break down. 
In the market context, and given the common-property nature of 
most dimensions of the natural environment, any changes in residuals 
outputs which are desirable will be achieved only by the 'polluted' parties 
offering compensation to the 'polluter' for any adjustments he makes.6 
Any such adjustments can be regarded as socially desirable if the 
marginal damage suffered by the polluted individuals exceeds the mar-
ginal cost to the polluter of changing his output, and indeed such adjust-
ments could only occur through voluntary action in so far as these 
implied net benefits exist. However, it is unlikely that the cooperative 
agreements-the bribes-will be appropriately arranged because the 
benefits of such agreements are non-excludable-that is, the benefits of 
5 We should perhaps emphasize two points relating to cases where the market 
does provide apparently efficient solutions. First, market processes may be slow 
in responding to the emergence of previously unrecognized conflicts; and, 
secondly, the market solutions may sometimes be grossly inequitable. Either of 
these observations might be sufficient to justify public intervention. 
• The compensation or 'bribes' referred to here is in an economic sense no 
different from prices paid for goods and services in the market. 
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reduced pollution arising from a bribe offered to the polluter by one 
individual accrue to all affected individuals even though they have made 
no contribution to the cost of reducing the pollution level. Each indi-
vidual thus obtains a 'free-ride' (cost-free benefits) at others' eJS:pense 
and, of course, has an incentive to obtain as substantial a free-ride as 
is possible. If the numbers of individuals involved is large, as will 
typically be the case in pollution problems, then each individual will be 
aware that any attempt on his part to obtain a free-ride will have a negli-
gible impact on the final negotiated outcome. He is thereby given a 
very definite incentive to understate his true preferences. Thus, the 
market is doomed in these circumstances to produce an inefficient 
allocation of resources between physical commodities and clean environ-
ment-and this despite the presumed existence of benefits to every-
one from a successful internalization of the relevant interdependencies. 
If the government is to succeed where the market fails, it must be 
able to overcome the difficulties inherent in the non-excludability prob-
lem associated with tackling residuals disposal at source. To this end, 
of course, governments have available to them a wide variety of policy 
instruments ranging from their ability to manipulate the legal system 
within which the market operates, through to their ability to manipulate 
the market process via the imposition of taxes and subsidies. However, 
before turning to a discussion of the instruments available, and their 
relative success in achieving an efficient allocation of resources between 
physical goods and clean environment, we shall consider the second 
of our two general questions-is there any reason for believing that 
explicit social choices, made through the political mechanism, will result 
in better choices than those achieved by the market? 
Political Failure 
It is typically presumed in economic policy discussions that where 
the market proves to be an inefficient coordinator of decisions, the 
government should step in to remedy the market's failings. As a value-
judgement, such a view would presumably meet with widespread 
approval, but it is an altogether different matter to establish the positive 
proposition that where the government does intervene, its decisions will 
be superior to those made in the market: political mechanisms them-
selves may be imperfect in coordinating decisions. Certainly the real-
world political framework appears to bear little relationship to the 
omniscient, infinitely benevolent government implied in much of the 
policy literature, and in this sense the answer to the question 'can the 
government do better than the market?' is not at all obvious. 
In fact, the performance of the government in economic policy mat-
ters has been subjected to a certain amount of analysis in the recent 
past. 7 Unfortunately most of the theoretical issues are nowhere near to 
being resolved so that any attempt on our part to deduce conclusions 
about the likely performance of the government with respect to pollu-
tion control must necessarily be tentative. Nonetheless, given the impor-
tance of the pollution problem (as well as the importance of the issues 
to be raised for policy discussion of all sorts) an attempt to indicate 
'The major contributions are the work of Downs [8] Tullock [13]. and 
Buchanan and Tullock [5]. 
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some of the more important features of the political mechanism's 
operation seems worthwhile. 
There is one sense in which the usual presumption that government 
intervention will be oriented towards improving the allocation of re-
sources is understandable. When we say that the market fails to allocate 
resources efficiently, what we generally mean is that there is a possible 
change in allocation which would make some individuals better off and 
none worse off: if this is so then there would appear to be benefits to 
elected governments (in terms of improvements in their popularity, or 
probability of being re-elected) from improving the allocation of 
resources where the market decisions are inefficient. Indeed, if it were 
true that all government decisions required unanimous support from the 
electorate then this observation would have substantial relevance. At 
least one assumes that no-one would give their support to policies which 
made them worse off, so that overall those changes in policy which 
occur would involve improvements in resource allocation in the normal 
Paretian sense. 
However, once we recognize that governments need only strive for 
majority, and not unanimous support, then we must also recognize that 
both the motivation and ability of governments to seek improvements in 
resource allocation are likely to be weak for at least two important 
reasons: 
(a) Given that the politicians who compose political parties are 
motivated, roughly speaking, by much the same aims as most 
'ordinary' individuals, and hence that they are not likely to be more 
than usually altruistic, it would seem likely that political parties 
would aim to improve the efficiency of the allocation of resources 
only in so far as political processes (and especially interparty com-
petition) constrains them to do so. In fact, however, a party can 
be elected or ensure continuing support by redistributing income 
in favour of elector ally important or dominant coalitions of indi-
viduals in society. For this reason we would expect that political 
competition is at least as likely to take the form of 'bribing' such 
groups of individuals (floating voters, farmers, the unions, business-
men and so on) by offers of specific tax concessions or subsidies, 
as it is to involve pressures to improve the allocation of resources. 
Ultimately, under majority rule, even a policy platform offering a 
perfectly efficient allocation of resources can be defeated by another 
platform offering redistribution of income from a minority to a 
majority of voters. 8 
(b) To the extent that incentives do exist for governments to attempt 
to improve on the allocation of resources determined by the 
market mechanism, they are constrained by the information that is 
made available to them about individuals' preferences. The informa-
tion made available to the government through voting behaviour is 
likely to be deficient for a number of reasons. In the first place, 
since an individual voter recognizes that his vote is unlikely to be 
decisive, he will (quite rationally) tend to seek little information 
8 Strictly speaking, of course, redistributions need only be aimed at potential 
floating voters, or groups which carry enough influence to affect the outcome of 
elections. 
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about the benefits of publicly provided services, or at least will not 
obtain as much information about them as he would about equiva-
lent goods or services available in the private market. In the 
second place, voters have only one vote with which to express 
their preferences over competing packages of policies (policy plat-
forms): they are not in a position to reveal their preferences over 
specific projects, nor the intensity with which those preferences are 
held. For these sorts of reasons the ballot-box is likely to be a poor 
source of information for government, and they will be obliged 
to rely fairly heavily on less direct sources of information provided 
by lobbies, formal surveys and enquiries, letters to members, and 
so on. However, while these sources may provide some information, 
the quality of that information is unknown. It may, for example, 
reflect peculiarities in the cost-sharing (tax) arrangements: anyone 
will demand more of a publicly provided service if it will cost them 
little or nothing. 
Considerations of this sort certainly confirm what was perhaps intui-
tively obvious anyway: that the government is not at all likely to make 
the most efficient choice between physical goods and clean environment. 
It also gives us reason for treating with considerably more caution than 
is usually done the presumption that the government will nonetheless 
improve on the market's results. The government has, of course, a 
number of advantages over the market: through its coercive powers 
(through taxation) the government can force everyone to contribute to 
the cost of pollution control, and in this sense has a means of coping 
with the 'free-rider' (non-excludability) problem that is the prime cause 
of the market's failure. Moreover, by responding to the desires of a 
coalition of individuals the government obtains a degree of co-operation 
which (as explained earlier) would be missing in the market where 
each individual attempts to free-ride at others' expense. Clearly, the 
more homogeneous the preferences of the individuals in society the more 
likely it is that preferences of the dominant coalition will be fairly 
representative of those of society as a whole, and hence that the govern-
ment's response will be substantially better than the market's . Unfor-
tunately, we have little reason for supposing that the pollution issue 
is one on which there is a great deal of agreement. At least, that is, 
we regard the pollution question as involving more intense divisions of 
opinion than many other current issues, and hence we suspect that the 
performance of the political mechanism is likely to be correspondingly 
poorer: we cannot be certain, though, whether this is likely to involve 
too much, or too little pollution control. 
This catalogue of difficulties inherent in the political mechanism con-
vinces us that we should not expect too much of the government as a 
decision-maker in relation to pollution control. This is not to say that 
the government cannot be expected to improve at all on the market, 
and clearly the better informed it is, the greater are its chances of 
achieving a signifIcant improvement. The economist's role would, then, 
appear to be to attempt to inform the government about its main policy 
options in controlling pollution, and the considerations which are likely 
to be crucial in choosing between them. It is to an outline of this task 
that we now turn our attention. 
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III 
Methods of Pollution Control 
In so far as the market fails to establish an efficient allocation of 
resources between the output of physical commodities and the output of 
clean environment, the government is faced with the problem of choos-
ing between a large number of instruments for modifying the behaviour 
of economic units. Since our major concern is with general conceptual 
issues, it seems useful to begin by attempting to classify the instruments 
available into broad categories. One such classification which im-
mediately suggests itself is that which distinguishes those instruments 
which involve the use of the government's legal powers from those which 
involve the use of its fiscal powers. 
This particular classification is one that has been quite widely used 
in economic analysis, apparently in the belief that it provides a clear 
distinction between the use of direct controls and the use of fiscal instru-
ments. However, in an important sense this particular distinction is 
misleading, for the legal powers available to the government are of two 
quite distinct sorts, only one of which corresponds to the 'direct controls' 
mentioned above. 
One form of legal power available to the government is that which 
allows it to establish liability rules. That is, the government may establish 
whether or not those whose activities impose damage on others are 
'liable' for the damages caused. Once such liability rules are established, 
and the means of enforcing them (i.e. the legal system) provided, it 
may be left to voluntary activity to determine the extent to which 
individuals are prepared to allow their rights to be abridged in exchange 
for some form of compensation. 
The second form of legal action involves the government establishing 
structural rules, such as regulations and prohibitions, which directly 
limit the permissible behaviour of individuals and / or firms. In one sense, 
these structural rules are not unlike the liability rules since both estab-
lish particular patterns of property rights. However, while the liability 
rules form a base from which negotiations may freely proceed between 
damaged and damaging parties, the structural rules provide a non-
negotiable upper limit to the extent that one party may inflict damage 
upon another. 
It is clear, then, that there are three distinguishable policy types 
available to government-the establishment of liability rules, the estab-
lishment of structural rules, or the use of fiscal instruments-and at 
the most general level the issue to be tackled is the question whether 
there are reasons for favouring one policy type over the others in 
attempting to achieve an efficient level of pollution control. For purposes 
of analysis, the subsequent discussion is broken into two sections. The 
first considers briefly the way that changing liability rules might help 
to relieve the pollution problem, while the second contains a more 
extensive discussion of regulations (i.e. structural rules) and fiscal 
instruments in controlling pollution. 
Liability Rules, Property Rights and Pollution Control 
There is a clear connection between the establishment of liability rules 
(i.e. the definition of property rights) and the successful operation of 
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the market system. The process of exchange which characterizes market 
transactions essentially involves the exchange of property rights over 
the services of assets owned by the transacting parties. This of course 
is most obvious in the case of a barter process, but the only substantive 
difference in modern market systems is that money is interposed as the 
medium through which the exchange of property rights is effected. 
These 'property rights' embody the relevant liability rules, if the ex-
change system (the market mechanism) is to function efficiently it 
must be possible to define and enforce all such rights. If we cannot 
enforce a property right over the benefits of our activities others will 
benefit without having to exchange some of their property to obtain 
the services of ours. This is, of course, precisely the problem generally 
referred to as the 'free-rider' problem arising from non-excludability, 
and in a fundamental sense this problem arises directly from an inability 
to enforce property rights. 
The relationship between these observations and the possibility of 
using changes in liability rules as a solution for the pollution problem 
lies predominantly in the fact that much of the natural environment is 
not subject to private property rights. In most respects the air mantle, 
waterways and open access lands are common property resources, 
equally available for use by all; and even in those cases where there 
are liability rules relating to damages caused through use of 'the 
environment', the large numbers of economic units involved, and the 
diffuse nature of the damage each imposes on other users of the environ-
ment often makes the enforcement of property rights technically and 
economically infeasible. These facts have inspired the belief that chang-
ing liability rules--defining or redefining property rights-would provide 
one way of improving the allocation of resources to pollution control. 
The proposals for an 'Environmental Bill of Rights', awarding a 
property right to a clean environment to individuals in society, are a 
case in point. Already modest beginnings with such Bills have been made 
in some states of the U.S.A. and their major purpose seems to be to 
make the burden of proof in environmental suits (under nuisance and 
property laws) less demanding. If these Bills of Right achieve their 
purpose, they will provide some incentive to polluters to control the 
damage they cause, or to offer compensation to affected individuals, 
although the extent to which this is so depends crucially upon the 
success of prosecutions under the Bills, the cost of prosecutions, and the 
size of damages awarded. 
The qualifications introduced in the last sentence are obviously of 
critical importance, for the point of relying on this (or any other) sort 
of re-allocation of property rights to solve the choice problem is not 
merely to provide a legal and institutional framework within which 
retribution can be exacted ex post for damages suffered: the essential 
purpose of defining (or re-defining) property rights is to establish a basis 
from which negotiations between polluter and polluted could emerge 
to internalize relevant interdependencies through voluntary action. What 
is required, then, is not simply the clear definition of rights, but also the 
means of policing and enforcing such rights. So long as it is difficult to 
perceive iniringements of rights or to prove damages, and while large 
numbers of economic units are involved, the negotiation and policing of 
agreements between damaging and damaged parties will remain economi-
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cally infeasible. But even if Environmental Bills of Rights are successful 
in reducing the problems of enforcement, there is yet another problem 
to be faced-that is, they may give rise to a level of pollution which is 
inefficiently low. This is so because precisely thc reasoning which induces 
individuals to understate their preferences for pollution control when the 
fu·m has a de facto right to pollute, will induce individuals to overstate 
their requirements for compensation when the firm is liable for damages 
caused. In this case, the choice between physical goods and clean 
environment will be distorted in favour of the latter, and it is by no 
means obvious that a distortion in that direction is to be preferred. 
It certainly seems to us that whatever purpose manipulation of proper-
ty rights may serve, it is unlikely that it will provide a simple solution to 
the pollution problem. The crucial points may, perhaps, be summarized 
as follows. If the market fails to achieve an efficient allocation of 
resources, then it may fail whatever the allocation of property rights, 
because market failure can often be taken to imply that enforcement 
of private property rights is infeasible or uneconomic; and , moreover, 
if the enforcement problems can be mitigated (by, for example, reducing 
the burden of proof in environment suits) we may find ourselves faced 
with a choice between inefficiently high and inefficiently low levels of 
pollution! 
Perhaps, after all, Environmental Bills of Right and similar legal instru-
ments should be seen as embodying a statement of society's views on 
the most equitable liability rules. Effective enforcement of property 
rights, and hence the establishment of major improvements in the 
allocation of resources between clean environment and physical con-
sumption, will, in most cases, require the government to intervene more 
directly in market processes, through the use of its regulatory and 
fiscal powers. 
Fiscal Instruments and Regulations in Pollution Control 
Accepting that the establishment of efficient pollution control measures 
will require the government to intervene more or less directly in the 
market, using its fiscal or its regulatory powers, what issues are likely 
to be decisive in choosing the appropriate policy-mix? 
This question, which constitutes the subject matter of this section, 
is not easily answered. In part, the difficulties arise from the fact that 
the criteria needed to judge the relative merits of the available options 
are difficult to specify with precision, but, in addition, the policy options 
which have been grouped into the categories 'fiscal instruments' and 
'regulatory powers,g may themselves be employed in many different 
ways. For example, in a purely technical sense it is possible to distinguish 
three basic methods of controlling pollution: reduction in the volume 
and/or improvement in the quality, location , or time pattern of residuals 
generation ; treatment of residuals after generation and/or improvement 
of the assimilative capacity of the environment; or application of protec-
tive measures at the point where damage is inflicted upon the ultimate 
receptors. To each of these technical methods of control there corres-
• The term 'fiscal instruments' refers to both taxes and subsidies, while 
'regulatory powers' includes the power to prohibit or ban an activity. Tn the 
analysis which follows we generally use taxes as representative of all fiscal instru-
ments, and regulations as a term covering all direct controls. 
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ponds an array of taxes, subsidies, or regulations which may be 
employed to achieve some given degree of control. For example, if 
we are concerned primarily with controlling the volume and/ or quality 
of residuals generated in productive activities, we may choose to relate 
taxes, subsidies or regulations to one or more of the following dimen-
sions of the production-consumption process: 
(i) pollution 'nuisance' or damage, defined in terms of the relevant 
argument(s) which enter individuals' utility functions, or firms' 
production functions; 
(ii) the emissions which are produced as a by-product in the produc-
tion of goods; 
(iii) the goods with which emissions are jointly produced; 
(iv) the inputs used in production processes generating pollution. 
Rather than attempting (and necessarily failing) to do justice to the 
infinite variety of alternative policies and policy-mixes available, we 
have concentrated on the general issue of whether there are reasons 
systematically favouring the use of fiscal instruments over 'equivalent' 
regulations, or vice-versa. By way of justification we might offer two 
observations. Firstly, much of the detailed investigation of the various 
parameters to which taxes and regulations may be applied is available 
elsewhere;lo and secondly discussion at this more general level may 
substantially reduce the difficulties which need to be resolved at the 
more specific level of choice. However, whichever level of choice we are 
concerned to examine, an essential first-step is the specification of the 
criteria in terms of which choice should be made, and it is to this 
task that we initially turn. 
The Criteria 
In the most general sense, the basic objective is to choose, from the 
available set of policy options, a policy (or policy mix) which will 
achieve global efficiency in the allocation of resources to alternative 
uses-which 'uses' explicitly include the output 'clean environment'. 
However, in order to make some progress towards evaluating the rela-
tive merits of alternative policy options it seems appropriate to break 
up the general efficiency goal into several specific aspects, which we can 
indicate by raising the following set of questions: 
(i) does the policy achieve an efficient 'quantity' of pollution (clean 
environment), both in the period in which it is initially imposed, 
and over time? 
(ii) does the policy achieve the established level of pollution control at 
least social cost in terms of other goods and services foregone? 
(iii) how does the policy distribute cost between the various parties 
in the pollution conflict? 
(iv) what, for any given level of policy success, are the informational 
requirements of the policy? 
(v) what are the measurement and monitoring costs associated with the 
chosen policy? 
10 See, for instance, Brennan, Walsh and Chisholm [3], Parish [10] and Zerbe 
[14]. 
The', \ 
;<lLuncD 
;:no1d 
~Jlen:~ 
once qU( 
tellj~f 
[/lITJI 
jeJ(ecit 
tcla~~j( 
neb 
Le)~w 
qr.lll: 
accDJlJi 
J:ra:cre 
cl6t,mi' 
cj(lice~ 
ale:C(i[ i 
Icno'h 
fwr~~ 113 
lle pn 
o:nscal U 
~6k,~ ~ 
fue .aler 
~Ul2~~11 
w~;:k u. 
inl~l!!Iem 
t:;)d 
o.llerelce 
i;:tmnm 
lnu 
Cuc\cna! 
telocied 
rateltn.:a 
U>],tVle] 
:l.e:ei.~:: .i 
::le O\er[ 
cncn~ei m 
latiot~. 0 
aJd B Qet! 
a'llltt:iX 
. kh:t, 
1::0 ale] 
he c,n~a\ 
'The p~ 
~tDi~ ito: 
C(~;:i .~ 
e~\~it'l! 
I'}:!:. 
, ,ac:j;f 
(:I:~ ~Ot~Lttv~ ~eJt~~ 
IPR:!. 1974 POLLUTION RESOURCE ALLOCATION 15 
~.) ~ 
li!i~e, it 
. ~urui~ 
iUrelM: 
; cue!. 
.. , we 
These questions involve, to a certain extent, distinct dimensions of 
pollution control techniques. The first two relate to aspects of the 
standard Paretian efficiency goal.ll The third, in contrast, is basically 
concerned with the incidence of the various policy options. While inci-
dence questions might typically be thought of as being concerned with 
the distributional impact of the adopted policy, it is important to recog-
nize that distributional effects may not be allocatively neutral: the inci-
dence of the policy may directly influence the quantity of pollution con-
trol applied. 
The last two of the questions raised relate to administrative matters: 
they merit explicit attention here precisely because they are of such 
importance. To achieve Pareto optimality "regardless of cost" is clearly 
a contradiction in terms-and as has been emphasized in the externality 
literature (at least from Coase [6] onwards) questions of administrative 
cost, in the widest sense, may be crucial in determining the appropriate 
choice between policy tools. Because of their importance, particular 
attention is given to information and measurement costs in the compari-
son of fiscal instruments and regulatory controls which follows. 
Fiscal Instruments versus Regulations 
The primary difference between the use of regulations and the use 
of fiscal instruments to achieve a given end is that the fonner seeks to 
achieve the objective by directly manipulating relative quantities, while 
the latter operates on relative prices. While we shall have reason to 
suggest that this difference is of crucial importance in determining 
whether one or the other policy-type is generally to be preferred as the 
instrument for establishing an efficient level of pollution control, it may 
be as well to indicate at this point that at the conceptual level the 
difference between fiscal instruments and regulations is not as great as 
is commonly suggested. 
In an analytical sense, the difference between, say, a tax on the pro-
duction of a commodity, and a law regulating its output level might 
be looked on as follows: a regulation involves an implicit tax, with a 
rate structure that is subject to a large, discrete change at some point-
usually zero up to that point, and some other, positive and finite, rate 
thereafterP A tax, on the other hand, usually applies at a non-zero 
rate over the whole range of output, although it too could have discrete 
changes in the rate structure. The non-zero tax rate implicit in the regu-
lation is, of course, associated with the cost of violating the regulation , 
and is determined by the probability of being detected and convicted, 
and the penalty imposed on conviction. 
In fact, if the practice of courts or legislatures in framing penalties 
is to attempt to estimate the true cost to the rest of society involved in 
the contravention of the law, and then shore up this 'cost' to allow 
II The Paretian efficiency goal refers to the attainment of a so-called Pareto 
optimal allocation of resources i.e. an allocation such that there exists no further 
changes which allow someone to be made better-off without making someone 
else worse-off. 
12 The fact that the implicit rate is almost always finite is important, for it is 
this fact which ensures that there will be some possibility of firms failing to meet 
the regulations. This implicit tax rate is, as we suggest later, a function of the 
probability of violations of the regulation being detected and prosecuted, and the 
fine imposed on conviction. 
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for inadequacies in enforcement procedures, the expected cost to each 
firm of contravening the law would seem to be exactly the same as that 
faced by the firm under a tax calculated according to marginal social 
damaae caused (i.e. the 'ideal' Pigovian tax). Of course, one could 
argue~ possibly quite forcibly, that generally held notions of retributive 
justice ('making the punishment fit the crime') may tend to militate 
against offenders bcing fined more than the estimated value of damages 
caused, so that due allowance for the probability of being detected is 
not made. However, there are often other costs associated with the act 
of law-breaking arising from the disapproval of society (psychic costs, 
or loss of goodwill, for example). Such costs (if applying) raise the 
effective tax rate implicit in the regulation, and may offset the failure 
of the courts to take full account of the deficiencies in enforcement 
procedures. 
Clearly, taxes and regulations can, in principle, be made to operate 
in precisely the same way, and the differences between them at the 
conceptual level are much smaller than is often suggested. Nonetheless, 
important differences do exist associated with information requirements, 
measurement costs, and allocative effects generally. 
Information Requirements. 
One of the crucial differences between the use of taxes and regula-
tions for achieving a relatively efficient level of pollution abatement 
is associated with their information requirements. Surprisingly, this is 
a fact which has received less attention than it warrants, and such 
observations as have been made are often dangerously misleading. 
To achieve a relatively efficient degree of pollution control through 
a policy of 'pure' regulation, the government would need to know: 
(a) what is the optimum aggregate level of pollution abatement for each 
of the various types of waste emissions; 
(b) how these aggregates should be allocated among individual pollut-
ing units; and 
(c) the level of penalties necessary to ensure compliance with the 
regulations. 
The information needed to make correct decisions is clearly enormous: 
ideally what we need to know to establish the regulations is the marginal 
social damage function (the demand curve for pollution abatement) 
and the marginal social cost of abatement function (the supply curve 
of pollution abatement) not merely for each type of waste emission, 
but also for each individual polluting unit. Estimation of the demand 
curves requires obtaining individuals' evaluations of different levels of 
environmental quality, while estimation of the supply curves involves 
estimating the cost of goods and services foregone to achieve different 
levels of pollution abatement. And we need to know both because we 
wish to know the optimum quantity of pollution abatement. 
Pollution taxes, on the other hand, would appear to be inherently 
less dem anding information ally than regulations designed to achieve the 
same efficient level of pollution abatement. The point is that if we 
could estimate the demand curves for pollution abatement, we could 
face firms with a tax schedule corresponding to the marginal social 
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damage at each level of their activity, and firms themselves would 
adjust their activities to the efficient level. In short, in order to impose 
the appropriate tax, we need only know the demand curve, whereas 
for regulations we need both the demand and supply curves. Of course, 
with the tax scheme we would not know what the optimum pollution 
level is: the optimum will emerge from firms' adjustments. 
The difficulties associated with obtaining the necessary information 
to set appropriate rates of tax should not, of course, be underestimated; 
and the costs of failing to obtain all the required information may be 
extreme.l3 Nonetheless, it does seem clear that whatever the difficulties 
involved in meeting the informational demands of establishing efficient 
pollution taxes may be, they are substantially less than those involved in 
establishing equally efficient regulations. Since, in practice, we will 
have to contend with very incomplete information, expendable uncer-
tainties should not be introduced: the expected error in 'guessing' an 
optimal tax structure is likely to be less than that involved in 'guessing' 
an optimal quantity . 
Measurement Requirements 
An important aspect of the administration of pollution control policies 
lies in the business of measuring and monitoring individuals' use of the 
various recipient media for the discharge of wastes. It is tempting for 
policy-administrators to focus only on that dimension of measurement 
cost which accrues to the government; but individual firms might also 
be obliged to incur measurement costs under certain policy options. Thus 
two aspects of the measurement problem are relevant: 
(a) what is the total amount of measurement required? 
(b) how is the responsibility for measurement apportioned between 
government and individual firms? 
In the absence of empirical detail it is not possible to know preci-
sely how measurement costs vary between industries, between regula-
tions and taxes, and according to which parameters within the produc-
tion-consumption process are measured.H Some general observations 
can, however, be made. 
With a pollution tax it would appear to be necessary for each firm's 
activities to be continuously monitored in order to establish total tax 
liability. A regulation, on the other hand, is normally enforced by 
monitoring the activities of some (randomly selected) firms at occasional 
(randomly selected) time intervals. Thus under a regulation, it seems, 
at first glance, that measurement costs will be smaller. We do not believe 
13 For example, a tax on emissions into the atmosphere may induce firms 
to substitute water for air as the recipient medium for waste products-and the 
resulting state of the world may well be worse than formerly. 
H It seems fairly clear, however, that measurement costs will generall y be 
lower when the target of the tax or regulation is physical inputs or outputs of 
goods, rather than waste emissions or actual pollution damage. Against these 
lower measurement costs must be set the fact that it is relatively inefficient to 
control pollution by imposing taxes on physical inputs or outputs. We simply do 
not have the formidable amount of information that would be required to specify 
the particular mix and level of taxes on physical inputs and/ or outputs that would 
result in precisely the same allocation of resources as would efficient taxes on 
pollution damage itself. 
B 
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this to be true. Aithough the gdvernment is not required to do as much 
measuring as in the tax case, firms themselves will be required to 
measure their own emissions in order to ensure obedience to the law. 
If the effective tax rate implied under the regulation is the same as that 
under a tax, the incentive to measure will be the same. Total measure-
ment costs are therefore likely to be at least as large for a regulation as 
for an equivalent tax, but the government has the prime responsibility 
for measurement in the tax case-and the fi rm in the regulation case. 
Allocative Effects 
We have argued that, conceptually at least, it is possible to frame 
penalties such that the expected cost to a firm of contravening a regu-
lation is the same as that which would be faced by the firm under an 
ideal pollution tax designed to achieve the same resultant output of 
residuals. The implications for resource allocation are, however, likely 
to differ in some respects. 
In the first place, the outcome under a regulation-which is enforced 
by a system of occasional random checks-will depend partly upon 
the attitudes to risk of individual firms. If firms are risk averse, there 
will be less pollution under a regulation than under an 'equivalent' 
continuously monitored tax. 
In the second place, the tax normally involves payment over intra-
marginal as well as marginal units-the regulation applies only to 
marginal units. Thus, if a firm produces one hundred units of pollution 
on the basis of a pollution tax applying at an average rate of t dollars, 
it pays a total tax of 100. t dollars. If the same firm faces a pollution 
quota of one hundred units, and adheres to it (which it will if the 
expected cost of exceeding the quota is equal to, or more than, t dollars 
per unit excess) then it pays nothing at all .15 Although this phenomenon 
is customarily referred to as an 'income effect', this may be misleading 
because it is also sometimes suggested that, since firms will prefer regu-
lations to allocatively equivalent taxes, one might get more pollution 
control (via more general political acceptability for pollution control) 
if regulations are used.16 Moreover, it is also frequently noted that firms 
have a greater incentive to invest in pollution-reducing technology under 
taxes than under equivalent regulations because any given reduction in 
pollution is worth more to them in the tax case. In this sense, taxes and 
regulations are not allocatively equivalent, even when they result in the 
initial period in the same level of pollution output. Thus, it is clear that 
the so-called 'income effects' mentioned here are not really income 
effects at all. 
Summary 
Taken together, the information, measurement and allocative aspects 
of the tax versus regulation comparison suggest that a fairly clear case 
exists for generally favouring the use of fiscal instruments over the 
use of regulatory powers as a means of achieving a relatively efficient 
level of pollution control. Of course, even at this very general level 
,. Except, of course, the foregone profits which applies equally to the tax. 
,. Firms would have an even higher preference for subsidies on pollution abate-
ment, byt given that subsidies would probably be financed via general taxes it 
-seems likely they would be less politically acceptable to the general public. 
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of analysis the arguments are not entirely conclusive. For example, we 
have already noted that the 'income effects' associated with regulations 
make their use more attractive to polluting units than equivalent taxes, 
and hence may make the use of regulations more politically acceptable. 
Moreover, if we consider particular cases of pollution we may find 
circumstances in which uncertainty is so pervasive, and the potential 
social costs of failing to take appropriate action so large, that the 
immediate imposition of stringent regulations appears to be essential. 
It is interesting to note, too, that this general preference for taxes 
over regulations also suggests that a somewhat distinct group of policies 
which have been the focus of increasing attention in recent years are 
not as attractive as they initially appear. 'These policies, which might 
collectively be referred to as 'environmental standards' approaches, 
involve a mixture of policy-types-partly imposing regulations (i.e. the 
imposition of aggregate standards of residuals disposal), and partly 
using the pricing mechanism (i.e. emissions taxes in the Baumol and 
Oates [2] scheme, and transferable quotas in Dales' [7] proposal). 
Baumol and Oates in particular have argued that these 'standards' 
approaches are information ally less demanding than pure tax approaches. 
Our earlier arguments, however, clearly suggest that this proposition 
is subject to serious doubt. 
The essential point is that in order to establish relatively efficient 
aggregate standards we must obtain estimates of both the aggregate 
demand and supply schedules for pollution control, whereas a pure 
tax scheme would involve estimation of only the demand schedule. 
However, we must also accept that the 'transferable quota' approach 
does have some countervailing advantages. Using a pure tax scheme, 
we need to know not merely the aggregate marginal social damage 
function, but rather the social damage function for each individual 
polluting unit: but using tranferable quotas, once the aggregate standard 
is determined, the allocation of quotas among individual units 
is achieved efficiently by the market mechanism.17 In contrast, the 
iterative procedure involved in the Baumol and Oates schemes (i.e. 
adjusting uniform emissions taxes until the desired aggregate standard 
is established) appears positively clumsy. 
Certainly, it seems to us, the appropriate choice between taxes and 
standards is much less obvious than Baumol and Oates would have us 
believe, and their particular proposal appears to be less attractive than 
the transferable quota approach suggested by Dales. But it would be 
misleading to leave the overall debate with an implicit suggestion that 
the adoption of either taxes or standards for the attainment of efficient 
levels of pollution abatement would be a fairly simple matter. It should 
be clear from our previous remarks that the information and measure-
ment requirements for both policy types are very large; and policies in 
this area are likely to be determined in circumstances of substantial 
ignorance and uncertainty. In this case, it may be best to persuade 
17 The operation of a transferable quota scheme requires that waste emissions 
be measured in terms of some standardized 'pollution index'. W11th respect to 
water pollution, Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) could be adopted as the 
unit of measurement for pollution quotas, for example. It should be noted, too, 
that the measurement costs required to ensure that firms do not exceed their 
quota levels may be high, as we have previously suggested. 
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governments to adopt only modest policies, and to treat broad classes 
of goods or inputs in uniform fashion even though we may suspect that 
different inputs or production processes have different 'pollution produc-
tivities'. Exceptions to this uniformity rule could then be allowed in 
cases where it can be clearly shown that particular inputs or processes 
have much higher (or lower) than average 'pollution productivity', or 
in particular geographical areas where pollution is more serious, and/ or 
the demand for abatement higher than average. To adopt a series of 
'finely-tuned' policies in circumstances where information is incomplete, 
or prohibitively expensive is to ignore the very high social costs involved 
in making a wrong decision. IS 
IV 
Conclusions 
To attempt to provide a concise summary of the contents of this 
paper, given its size, and the wide-ranging nature of its contents, would 
be an impossible task. Instead, in conclusion, we might simply emphasize 
some of the major issues that we have raised. 
We have argued that, as an economic problem, 'pollution' must be 
seen as involving a conflict between various possible uses of the environ-
ment, forcing us to choose between, on the one hand, consumption of 
physical (or produced) commodities, and on the other, consumption 
of a 'clean environment'. However, to argue that a choice needs to be 
made is not to argue that the choice need necessarily be made through 
the political mechanism. Making choices is, after all , what organized 
markets are all about, and even accepting that substantial 'market 
failure' is likely, we cannot state with certainty that where political 
decision-making processes are utilized to resolve the conflicts the 
results will be substantially better than those generated by voluntary 
action. Nonetheless, whatever we may think about the relative virtues 
of market and political decision-making processes, substantial political 
intervention is inevitable. 
All of the alternative policy options for pollution control require that 
the demand curve for 'clean environment' be estimated. In addition, 
some policy options also require estimation of the supply curve of 
'clean environment'. It is essentially this observation which leads us 
to argue that, in general, the use of taxes and subsidies is likely to 
be preferable to widespread use of regulations or other legal instruments. 
On the other hand, there does appear to be some virtue in the proposal 
for using transferable quotas in the context of an 'environmental stan-
dards' approach, and a mixture of 'pure' taxation policies, and the use 
of this quota scheme may prove to be the most useful form of pollution 
control. 
Finally, we believe that the information and measurement require-
ments involved in the implementation of appropriate pollution control 
policies will often be extremely costly. This suggests that attempts to 
implement finely tuned policies for pollution control are unwarranted. 
In other words, it is our view that the use of the political decision-making 
'8 Some of the issues relevant to this assertion are considered in an unpublished 
manuscript by H. G. Brennan and T. McGuire, 'Optimal Policy Choice under 
Uncertainty'. 
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process to impose discriminatory control on pollution sources can, in 
general, only be justified in circumstances of clear market failure and 
where a fairly high demand for pollution abatement exists. A general 
policy of reducing pollution levels might be better achieved by general 
and reasonably uniform taxes on all pollution sources. 
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THE PARAMETER SUBJECT TO TAX 
APPENDIX 
THE PARAMETER SUBJECT TO TAX 
This Appendix examines the major parameters to which taxes (or regula-
tions), aimed at controlling pollution, may be applied. 1 
Pigovian Tax 
The conceptually ideal parameter to which taxes should be applied is 
the pollution damage itself, defined in terms of the argument(s) which enter 
negatively into individuals' utility functions, or firms' production functions. 
The tax, which is commonly called a "Pigovian tax", should be levied at a 
rate equal to the marginal social damage caused at each level of pollution. 
In so far as the amount of pollution damage is influenced by such fact-
ors as the receptive medium into which pollutants are discharged, the loca-
tion of the discharge point (e.g. height of chimney, or location of firm), 
the chemical composition of the emissions, and the time pattern of emission 
generation and discharge, these factors must all enter into the calculation 
of the tax levied on a pollution-generating activity. Otherwise, the incen-
tives to use the relevant dimensions of the scarce resource, clean environ-
ment, in the most efficient way, will not apply. 
While the properties of the Pigovian tax are extremely impressive, there 
are unfortunately considerable difficulties in applying the tax. The base 
of the tax is not such tangible variables as a firm's output level of physi-
cal commodities, or its input of particular resources, nor is it based merely 
on the voZume of discharge of particular residuals. Rather, the tax is to be 
The Appendix is largely based on previous discussions,on the various 
parameters to which pollution taxes may be applied, in Tony Chisholm and 
Cliff Walsh; "Environmental Quality and Resource Allocation: A Proposed 
Framework for Analysis", paper presented to 17th Australian Agricultural 
Economics Society Annual Conference, February 1973; and Brennan, H.G., 
Walsh, C. and Chisholm, A.H. [3], op.cit. 
See also, Parish [10] op.cit. and Zerbe [14] op.cit. 
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assessed at a rate egual to the marginal social damage caused by each firm's 
activity. Since a firm can vary the form of its activity to reduce the 
damage caused, any attempt to relate the tax to volume of emissions, output 
of physical commodities, or inputs used, represents a substantial departure 
from the principal advantages claimed for the Pigovian tax. Moreover, to 
calculate the optimal tax, we require to know not so much the curr ent margi-
nal damage caused by a firm's activity, but rather what marginal damage the 
activity will cause when the level and organization of the activity have been 
adjusted in optimal fashion. 
Apart from the severe informational demands of applying taxes to pollu-
tion damage levels, per Be, there will generally be very substantial measure-
ment costs involved. For example, to monitor such highly dispersed dis-
charges as run-off water carrying agricultural fertilizers or pesticides, 
may be technically quite infeasible, even when one knows precisely which 
fertilizers (pesticides), or compounds used in them are most objectionable 
and which least, and what relative negative values individuals place on them. 
Such considerations have generally encouraged a less ambitious approach 
to policy - at least among policy-makers. The prime task is, of course, to 
find a parameter which is amenable to easy measurement. The major alter-
native tax bases are now considered. 
Emissions Taxes 
Taxes imposed on emissions of particular residuals seem to retain many 
of the desirable features of taxes based on damage caused by those residuals. 
In particular, they provide firms with direct incentives to adjust their 
production techniques, or install pollution control devices, since these 
adjustments will reduce the level of the emission tax paid. At the same 
time, unless emissions of all damaging residuals are taxed at the appropriate 
rates, and all points of emission subjected to monitoring, firms will have 
an incentive to change their techniques of production to those which generate 
relatively more of untaxed residuals, or to change their points of discharge 
3 
to those which are unmonitored. Since the appropriate rates of the taxes 
required to achieve optimal adjustments by firms must be determined by the 
damages caused by the emissions, the calculation of emissions taxes is ulti-
mately plagued with broadly the same information problems as the Pigovian tax. 
If the rates of tax are not appropriately calculated, then more polluting 
emissions may be substituted for less polluting ones, discharge locations 
involving greater damage substituted for locations involving less, and so on. 
In this sense, it is not clear that the gains from departing from the attempt 
to determine the appropriate Pigovian tax are so very substantial, at least in 
informational terms. The basic point is that certain information is required 
and there are costs in not having it. 
Production (Output) Taxes 
It is commonly suggested that a tax should be imposed on the output of 
commodities when their production generates harmful residuals. From the 
standpoint of economic efficiency and incentive to innovate, a production tax 
is clearly a fairly crude control procedure. The primary weakness of this 
tax is that it provides no incentive to substitute production techniques which 
generate lower damage per unit of output for those creating higher per unit 
damage. Furthermore, output taxes provide no incentive for pollution reducing 
technical innovation, or for the use of pollution control processes that do 
not directly reduce a firm's costs of production. 
At the same time, measurement (and hence enforcement) costs are relative-
ly low with output taxes, and such taxes are sometimes defended on these 
grounds. However, input taxes have the same virtue, and in addition have the 
advantage of encouraging firms to use less polluting technologies. 
Input Taxes 
The prime virtue of input taxes is their administrative feasibility. In 
particular, input taxes may be the best control procedure for situations where 
the direct monitoring of pollution emissions is technically impossible, or 
would involve very high administrative costs. For example, for highly 
4 
dispersed discharges such as run-off water carrying agricultural fertilizers 
or pesticides. 
With an input tax a firm would be given an incentive to reduce its pollu-
tion emissions, not simply by reducing production as with an output tax, but 
also by changing the input mix. Providing the appropriate rate(s) of input 
tax(es) is selected, the post-tax resource allocation will be more efficient 
than that which would prevail with an output tax. A government is extremely 
unlikely though to ever have sufficient information to levy 'optimal' input 
taxes. This would require detailed knowledge of the relative pollution pro-
ductivity of the various resources, the elasticity of output supply, and the 
elasticity of substitution between resources. Even with such information, 
input taxes will not generally ensure a Pareto efficient resource allocation, 
since they provide no incentive to use emission-control equipment to improve 
the quality of emissions and/or reduce their volume. In some circumstances, 
the least-cost way of reducing pollution may be to continue to use the same 
input-mix, but install emission-control equipment. 2 
Basically, there appear to be two main considerations in that dimension 
of policy choice concerned with the point in the production-consumption 
process at which policy is operative. The first relates to differential meas-
urement and enforcement costs. It is almost certainly cheaper for a govern-
ment to administer an inputs or outputs tax than an emissions or pollution 
tax. The second relates to the appropriate policy response to inadequate 
information. It is perhaps obvious, for instance, that any superiority of 
2 With regard to the installation of pollution-control equipment, the Report 
of the Australian Select Committee on Water Pollution, Water Pollution in 
Australia~ Commonwealth Printing Office, 1970, pp.111-120, is relevant. 
Income tax concessions and other forms of subsidy on pollution control 
equipment were the most commonly proposed policies for pollution control 
made by firms giving evidence before the Senate Committee. Perhaps the 
most important point to make on this matter is that any form of subsidy 
on pollution control equipment is, on its own, of little value as a control 
measure. Unless firms are penalised in some way for waste emissions, they 
have little incentive to install equipment which neither adds to revenues 
nor reduces production costs, no matter how small the post-subsidy equip-
ment cost may be. 
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input taxes over output taxes~depends crucially on the presumed knowledge 
on the part of the policy-maker that some inputs generate more pollution 
than others. If the policy-maker does not have this information it is more 
efficient to impose a simple output tax rather than to tax all inputs at 
the same rate. Similarly, in circumstances where there is predominant 
ignorance concerning the precise pollution-generating characteristics of 
different outputs, it may be desirable to tax broad classes of commodities 
at identical rates, even though the pollution generated within those classes 
may differ. 
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and Geoffrey Brennan 
Australian National University 
A REPLY 
Richardson's comments [2] on our analysis of the pollution problem [1] 
appear to contain three distinct strands. Firstly, Richardson accuses us of 
failing to allow for the possibility of controlling pollution at any point in 
the production-consumption process other than that at which physical commodi-
ties are actually produced. Secondly, he is critical of our failure to deal 
specifically with r ecycli ng as a possible solution to the pollution problem. 
Finally, he questions whether conclusions about appropriate policy responses 
to pollution can be generated from a discussion of general principles . Each 
strand seems to demand some response on our part, and we consider each in turn. 
It seems clear that Richardson sees our focus on the question of contro1-
ling pollution flat source " as a crucial departure from generality. 
" .•. This model places emphasis on controlling pollution 
at source, i.e. in the production process, thus ignoring 
the possibility of control at a subsequent point, namely 
after the consumption activity." [2, p.1]. 
But, as even a moderately casual reading of our article would reveal, this 
criticism is based on a gross misunderstanding and misrepresentation of what 
we say. Certainly, there is nothing in the structure of our model that rules 
out control of pollution at or beyond the point of consumption . Throughout 
our discussion, we emphasize the importance of viewing the production-consumption 
process for physical consumption goods as a whole; and it is perfectly clear 
that pollution control policies, designed to change the balance between 
physical goods and "clean environment" can be applied at any point in the 
2 
chain. It is true that we draw a distinction between adjustments to pollu-
tion by the 'victims' of the negative externality " ••• at the point of damage" 
and adjustments by the externality-generating agents " ••. at source". This 
distinction is essentially that between responses to pollution at the point 
in the consumption or production process where residuals cause a perceived 
nuisance (the point of damage), and those which occur at the point where 
residuals are produced " ••. simultaneously with the production and consumption 
of physical goods" ([1,p.7] emphasis added). Yet Richardson seems to believe 
that our model equates the "source" of pollution with the production process 
alone. This definition of "source" is his, not ours - it is in no way a 
definition that is suggested by our discussion, and its relevance to our 
analysis lies entirely in Richardson's imagination. 
Since there seems to be some confusion about this point, however, it 
may be useful to re-emphasize the reasons for our distinction b etween adjust-
ment at 'source' and elsewhere. Typically, adjustments to pollution by 
receptors at the point where damage occurs - adjustments such as movin g away 
from the pollution source, installing air cleaning or condition ing devices 
and so forth - are pr ivate in nature. These responses will occur naturally 
in the freely operating market whenever the private marginal gains exceed 
the private marginal costs of adjustment. By contrast, adjustments by the 
externality-generating agents, whether by producers or consumers, (i.e. 
adjustments " •.. at source" in our terminology) are typically puhZic in nature , 
in the sense that the benefits of such adjustments are equally and totally 
consumed by all the affected parties. These are not responses which one 
would, in general, expect to emerge naturally in a freely operating market. 
To the extent that responses at source are least social cost (most effici ent), 
there will be a case for government intervention via regulation or fiscal 
instruments - although, as we are at pains to point out in the latter part 
of our article, this case is only a weakly presumptive one. 
Thus, the distinction between pollution adjustments at sour ce and those 
3 
at the point of damage is of considerable policy significance, for it is 
only in so far as adjustments at source are the more efficient that a case 
for public intervention can be made. The distinction between pollution from 
production activities and pollution from consumption activities (i.e. between 
production and consumption wastes) by contrast seems to us to be of no policy 
significance whatsoever. And the fact that we did not provide a separate 
analysis of each in our paper is, we believe, a reflection of the generality 
of our approach, rather than the opposite as Richardson implies. 
Turning to the second issue raised by Richardson, it is true that we 
did not explicitly consider the possibility of recycling. Such neglect was 
deliberate. The focus of our paper related to the question of market failure 
and the associated question of appropriate pollution policies. To the extent 
that recycling, of both consumption and production wastes, is economically 
viable in the freely operating market it will occur naturally and hence lies 
outside the concern of our discussion. The recycling issue only becomes 
relevant for policy purposes if one or other of two possibilities occur. The 
first is that the freely operating market sets prices for so-called "exhaus-
tible" resources improperly so that their rate of exploitation over time is 
non-optimal: in this case, recycling decisions based on market prices will 
also be inefficient. But we made it quite clear in our original discussion 
that the problems of optimal pricing and rate of exploitation of exhaustible 
resources lay outside the scope of our paper. 
The second possibility is that, although recycling is not economically 
viable at current market prices, it may become efficient when appropriate 
taxes or regulations on wastes disposal are imposed. In this case, however, 
it is the absence of these policy instruments to internalize the externality 
that gives rise to inefficient recycling decisions. In other words, the 
recycling possibility (like a whole range of other feasible methods of 
adjustment that serve to minimize residuals generated per unit of physical 
product) only emerges in response to government policies, if it emerges at 
4 
all. Whether recycling or some other change in technique is most efficient 
depends of course on the particular case. The important point is that if 
the correct policy choice is made (e.g. the appropriate Pigovian damage tax), 
the polluting agents themselves will make the correct adjustments. l If one 
accepts this, then the isolation of the 'correct policy' - and not the best 
response to it by firms and consumers - becomes the crucial policy issue. 2 
We adhere to our belief that recycling is not in itself relevant to the cen-
tral policy question. 
Finally, we come to the matter of whether a discussion of general prin-
ciples is capable of indicating a preference for fiscal over regulatory 
instruments in the pollution context. To be sure, there will be cases where 
regulations may be more appropriate and nothing in our paper denies that 
possibility. 3 Our conclusion was simply a response to a persistent trend in 
the way logic appeared to take us (particularly in our arguments about infor-
mation and measurement) favouring the use of fiscal instruments. Richardson's 
discussion has not in any way served to indicate that such a general conclu-
sion may be inappropriate. 
Generally speaking, we believe that the presumption in favour of fiscal 
instruments over regulations must be allowed to stand, and that the relative 
neglect of these instruments by policy makers, in favour of direct regulations, 
1 
2 
3 
The implementation of a 'correct policy' will commonly induce a polluting 
agent to simultaneously use a number of methods of pollution control, 
including perhaps recycling. In these circumstances, when optimal adjust-
ments have been made,the marginal social benefit from pollution abatement 
will equal the marginal composite cost of pollution abatement, and the 
marginal cost of pollution abatement by each method in use also will be 
equal to the marginal social benefit. 
Our decision not to examine recycling in detail is therefore no more sur-
prising than our failure to discuss at some length the theory of induced 
technical change. 
For instance, direct regulations are likely to be the most appropriate 
policy in situations where the level of pollution damage is subject to 
sudden and extreme fluctuations as a result of stochastic disturbances 
arising from, say, unusual meteorological conditions. 
5 
cannot be easily justified in efficiency terms. A serious question is there-
fore raised as to whether society is currently bearing unnecessarily large 
costs from pollution controls. 
But whether this is so or not, we believe that a good grasp of the con-
ceptual issues at stake in the pollution/environment debate is a crucial pre-
requisite for policy formulation. Nothing, either in Richardson's comments or 
elsewhere, has persuaded us otherwise. 
6 
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Introduction 
The natural resources of Australia's arid zone provide a 
)w of economic services of both a production and con-
mption variety that contribute to man's well-being. In the 
. rmer category are the intensive (in an economic sense) wool 
,d beef industries and the point-located mineral deposits, the 
[ning of which is the raison d'etre for most of the major 
Wns located in arid Australia. These industries are currently 
'e dominant economic activities in arid Australia and seem 
I stined to continue in that role for the foreseeable future. 
l In the latter category are the environmental/recreational 
"vices, which arid Australia provides for both Australian and 
I erseas visitors. The use of arid Australia for leisure-
hentated environmental/recreational purposes is, after the 
IlItoral and mining activities, its most significant use. And it is 
\s use that is the primary concern of the present paper. 
JThe paper is broadly divided into three parts. The first 
t tion provides a brief background perspective of the demand 
I· and supply of environmental/recreational services in arid 
.;stralia. Some figures given in this section indicate that there 
I; been a rapid rate of increase in demand for recreation in 
U Australia in recent years. This suggests that there will be 
!later competition for scarce natural resources in the future 
: I that an increasing number of social choices will be 
required to achieve appropriate utilization of the arid zone's 
resources. 
Many of the best attainable social choices are not made 
explicitly as such, rather they emerge as the summation of a 
large number of decentralized market decisions. Certain types 
of environmental/recreational services may profitably be pro-
vided in arid Australia by private enterprise (e.g. as an adjunct 
to pastoral activities). However, most environmental/ 
recreational resources in arid Australia have characteristics that 
prevent their effi6ent utilization through decentralized market 
processes. Market failure arises primarily because for many 
environmental/recreational resources, the enforcement of pri-
vate property rights is infeasible. For the market mechanism to 
operate efficiently it must be possible to precisely define and 
enforce property rights. 
When market failure occurs it is typically presumed that 
social choices will need to be made explicitly by government. 
The primary aim of this paper is to provide a conceptual 
economic framework within which the pertinent issues for 
such social choices may be considered. Towards this end, in 
the second section of the paper, the economic problems 
relating to the preservation and utilization of wildlife are 
considered. In the third section, we consider the problems 
posed by choices relating to such matters as whether or not to 
preserve a landscape with rare geomorphological features 
threatened by demands for an alternative use of the site, such 
as mineral exploitation. In particular, we consider the con-
ceptual problem of how the environmental/recreational 
benefits of such assets should be evaluated. 
_ .. _-_._ ._----------------------------------
Demand and Supply of Environmental/Recreational Services l 
Arid Australia has distinctive geomorphological features , 
plant and animal life, climatic conditions, and a general 
atmosphere of vastness and spaciousness. The visual/aesthetic 
qualities of the most outstanding arid landscapes (e.g. Ayers 
Rock and Mt Olga) probably make them the most valuable 
environmental / recreational resources in arid Australia. The 
visual character of the landscape is enhanced by a diverse range 
of animal and bird life , although many of the animal species 
are nocturnal, a characteristic which conSiderably detracts 
from their recreational value. 
In addition to the natural phenomena of arid Australia, 
there are interesting historical and cultural features, and a 
distinctive 'outback' way of life that has evolved in response to 
the vast distances and harsh environment. Such features as 
Aborigi nal rock and cave engravings and paintings, cattle and 
sheep stations, and mining operations are important recrea-
tional attractions. 
In relation to other environmental/recreational areas, the 
most significant comparative disadvantage of arid Australia is 
the distant location of the recreational attractions in relation 
to the main population centres in addition to the vast expanses 
of monotonous landscape and poor quality roads between the 
major recreational attractions. Travel to and within arid 
Australia tends to be costly in terms of both money and time. 
The demand for open-space recreation in arid Australia is 
being moulded by a number of influences . These influences 
include the growth rate of both the Australian population and 
of overseas visitors; changes in real per capita incomes ; 
available leisure time and tastes for open-space recreation; 
changes in the cost, time and comfort of travel to and within 
arid Australia ; the levels of congestion and pollution within 
the large urban popUlation centres; and the supply of 
environmental/recreational services in non-arid areas. 
A reasonable indicator of the general growing demand for 
environmental/recreational services in Australia is provided by 
data that shows an increase in the number of people visiting 
natural parks. McMichael (1972) reports that the median rate 
of annual increase in visitors to natural parks in Australia over 
the late 1960s was 11 per cent. He states that an annual 
increase in demand for open-space recreation' of the order of 
10-12 per cent may be expected. 
The above figures may be compared with data enumerating 
visitors to Alice Springs and Ayers Rock , the main recreational 
attractions in arid Australia. Based on figures provided by the 
Ministry of Tourism, the average annual growth rate of visitors 
to Ayers Rock and Alice Springs over the period 1968-71 was 
approximately 22 per cent and 32 per cent, respectively.2 
These figures substantially exceed the annual rate of growth of 
the Australian population of approximately two per cent. 
Many of the environmental/recreational services in arid 
Australia are provided by natural parks used exclusively for 
recreation. There are other areas of arid Australia used 
primarily for non-recreational purposes, bu t which also jointly 
supply, or influence the supply of, environmental/recreational 
services. Apart from the obvious example of the pastoral 
I A number of references are relevant to the issues outHned in this 
secti?n of the paper. See, in part icular, Box, 1972; Christian, 1969; 
COStlll , 1969 ; Day , 1971 ; Harris , 1969 ; Heathcote 1972' and 
McMichael , 1972. ' , 
2In absolut e terms, the number of visitors to the main recreational 
attractions in ~ri,! Australia is very small compared with visitors to 
natural parks wlthln close reach of a large city. For example, McMichael 
(1972) r~ports that 1,600,000 people visited Royal Nahonal Park near 
Sydney 111 1969. In comparison, 47,000 people visited Ayers Rock in 1972 . 
L...._ _________ _ ___ ____ _ 
properties, there are two further uses of arid Australia that ar[ 
related to recreation and conservation. First, there is a demanQ 
to set aside representative areas of the various arid zono 
ecosystems for purposes of scientific study. The gene pool, 
preserved in such areas have a potential economic value fo: 
future plant and animal improvement programs and as a sourc; 
of biologically active compounds. Additionally, studies ofth-
structure and function of representative ecosystems woul,l 
provide benchmarks against which man-induced changes in thl 
arid environment may be understood and monitored. SUC[ 
studies would have particular relevance to problems CI 
ecosystem instability that may arise from man's use of ari' 
Australia for pastoral , recreational and other activitie~ 
Secondly, there is a demand to conserve areas of arid Aus tralil 
for Aboriginal reserves. These reserves contain some of thl 
most scenic and best preserved areas in the arid zone, and i 
addition have many cultural antiquities. This is resulting in l 
growing tourist demand to visit these areas. It is pOSSible that1 
complementary relationship exists between the use of areas ; 
Aboriginal reserves and their use by visitors. By opening L1 
certain areas of their reserves to visitors and acting as gUidd 
and interpretors of interesting cultural features-such as ca~ 
and rock paintings and engravings and stone arrangj 
ments-Aboriginals may enhance their sense of identity ar 
pride in their own culture. At the same time they wou_ 
generate a greater understanding and appreciation of thn 
culture and point up the inevitable problems that confro: 
such minority groups . 
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'illOO~ Arid Australia supports a large wildlife popUlation ir 
lir~ 
which there is a significant recreational demand, In this sectidl i' 
we attempt to identify: the social choices relating to t ~ .. lflJ:'il\ 
if f 1,> ~llt preservation and utilization of wildl' e, the areas 0 mar~.l 
il bl j .. jbJ~ failure, and the policy options ava' a e to government r 
controlling wildlife. The following discussion, which involis .11111.1 
using the kangaro03 as an illustrative example, is indicat1e . 1.11:,-
rather than definitive. ~ Ihe n 
The kangaroo is by most measures , the leading formlf le.;!. 
wildlife in arid Australia. It is to be found over most of I e ~re~1li1 
arid zone with heavy concentrations of its larger species on ' e :e~ 0) 
relatively well-watered pastoral properties. Indeed, it s 'OOI'~1 
claimed that the spread of grazing and pastoral activities ~ d ·1:11/1 
the associated provision of watering points and favoura<e til:: 
changes induced in the composition of vegetation by dome?-c ~B~at 
livestock have led to an overall increase in the populatiof)1f jl it a I 
the larger kangaroo species, particularly the red kangaroo.,t ' {(hl~ 1 
the same time , however, pastoralism has resulted in Ie :~IJ:1c 
extinction or threatened extinction of many species of Ie mly k., 
smaller marsupials. T1J; 
To obtain an understanding of the nature of the econoDic "~Jad.( 
problem our first step is to identify the main competlg I~Jiu:'111 
demands for the larger kangaroo species. These are: their vi:ial ~:aJ'f 
recreational attraction, their commercial exploitation for sk~s ~ I( 
and meat by itinerant hunting, hunting them for sport, ,d ~ 
hunting to destroy them as pests on pastoral properties, Iffle 111~i .. 
proper social choices were made they would result 11 a .:~f ·~ 
kangaroo population of optimum size and simu1ta~eo) Y .~ '~~JO 
achieve a correct balance among the above competm~~~ ~:I 
mands. The free market mechanism will, however, fau t ,~:"I 
achieve this goaL ~~.'~ 
___ _____________________ "'h 
3The discussion, however, is also relevant to ot.her non-domestidced :;ij~' 
species in arid Australia such as the emu and rabbit. . t 
I,., • 
• 
The major obstacle to the market attainment of a socially 
'.. Ilppropriate level of preservation and utilization of kangaroo , is 
-heir wide-ranging mobility . This mobility , which is character-
Istic of most wildlife species, usually thwarts individuals having 
lliorkable property rights in them. It is usually uneconomic for 
Individuals to attempt to confine wildlife within the spatial 
Iloundaries of particular pieces of land. Although some 
I esearch work on the feasibility of enclosing and farming 
: ~angaroos is being carried out by the Commonwealth 
:;cientific and Industrial Research Organization (C.S.I.R.O.), 
Ihere is currently no commercial farming of kargaroos of 
,vhich the author is aware. Thus, the kangaroo tends to roam 
t large as a common property resource. In the absence of 
:!leAl 6 pecific government legislation and regulations4 it will be 
I .: .qually available for use by all. 
To elucidate the economic inefficiencies likely to result 
'rom wildlife being held under common-ownership we con-
Ider in turn each of the above uses for the kangaroo. Initially, 
Ie will assume that the particular use under consideration is 
'1e only use. We later relax this assumption and examine the 
.dditional inefficiencies that may arise as a result of the 
lterrelationships between competing uses. 
First we may consider the situation where the only demand 
)r kangaroo is commercial huntingS for its skin and meat, or 
mply hunting for sport. In these circumstances, the species 
ill tend to be over exploited since each individual hunter will 
.m to maximize his immediate profits from capture with 
:ant regard for the future. There are two reasons why an 
Idividual hunter has little incentive to consider the effect of 
is current hunting activities on the future size and viability of 
le kangaroo population. His individual hunting activities may 
~ such a small part of the aggregate activity that they have a 
~gligible impact on the future kangaroo population and his 
:sociated future costs of capture and profits. Alternatively, an 
.dividual hunter may be in a position to influence the size of 
le future kangaroo popUlation through his current hunting 
;tivity. There is still little incentive for these hunters to 
lflsider the future and modify their current harvesting 
)licies accordingly, since they have no guarantee that most of 
1e future benefits resulting from their restraint will not be 
.~ lpropriated by others. In other words, individual hunters 
,I, ho do not restrict their current hunting activities obtain a 
rj~. ee-ride' at the expense of those who do . 
The main conclusion, which emerges from the above 
., ' scussion is that the combined activities of individual hunters 
r"~ ill result in a level and form of exploitation that is not in 
rt{ eir collective interests, or those of society. Indiscriminate 
~I,;" lughtering of too many animals, including females and their 
lung, may lead to a rapid depletion of the kangaroo 
:-e.' FPulation. This may occur when it would be in the collective 
Iterest to practice restraint in order to maximize the present 
due of future profits from hunting. 
t·:· It is logical to consider next the kangaroo in its capacity to 
a pest on pastoral properties. In many ways this case is the 
./ 
Wur aim is to identify and elucidate first the main types of market 
.tlure , and their likely consequences, in a situation where there are no 
,tYernment regulations concerning the utilization of the kangaroo. This ~ bl~ the main policy options available to government to be 
fJnhfied and discussed , albeit briefly. It is beyond the scope of the ~er to appraise the existinll State and Commonwealth Government 
.... sl~ture concerning the utilization of the kangaroo. For details of 
~Idual State and Commonwealth legislation see Parliament, 
1I11monwealth of Australia, 1971 , pp. 13-19. 
')ost of the eco nomic literature on the utilj zation of common 
t1perty. wildlife has focussed exclusively on their commercial ~ llol.tatIon for meat and/or skins. See, for instance, Plourde, 1971, 
, Tisdell, 1972. 
l 
inverse of the previous one. Very little knowledge exists about 
the degree of competition between kangaroos and domestic 
livestock for forage and water. 6 There seems little doubt, 
however, that beyond some density kangaroos are competitive 
with the sheep and cattle enterprises, and this competition is 
probably most marked in times of unfavourable seasonal 
conditions. Apart from competition for forage and water, 
kangaroos may cause damage to fences. 
In contrast with the potential excessive exploitation of 
kangaroo for its skin and meat, in its role as a pure pest it will 
tend to be undercontrolled. Due to the mobility of the pest, 
control undertaken on one property will generate benefits for 
surrounding properties. There is thus a substantial element of 
non-excludability. Those who do not undertake pest control 
may nonetheless benefit from control measures adopted by 
others. Because individual property owners do not receive 
payment for the benefits they confer upon others through 
their pest control operations, a less than socially (collectively) 
optimal amount of pest control will be undertaken. 
Finally, we consider the kangaroo as a visual recreational 
resource.? In this capacity, the kangaroo will commonly have 
the attributes of a public good. Consumption of the visual 
recreational services kangaroos provide, will not dimish the 
quantity of services available for consumption by others. 
Moreover, it will usually be infeasible to attempt to make the 
consumption of these services dependent upon a price pay-
ment. Consequently, the market will provide less than a 
socially optimal quantity of kangaroos for visual recreational 
purposes . In this regard, the main form of market failure may 
be readily identified if we consider competing uses for the 
natural resources that support kangaroos. Private entre-
preneurs who are deciding the most profitable use of natural 
areas of land will place a zero value on its use as a habitat for 
kangaroo- as a visual recreational attraction-if they are unable 
to appropriate payment from those who benefit. The land may 
thus be developed for an alternative use that is incompatible 
with the continued support of kangaroo, despite the fact that 
the preservation alternative may yield higher benefits for 
society.8 
We have now considered each of the alternative uses for 
kangaroo. Our conclusion is that in each case market failure 
will typically occur and lead to socially inappropriate preserva-
tion and utilization decisions. Up to this point we have . not 
considered the interrelationships between the alternative uses 
for kangaroo. It is helpful to begin this task by specifying the 
necessary economic conditions that would need to be satisfied 
to achieve a socially efficient equilibrium among the alterna-
tive uses . The necessary condition is given below: 
MSVr 
where, 
MSVr 
MSVh 
marginal social value of kangaroo in its visual/ 
recreational use. 
marginal social value of kangaroo in commer-
cial hunting activity . 
marginal social damage of kangaroo as a pest. 
6 For some discussion of competition between the kangaroo and 
domestic liv e stock on pastoral properties , see Parliamcnt, 
Commonwealth of Australia, 1971 , and Mam, 1969 . 
7 This t er m is used broadly to enbrace the totality of 
visual-aesthetic-ethical demands for kangaroos. 
8 As we have already seen, some forms of development on pastoral 
properties may increase the capacity of the land to support kangaroos . 
That is, in somc circumstances development may be complementary 
rather than competitive with the kangaroo. 
In a freely-operating market-with no government inter-
vention- the above condition will not be fulfilled. In some 
regions the marginal social value of the kangaroo in its 
visual/recreational use will exceed the combined marginal 
social value of kangaroo in the commercial hunting activity 
plus the marginal social damage of kangaroo as a pest, and the 
size of the kangaroo population should be increased accord-
ingly. And vice versa. It is also apparent that when the 
interrelationships among alternative uses of the kangaroo are 
considered that there are market failures, which are additional 
to those that have been previously discussed. The most 
important of these is that commercial hunters and pest 
controllers will take no account of the social visual/ 
recreational value foregone as a result of the kangaroos they 
slaughter. 
It is typically argued that the divergences between private 
and social costs and benefits, arising from these market 
failures, provide a strong case for government intervention. We 
may distinguish two forms of intervention. The government 
may use its fiscal powers to impose Pigovian- type taxes (or 
subsidies) on the various activities associated with the 
slaughter of the kangaroo or the destruction of its habitat. 
Secondly, the government may use its legal powers to impose 
regulations and/or prohibitions on the above activities. Alter-
natively, the government may use its legal power to acquire 
land for the purpose of establishing natural parks for the 
kangaroo and other wildlife. Or it may organize the construc-
tion of pest proof fences around the periphery of pas toral 
areas, as has been done in attempting to exclude the emu and 
rabbit from some pastoral areas. 
In practice we would expect the government to use some 
combination of these policy options, but for purposes of 
discussion we consider separately Pigovian - type taxes (sub-
sidies), and regulations and prohibitions. The overall aim of 
the tax (subsidy) approach is to induce changes in the market 
behaviour of individuals by removing divergences between 
marginal private and social costs and benefits. We may 
illustrate this by reference to the commercial hunting activity, 
where it is assumed that each individual hunter will expand his 
activity to the point where he estimates that the marginal cost 
of capturing additional animals equals the marginal revenue 
from their skins and meat. Each hunter's activity, however, 
generates externalities and it is these that would be target of 
the tax. Ideally, the amount of tax paid on the capture of each 
kangaroo would equal the sum of several components: the loss 
in social visual/recreational benefits; and the present value of 
future losses borne collectively by commercial hunters, due to 
the individual hunter taking no account of the impact of his 
current hunting activities on the future collective profitability 
of hunting. From the sum of the above two external 
diseconomies it is necessary to deduct any favourable impact 
(external economy) of the capture when it reduces marginal 
pest damage. It is of course conceivable, that in areas where 
the kangaroo is a major pest, the appropriate amount of tax 
paid for their capture may be negative. That is, commercial 
hunting would be subsidized. 
Insofar as the external diseconomies (economies) generated 
by individual hunters vary over both space and time, the above 
taxes (subSidies) would need to reflect such variations. Thus 
such factors as locality , seasonal conditions, breeding or 
non-breeding period, and perhaps the sex and size of individual 
kangaroos, may need to be taken into account when assessing 
the appropriate scale of taxes (subsidies). 
In addition to commercial hunting activities, taxes (sub-
sidies) would also need to be simultaneously imposed on pesi ;,oo~1 
control and any activities that destroy or improve the habi ta, ,1f.l 
for kangaroos. The operation of a tax-subsidy scheme incor 'i:C~ 
porating the above features would clearly be extremelj aon, n~ 
demanding in terms of information and administration. It i l11P/! 
with these co siderations in mind that various forms 0: .,fd 
regulations and prohibitions may be discussed. ~mir) p 
One such procedure would be for the government to set i,~ln 
target (standard) for the approximate size and distribution o[ leil 
the kangaroo population, on the basis of a fairly arbitrar~ \:Jtri 
'weighing-up' of the competing demands for kangaroos and th t ;:Id;~ 
associated areas of market failure. This is similar to tW ;ljcf:iJ 
quantitative standards approach proposed by Baumol aw ;l f01 
Oates (1971) for regulating environmental pollution. TI l ._iJmm 
preserve the chosen 'social optimal' stock of kangaroos thl lIIl~el 
government could introduce a quota system. Quotas, specif)- UIJ 
ing the aggregate numbers of kangaroos permitted to be killee !X~ b 
could be set for clearly defined zones. To enable an efficier: -5 lhe il 
allocation of quotas among individuals, they could be sold bl I.l11! 
auction (competitive bidding), or an attempt could be made t IBIle~n 
set a quota price that would equate supply and demand. "/YeaLn 
To set aggregate quotas at a socially optimal level, ,:ortl11~ 
government would require at least as much information , :l1Id as 
would be required to set a socially optimal scale of taxes am iiXGF~ 
subsidies. Some administrative costs, however, are likely to t 1X~y 
lower for a quota scheme than for a tax-subsidy system. 'pce lei 
quota scheme may be policed by a system of random checl: ~.illn 
combined with the imposition of sufficiently punitive fines (, 'tlC! II1l 
individuals detected hunting without quota rights, or excee 1/ ~erln, 
ing their quota rights, or hunting in prohibited areas, or [,. 
prohibited times of the year. On the other hand, a governmee ~q;erJ 
would need to incur collection costs and the costs of preci: ] i!IQLQ 
assessment with a tax (subsidy) scheme. 
. r,e~1 
In practice, the appropriate mix of taxes (subsidies) all 
regulations will vary from one situation to another, bei~ :~(ti:1 
largely determined by information and administrative consj;' ~,:I:lel( 
erations. If. llil 
Evaluating the Social Benefits of Environmental/ 
Recreational Phenomena 
,lDaHI 
.. ~nuI' 
[irlij ~ 
tillar. 
Our aim in this part of the paper is to provide a conceptd :"aa~il~( 
framework for identifying and evaluating the economic bew:;ifolo/ 
fits provided by an important class of environment.f :.~er:I~I., 
recreational phenomena in arid Australia. The kinds of soc,l '~li:Ul:l 
choice problems to which our discussion is applicable ,) ~, 
'IUr, 
perhaps best illustrated by example. :'::t./. 
First, a decision may need to be made whether or not) .' due I 
preserve a landscape with unique (rare) geomorphologid1 'bl:", 
features that is threatened by an alternative use for the sh. '~e, r 
such as mineral exploitation. Alternatively, the threat f rtotl1( 
destruction may come from natural processes such as erosia, I, les 
and it may be necessary to make a decision whether or notl1 \ l 
Ulf, implement costly preservation measures. Secondly, a presefl- ~'Q~fo"" 
tion decision may be required when the use of an area foca .~ ~:m ~'" 
particular purpose (e.g. pastoral activities) threatens an en,e i,i ~ 
ecosystem that is essential to the survival of some species sf tie ~ ~le, 
arid zone wildlife. Finally, in many localities in arid Austraa. '1\ 1'1: 
there are aboriginal rock and cave paintings and engravingssn 'I' q ~ 
the absence of preservation measures, many of these cult~111 ,,':(1 ~ 
antiquities will be damaged and eventually destroyed throoh <tIot'j 
weathering. In many instances, these could be preserved bYf- , --........ 
, hin ' I~J\ pert touc g-up. . .. j,~Ilt!. 
The essential characteristics of these preservation declSll's ':;j/"t 
are that they involve unique, or rare, phenomena, wl'lh ~~!~ 
·.~~I ~ 
rll/ 
Iprovide non-priced environmental/recreational services. These 
phenomena, once destroyed or transformed, are virtually 
irreplaceable. Central to these preservation decisions is the 
Iquestion, how can we evaluate the economic (social) benefits 
Ifrom the preservation of rare natural environments? 
As a point of departure for evaluating the social benefits of 
:he services provided by such phenomena, we may value the 
:Jenefits as the aggregate amount users of the environmental 
"acility would be willing to pay rather than forego its services. 
rhis value is conventionally represented by the area under the 
Iggregate demand curve, where the demand curve relates the 
lIuantity of the service consumed per unit of time, to the price 
:harged for the service. For a reusable, non-depreciating 
8 latural environment, the value of its services is the sum of the 
.. alues under the demand curves for each time period the 
acility is used . The customary unit of time is one year and the 
otal social benefits-expressed in terms of their present 
,alue-is the sum of the discounted annual benefits. For the 
~resent, the analysis is confined to valuing the benefits for a 
ingle time period only. 
The area under the aggregate demand curve for the services 
If a particular environmental/ recreational facility may be 
I1terpreted as the total 'gate receipts' that could be theoreti-
ally appropriated by implementing a perfectly discriminating 
Ticing policy. That is , each consumer would be required to 
ay a price (entry fee) equal to the maximum amount he 
'ould be willing to pay rather than forgo the recreational 
~perience. This amount would vary from one individual to 
10ther depending upon the intensity of each individual's 
references for the recreational experience. Some individuals 
ould be prepared to pay high amounts and others only low 
r zero amounts, and this is precisely why the aggregate 
~mand curve slopes downwards to the right. 
In practice, of course, discriminatory pricing is infeasible 
1d either free entry is given to all, or a standard entry fee is 
1arged. In the absence of congestion and/or ecological 
amage to an environmental facility, free entry is commonly 
lowed. Natural phenomena may be viewed as free gifts of 
ature . Until some saturation level of recreational use is 
:ached for a particular environmental facility, the use of the 
'ea by additional people does not dinUnish the recreational 
'perience for others. There is therefore no need to ration the 
lvironmental/ recreational services by restricting entry to the 
ea. This situation is depicted in Figure 1. Suppose Dj Dj is 
Ie demand curve for , and SS the supply curve of, environ-
ental/recreational services provided by the area. The 
regate value of the recreational benefits is then measured 
, the whole area OBqo under the demand curve Dj Dj. Ifwe 
lW assume a new demand curve D2D2, the demand for 
wironmental/ recreational services will exceed supply9 unless 
'me form of restriction is imposed on entry. For instance, 
~ try may be rationed through the price mechanism by 
larging a uniform entrance fee. The area under the 
19regate demand curve D2D2 may be separated into two 
nrts. First is the area OCEqo, which represents the value of 
ppropriate benefits. That is, the actual payments made for 
!e use of the facility. Second is the area CAE, w luch measures 
!e difference between actual payments OCEqo and the 
L1Xirnum amount users would have been willing to pay 
~"I"" ~he S~pply curve for environmental/recreational services presumes that 
;t~' (IO Phmal 'carrying capacity' for the area has been specified. Theoreti-
iY, the optimal carrying capacity is attained when the marginal dis-
tilty to existing users of the increased congestion (external disecono-
• ,es) generated by an additional visitor is equal to the utility gain of 
, additional visitor. 
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Fig. 1. Demand and supply of environment/recreational services. 
OAEqo. This quantity CAE is termed consumer surplus. 1 0 In 
situations where no benefits are appropriated through actual 
payments, the whole area under the aggregate demand curve 
represen ts consumer surplus. In Figure 1, for example, the area 
OBqo is all consumer surplus given the demand curve DID 1 
and assuming free entry. 
The main reason for introdUCing the concept of consumer 
surplus has been to highlight the fact that the actual prices 
charged for the use of public environmental/recreational areas 
are typically an extremely poor indicator of their ' true' 
economic value. On the other hand, the area under the 
aggregate demand curve incorporates both actual payments 
and consumer surplus and thus provides a much fuller measure 
of the social benefits derived from environmental/recreational 
services. Even this measure, however, will not always capture 
the full social benefits provided by an environmental/ 
recreational area. Following in particular the s timulus of an 
important contribution by Krutilla (1967) some further con-
siderations have been recognized by economists in recent 
years. We will now separately consider the influences of 
externalities , option demand, and technological change on the 
social benefits derived from natural environmental facilities . 
The latter two influences arise from the presumption that the 
supply of natural environments is virtually inelastic and that 
they are non-reproducible once destroyed. It seems to be 
widely accepted that much of arid Australia is ecologically 
brittle, in the sense that intervention by man will often 
fundamentally change the ecology and natural qualities of the 
area. More importantly, if intervention ceases, the original 
natural environmental qualities may have been destroyed 
forever , or else the rate of their recovery will be extremely 
slow . Clearly, man-made decisions that may irreverSibly alter 
the environment, entail a much greater responsibility than 
IOConsumer surplus assumes importance for environmental/-
recreational phenomena because each natural facility provides a 
recreational service(s) which differs, in some degree, from those 
provided by othe~ natural phenomena. A .separate demand curve may 
therefore be idenhfied for the servtces provtded by each envIronmental/ 
recreational area. On the other hand, consumer surpluS usually can be 
disregarded when evaluating the alternative uses for an environmental/ 
recreational site. For instance, beef or mineral production. The 
magnitude of the change in aggregate supply of such 'homogeneous' 
commodities, brought about by a single project, usually will be only 
marginal and will have a negligible influence on the commodity price. 
The current market price will therefore usually provide an adequate 
measure of social value. 
_ ._---_._----------------------
those decisions whose consequences can be undone if hind-
sight shows them to be undesirable. 
Externalities and Merit Goods 
It has been argued by Tisdell (1972b) and others that 
environmental/recreational areas commonly have favourable 
spillover effects (externalities) for society as a whole, which 
are additional to the utility gained by individual users. For 
instance, research by psychologists and sociologists indicates 
that high levels of congestion and crowding of human 
populations in cities tends to breed aggressiveness and 
violence, and that such tendencies are more marked in 
individuals who are unable to retreat to open natural environ-
ments. If this is true, the value of these spillover effects should 
ideally be added to the value of social benefits. Moreover, 
spillover effects of this sort provide a sound basis for 
subsidizing the use of these natural areas by such means as 
cheap transport. These forms of externalities, however, are 
most relevant for natural parks, beaches etc. within easy reach 
of major cities; and they are unlikely to be very Significant for 
environmental/recreational areas in arid Australia. 
Perhaps of more relevance to arid Australia is the likelihood 
that many individuals are unable to properly evaluate the 
benefits to be derived from recreation in this region because 
they have imperfect knowledge . In such cases, it may be 
argued that overt preferences do not represent an individual's 
true preferences or real interests. This concept is relevant to 
services provided by natural environments when effective 
consumption, and full appreciation of the benefits to be 
obtained from such services, is dependent upon the prior 
acquisition of specialized knowledge gained largely from direct 
experience (i.e. learning-by-doing) and communication with 
those who have had such experience. 
Option Demand 
The concept of option demand has been the subject of 
some controversy in the economic literature since it was first 
proposed by Weisbrod (1964). There is now reasonably 
widespread agreement, however, that option demand will 
commonly exist for rare irreplaceable natural assets. In 
situations where option demand exists, the measure of ex-
pected consumer surplus will understate the real social benefits 
provided by natural phenomena. The magnitiude of the option 
value-and thus the extent to which expected consumer 
surplus understates real benefits- is closely correlated with the 
degree of uncertainty regarding individual's future demands 
for the flow of services provided by irreplaceable assets. In 
general, the option value will be larger the greater the 
uncertainty of future demand. Thus, option value will assume 
par~i~ular importance when there are a large number of 
IndlVlduals who have a low probability of demand for the 
future flow of services provided by a natural phenomena. 
The existence of rare natural phenomena in arid Australia 
contributes to the well-being of many individuals who have 
not visi.ted the areas . These individuals may have a real, but 
uncertain, demand to preserve these natural environments 
which. reflects not so much a desire to have them immediatel; 
acceSSible to themselves but rather a wish to maintain the 
option of their continued availability in the future for oneself 
or future generations . Option demand may therefore exist 
even though there is no current intention to use a preserved 
are~ and, In fact , the option may never be exercised. Indeed, 
option ~emand may exist for persons who place a value on the 
mere eXistence of biological and geomorphological variety and 
its widespread distribution, even though they have no inten· · 
tion of visiting natural phenomena like Ayers Rock. 
While the above forms of option demand apply to: 
situations where individuals have reasonable knowledge of theE 
type of environmental/amenity services provided by particular 
natural phenom.ena, there is another form of option that. 
relates to the expectation that natural environments, if. 
preserved, will be eventually used for purposes we cannot at 
present foresee. This form of option demand seems to be an 
least partially implicit in statements like that made by 
Slatyer.1 1 
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Differences of opinion as to the best means of arid land 
utilization are inevitable. In particular, there is a conflict of 
interest between those whose primary concern is to conserve the 
arid land resource and those who wish to obtain an economic 
return from it. 
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The opposition of some scientists to pastoralism in arid 
Australia seems to be largely a question of getting·the·facts. 
straight as to whether the induced changes to the natura, 
ecosystems are stable or unstable. 12 It appears however that , 
part of the scientists concern arises from the view tha; 
irreversible changes to natural ecosystems-even if stable-ara 
likely to substantially restrict the range of future optiolll 
available to society in the use of these areas. 
Technological Progress and Conservation 
It has been suggested that the impact of technologicc: 
progress on the production of physical goods that requir 
inputs of natural resources, and environmental/recreation" 
services supplied directly by natural resources, is likely to bl 
asymmetrical. The argument supporting this proposition ; 
that the supply of processed goods may be capable c 
continuous expansion as a result of technological progress. 0: 
the other hand, the supply of natural phenomena is virtualll 
inelastic. l3 Thus, as the supply of rare natural arid phenomem 
cannot be augmented, the annual value of the servicft 
provided by such phenomena will grow, reflecting suo, 
influences as growth in population and per capita income! 
The area under the aggregate demand curve for the initial tiJr 
period (year) will therefore need to be adjusted upwards by a 
annual growth factor. This adjustment would reflect tt. 
anticipated annual increase in the value of the environmenta; 
recreational services as the aggregate demand curve shifte: 
upwards over time!4Given constant tastes for environmenta 
recreational services and for processed goods based on natur 
resource inputs , it is thus implicitly assumed that the shad <x 
prices of the former will increase more rapidly than the pric( 
of the latter. In other words, the presumption for ar 
Australia would be that the per unit value of products liJi 
11 See, Slatyer, R. O. and R. A. Perry, (£ds.) Arid Lands of Austral! 
Canberra, A.N.U. Press, 1969, p. vii. 
12 For some discussion on various aspects of tills problem see Campbe 
1966; Duncan, 1972; and Tisdell, 1972. 
13 The major exception is wildlife, whose population Can be manilj' 
lated by man to some degree. 
14 The procedure most commonly used to empirically estimate dema~ 
functions for visits to natural phenomena (parks) involves speci fyV, 
concentric distance zones around the natural facility. An estimatio!lJ1 
the price elasticity of demand is then made from observations on 1 • 
proportion of the population visiting from different distance zones.!: 
basic hypothesis is that travel costs are analogous to price. An ObVlil' 
weakness of this procedure is the implicit assumption that the s!l 
purpose of the trip was to visit the particular natural facility. Moreol/', 
the observations on participation rates of population groups fr 'rl 
different distance zones provide a measure of consumption and no.t~f 
demand alone. Thus, an identification problem arises sllll 
consumption is a function of the supply of competing recreatlO(1 
facilities (willch will vary from one distance zone to another) as wee~ 
the demand for the particular natural facility. 
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loinerals, wool and beef will tend to rise less rapidly in the 
luture than will the per unit value of the environment/ 
lecreational services provided by the arid zone. 
Concluding Comments 
In the future it seems likely that society will be increasingly 
ronfronted with difficult problems of social choice relating to 
he preservation and utilization of the natural resources of 
.,ustralia's arid zone. It will be necessary for most of the social 
Ihoices to be made explicitly through the political mechanism, 
.nee the natural resources typically have characteristics that 
o not permit socially appropriate choices to be made via a 
'reely- operating market mechanism. 
o The primary concern of this paper has been to provide a 
:onceptual economic framework within which the problems 
mociated with preservation and utilization of arid Australia's 
,atural resources may be analysed. Following a brief discus-
on on the supply and demand for environmental/recreational 
~)rvices in arid Australia, the problem of achieving a socially 
[ptimal pattern of preservation and utilization of the kangaroo 
'as analysed. The focus of the final part of the paper is the 
ifoblem of evaluating the economic benefits of the 
'ovironmental/recreational services provided by natural 
fhenomena. 
It emerges from this latter discussion that the conventional 
leasure of economic benefits - i.e. the area under the aggre-
!lte demand curve of current users-is likely to result in an 
nderestimate of the 'true' social benefits derived from rare 
It ural phenomena. Consideration should also be given to 
ption demand, favourable externalities, and asymmetrical 
'ehnological change. Ideally, the estimated influence of these 
.etors would be incorporated in a measure of the annual 
lcial benefits derived from an environmen tal/re crea tional 
·ea. 
The total present value of the natural asset would then be 
I, termined by the summation of the appropriately discounted 
ll1ual benefits. The net present value may then be derived by 
I,ducting the present value of the costs associated with the 
lministration and management of the area. It is this net 
'esent value that may then be compared with the corres-
lllding estimated net present value of using the area (natural 
sources) for another purpose that is incompatible with the 
'eservation of the natural phenomena of the area. 
Empirical measurement of the social bene-
:s derived from the environmental/recreational services pro-
ded by natural phenomena clearly involves some formidable 
formation problems. It is the writer's view, however, that a 
tll understanding of the conceptual issues is a necessary 
precursor to effective empirical measurement. 
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In a recent article in this journal, Chisholm, Walsh and Brennan 
[1] discuss a conceptual framework and some policy principles for pollution 
control. They conclude that ••• 
" in general fiscal instruments (taxes and subsidies) 
are a more efficient means of controlling pollution than 
the widespread use of regulations or other legal instruments." 
[l,p.l] • 
The authors argue that "market failure" in solving pollution problems occurs 
because of the existence of externalities. Adminis"trative solutions through 
fiscal or regulatory measures are therefore examined since these may be main 
policy instruments for pollution control. 
My principal difference with the authors concerns the generality of 
the approach used rather than the substance of the above conclusion. Briefly, 
the authors use a model in which there are two commodities, physical products 
and 'clean environment'. These two products are generally regarded as 
substitutes; it is not possible to have more of one without less of the other. l 
This model places emphasis on controlling pollution at the source, i.e. in the 
production process, thus ignoring the possibility of control at a subsequent 
point, namely after the consumption activity. Elaboration of this point may 
cast some light on the issue of market failure in resolving the pollution issue. 
Physical products and their associated wastes may be viewed as joint 
products. Some wastes are separated from products during the production process; 
these might be called production wastes. An important class of wastes is 
inseparable from products until after the act of consumption; these may be 
called consumption wastes. I have made the above distinction because the article 
by Chisholm, Walsh and Brennan concentrates on pollution control at the production 
stage thus ignoring consumption wastes. 
The authors point out that pollution results from consumer demand for 
lphysical products [1, p.4]. Lancaster [3] suggests that consumers demand products 
"for their want satisfying characteristics rather than simply demanding physical 
2 
products per se. Consumption wastes are a subset of product characteristics 
not normally considered in analyses of consumer demand, but which should be 
considered in dealing with waste disposal and the associated externalities. 
With rises in income consumer demand for convenience factors and services 
(particular characteristics of products) rises faster than the demand for other 
product characteristics. Consumption wastes, therefore, assume increasing 
importance in what has come to be known as the "effluent society".2 
Chisholm, Walsh and Brennan's emphasis on pollution control at the 
production stage results in a failure to consider a market solution through 
resource recovery (or recycling). Recycling should be given explicit treatment 
because of its unique position in relation to the production of beth physical 
commodities and "clean environment". Resource recovery may be complementary 
with production of physical commodities as wastes are a potential source of 
secondary inputs to production activities. In the future, with further depletion 
of primary resources and rises in costs of exploitation,3 resource recovery may 
become a more economically attractive source of raw materials for production. 
There may also be a complementarity between resource recovery and the production 
of the product clean environment. This double complementarity situation must 
take account of the law of Conservation of Mass [1, p.3] and, in fact, resource 
recovery may imply a more efficient use of residuals. The attraction of resource 
recovery is its potential to simultaneously conserve scarce primary resources 
and reduce the adverse environmental effects of the disposal of wastes. 
The development of an economically viable recycling industry is 
necessary before resource recovery can fulfill the role suggested above. Such 
a development depends upon a number of market determined factors. The supply of 
input products in the waste stream is an important factor and results of a study 
in the U.S.A. [4] indicate that large quantities of potentially valuable raw 
materials are discarded in the household consumption waste stream. Technological 
developments have occurred in the mechanical separation of mixed household wastes 
' which are making such wastes an economic source of raw materials relative to 
3 
reserves of primary resources. The demand for recycled inputs is related to 
the supply and price of primary resources, and the substitutability between 
primary and secondary inputs. 4 
In the case of consumption wastes and many production wastes, recycling 
represents a market solution to the pollution problem. As suggested above, the 
development of recycling will only occur in profitable circumstances which are 
created by factors other than the level of pollution. Environmental constraints 
are generally determined politically (or administratively) and it is not sur-
prising that there is a divergence between the market and the administrative 
solution. This distinction between a market and an administrative solution may, 
however, be misleading since any administrative solution (fiscal or regulatory) 
inevitably affects market solutions by altering the circumstances in which the 
market operates. The critical question for policy principles then becomes one 
of recognising the interaction of both fiscal and/or regulatory measures and the 
market place in our approach to environmental problems. The allocative effects 
of any combination of policies will not be clear unless this interaction is 
recognised, and most certainly depends on the particular mix of policies and 
market responses. In any case, it is questionable whether any statements about 
resource allocation can be distilled from a discussion of policy principZes~ 
particularly when this discussion involves pollution control solely at its source 
in the production stage of economic activity. 
In summary, it appears that the use of a two-product model and the pre-
occupation of the authors with pollution control at the source, result in an 
unnecessarily restrictive framework for discussing the principles of pollution 
control policy. The role of the market system in the context of fiscal and/or 
regulatory measures is not adequately considered, particularly with regard to 
recycling. The market system already recycles wastes in profitable circumstances. 
Allowing for the social costs of pollution and the value of inputs recovered, 
recycling may represent a relevant policy alternative. At least it should be 
considered in the evaluation of policy principles dealing with pollution and 
resource allocation. 
2 
3 
4 
FOOTNOTES 
The authors do recognise the possibility of complementarity between 
physical production and 'clean environment', but this is mentioned only 
incidentally [1, p.5] and is ignored in the discussion of policy 
alternatives. 
Existing waste disposal systems have been shown empirically to have 
important external effects [2]. 
This may be due, for example, to the necessity of exploiting lower 
quality reserves of raw materials. 
Wastes with a high primary resource price are extensively recovered 
through recycling; the precious and semi-precious metals as well as 
copper and uranium are already recycled. Aluminium, oil and iron are 
also possible candidates for increases in recycling. 
5 
REFERENCES 
[lJ Tony Chisholm, Cliff Walsh and Geoffrey Brennan, "Pollution and 
Resource Allocation," Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics~ VOl.18, No.1, April 1974. 
[2 J Joseph Havlicek, Jr., Robert Richardson and Lloyd Davies, "Measuring 
the Impacts of Solid Waste Disposal Site Location on 
Property Values," paper presented to the American 
Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting, August 15-18, 1971. 
[3J Lancaster, K.J. "A New Approach to Consumer Theory," The Journal of 
Political Economy~ Vol. LXXIV, No.3, April 1966. 
[4J Richardson, R.A. and J. Havlicek, Jr., "An Analysis of the Generation 
of Household Solid Wastes from Consumption", Purdue 
University Agricultural Experiment Station Research Bulletin 
No. 5060~ February 1975. 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION: 
A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
Tony Chisholm and Cliff Walsh 
Australiac National University 
Peper to be presented at 17th AUEtralian 
Agricultural Economics Society Annual 
Ccnferer.ce. 
Australi~n National University, 
14-16 Febru3ry 1973. 
At nearly all stages during the gestation of this pa e r 
we have benefited from communications with other people. Our 
greatest debt is to Geoff Brennan, for fruitful discussions 
aud his many perceptive comments and ideas on a preliminary 
draft of this paper which stimulated us to a complete rewrite. 
Doug Cocks also made constructive comments on the preliminary 
draft, helped with several 'useful discussions and provided 
some needed encouragement as we entered the I'bell lap". Our 
thanks are also due to Sharon Kaspura who was responsibel 
for obtaining the references and compiling the bibliography. 
In the early stages of preparation we benefited from discuss-
ions with various members of the BAE~ CSIRO and the Department 
of Primary Industry (Pesticides Branch). 
Finally, during part of 1972 we were able to participate 
in a series of seminars on population and pollution of resources 
which were organized by John Pitchford. John Pitchford is also 
currently leading several research projects dealing with 
various mac~oeconomic aspects of the theory of natural resources, 
population, and pollution control. We have benefited generally 
from the stimulus of this work despite our somewhat different 
approach to, and perspective on, the problem. Unfortunately~ 
a time constraint did not allow us to benefit fully from 
comments on our paper by this group. 
We thank, however, Bruce Forster for commenting on 
section IV of our paper. 
Errata 
p. 4 line 5 'tangible' should read 'intangible'. 
p. 13 2ud last line 'effluent' should read 'affluent'. 
"Everything I like is either illegal or 
immoral~ pollutes the environment~ or in-
creases the population". 
(R.A. Lewin, Bioscience, 19, p. 584, 1969) 
INTRODUCTION 
An ever increasing popular and technical literature has 
been concerned ' wi~h persuading us that the welfare of mankind is 
threatened by several emerging problems. In the broadest of 
generalisations the basis of these threats can be seen as consist-
ing of a combination of the pressnres of population growth, the 
rapid exploitation of known reserveG of exhaustible resources, 
and a significant deterioration of the quality of the natural 
environment. 
The purpose of the present paper is to sub mit to further 
examination just one of these problems - that of environmental 
quality disruption. From the start, however, it was obvious that 
the task of providing a comprehensive coverage of al l aspects 
of this problem in one paper would be impossible except in terms 
of largely meaningless generalisations, and the b e st strategy 
emerged in our view as that of focussing primaril; on one part-
icularly important source of environmental quality d isruption, 
tae so-called problem of pollution. 
Our primary objective has been to provide a broad con ceptual 
economic f~amework within which the pollu t ion problem might be 
analysed, and app~opriate means of redu~ing the imp&ct of pol l ut-
ion on society's well-being discussed. It seemed to us, indeed, 
to be particularly important that this should be ou r objective, 
because at this point in time the Australinn economics profe ssion 
in general has devoted little effort to the analys i s of the 
issues involved relative to the potential importance of the 
problem. Moreover, most of the inter~ational lite~ature on 
economic aspects of the pollution problem seems to proceed on a 
relatively ad hoc basis, and we have been unable to find any 
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previous paper which has attempted to start from first base with 
the question "what is the economic aspect of the pol1u~i(ln issue?" 
and to proceed logically from there to identify that aspect of 
the i.ssue which makes it a social problem, and ~hrough this to 
the ultimate question of what we should do about pollution. In 
this sense our contribution, we feel, goes considerably beyond a 
survey of the literature: it involves an attempt in some respects 
to rethink the issues and to present them in somewhat novel, and 
we hope, stimulating form. In this way we hope that our frame-
work might prove useful to those who are fairly familiar with 
much of the existing literature, as well as to those who are not, 
and to those who are economists as well as to those who are not. 
Obviously there will be issues that we have overlooked, and equally 
obviously issues that we have been aware of, but have been unable 
to incorporate 1n the space and time available. 
The fact that the paper 1s theoretically rather than 
empirically ori~nted arises from two influences. In the first 
place, both time and informational constraints were operative: 
a significant empirical contribution appeared unfeasible. More-
over in the second (and in some ways more importantly) without 
a firm theoretical underpinning. empirical work is methodologically 
suspect at best, and it seemed to us that empirical work lay 
some way beyond what we have attempted to do. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Secticn I presents 
background material, with special reference to the agricultural 
sector, which aicD to provide an over~ll perspective on the 
environmental quality issues in general. The remaining sections 
turn to the more specific questions raised by the so-called 
pollution problem. In section II we attempt to define pollution 
as an economic problem, while in Section III we attempt to 
de termine bo th the ex tent to wh ich the 11 e conomi e" prob 1em 
of pollution requires political intervention because the market 
fails to solve it, and the extent to which the political mechanism 
can be expected to achieve what the market cannot. Section IV 
presents a discussion of alternative pollution control procedures 
available to governmental autorities, and attempts to specify 
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the sort of criteria which should be considered to enable appropriate 
choices to he made. The final section contains concluding comments. 
I 
BACKGROUND 
The production of physical goods in the modern industrial 
economy is becoming increasingly independent of the traditional 
natural resource sector. More and more, technology i~ expanding 
the ways by which the fundamental building-blocks (atoms, 
molecules, and energy) can be manipulated to provide the basic 
inputs for industrial production. In the wake of this trend 
there has been a perceived deterioration in the quality of natural 
environments. In most developed countries, the demand for, and 
supply of, services provided by natural environm~nts is now a 
matter of major concern. 
The general problem of environmental qual1ty disruption 
might be most readily viewed as a compound of three related 
influences - increasing pollution, increasing congest i on, and 
an increasing value attached to recreational and other services 
provided by the natural environment. It is, indeed, in many 
respects particularly important that the tri-partite nature of 
the current problem be recognized, not the least of which arises 
from the need to formulate policies for improving environmental 
quality that recognize the essential interdependence of these 
problems. For example, the (partial) solution to both pollution 
and congestion problems provided by proposals to niversify the 
location of industrial and urban centres may be in substantial 
conflict with the need to preserve existing environment~: amenities . 
However, the heuristically convenient separation of th e se 
three dimennionc of the problem tends to mask SO Re cons i derable 
conceptual difficulties involved in distinguishing between th em. 
It is difficult, in the first place, to give any significant . 
economic interpretation of the problem of pollution except by 
regarding it as involving a conflict between various possible u s es 
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of the natural environment - most ~6nsplcuoua l y het~een the use 
of the environment as a means ~f dispcising of t h ~ unwanted by-
products of production and consumption activit i es and its use 
in providing other seTvices many of which are of 3 more or less 
tangible nature. In this sense, it is difficult to s e e that 
any meaningful, or operational, distinction can in fact be drawn 
between the problem of pollution and the fact of a rising value 
attached to environmental amenities. To an extent the same i s 
true with respect to congestion, for in this case the problem may 
involve too many users of a given amenity, again suggests a rise 
in its social value which also of course stimulates an increased 
demand for uncongested amenities. 
In the second plac~, at the analytical level th e re is a 
very close affinity between the problems of pollution and congest-
ion since both are characterised by the problem of externa l ity. 
As Rothenberg [69 p p.114] nutoit, 
"Both represent the unkind rub of human 
activities on one another, where t~ere is 
no intermediation of a market to enable 
affected parties to confront their 
tormentors" 
In this sense pollution and congestion in their extreme forms are 
af oppas!te ends of a spectcum involving problems whe r e indivi duals 
lnterf~re gith one another's well-being while using a conman 
re~our~e or facility. Pure congestion involves all users of the 
common facility interfering equally,in some sense, with one 
another, while pure pollution involves a dist i nct cleavage 
between users of the facility who {nterfer~ with others (but 
are not interfered with themselves), and those who are merely 
passive recipients of the interference. The mont practically 
relevant cases, however, fall between these extremes in which, in 
general, all users interfere with others, and share in the inter-
ference themselves, but in which degrees of interference s diffe r 
bet~-leen users. 
While it may be difficult to always maintain the dist-
inction between the various dimensions of the overall problem ve 
have nevertheless attempted to do so. The environmental quality 
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problem as a whole is so complex that policy discussion r.equires 
some way, initially, of separating out majo r problem blocks 
which can ultimately be brought together to form a consistent 
total persepctive, and the pollution-congestion-value of amenities 
distinction, if somewhat blurred around the edges, seems as useful 
as any. 
(a) Urban Pollution and Congestion 
Most of the concern with congestion and pollution is 
associated with the densely populated urban areas. It might be 
thought that in Australia the average ratio of land area to ?eople 
is so high that pollution would not be a serious problem. This 
is not true, since most of Australia's population is distributed 
between a small number of large conurbations. Thus urban pollut-
ion and congestion problems are of a similar t ype and magnitude 
to those prevalent in most other developed - but more densely 
populated - countries. That this is so, is being reflected in a 
steadily increasing flow of government and other publications 
which consider various dimensions of the pollution p r oblem in 
Australia. 1 
While, for some purposes, it is convenient to consider 
urban pollution/congestion problems separately from th ~ se faced 
by the rural sector, many of the urban problems have v e ry import -
ant implications for rural areas. Firstly, worsen in g u rban 
congestion and pollution problems will exert continuous pressure 
on non-urban land fer their amelioration via the establishme nt o f 
regional growth centres (and 'dirty' indust r ies) in what have 
traditionally been rural locations. Although the land area 
required for these new cities may be quite s mall they will have an 
influence which extends substantially beyond their geograph ica l 
boundaries. Secondly, rising urban cong e stion and pollution i s 
likely to result in a continuously increasing demand for environ-
mental recreational/amenity services i n rural locaticns - especia ll y 
in rural areas within easy reach of urban centres. A not u n like l y 
trend would be for more farms in these locations to provide an 
expanding array of recreational/amenity services for urban 
dwellers as an adjunct to - or complete replaceme nt of - th e i r 
traditional farming operation. 2 
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In a somewhat separate category are the direct adverse 
effects that industrial pollution may have en some forms of farm 
production. For instance, some forms of industrial pollution 
reduce yields and quality of market garden and or.chard produce 
commonly grown close to urban centres. 3 Of considerably greater 
importance is the fact that many of the food, fibre, and wood 
product p~ocessing industries are located in, or neaL, urban 
areas and would appear to be among Australia's heaviest pollut-
ing industries.~ If pollution control procedures were to be 
introduced for these industries, the cost burden could be distri-
buted in anyone of a number of possible ways - most of which 
would exert demand influences for the relevant products at the 
farm gate level .. 
(b) Rural Environments 
Rural environments 5 provide the site for food and fibre 
production, timber production, and various industries of an 
extractive nature. In their natur~l state, moreover, they contain 
a large part of our reservoir of genetic stocks 6 , and are natures 
laboratory for experiments in biological evolution. In addition, 
they function as assimilative sinks for the disposal of residuals . 
Finally, and very importantly, natural environments provide an 
array of , recreational/amenity services which may be consumed 
with, or without, complementary inputs, such as cars, boats, 
camping gear and so forth. 
The main concern of the paper is with that part of the 
rural environment which is related to and affected by - the 
disposal of re3iduals from production and consumption activities. 
However, any separation of the various . competitive demands for 
the array of services provided ~y natural environments is ne ces s -
arilysomewhat forced and artificial,so close and crucial are 
many of the interdependencies between them. The most i~portant 
of these relate to the compe~itive demand for the use of the ru r al 
environment as a site . for agricultural production, as an assimil-
ative sink ~or the disposal of agriculture's residuals, and as 
a provider of recreational and amenity serviceD. 
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(i) Demand and SupplY of Environmen!al Amenities 
Modern agriculture imposes an ever increasing demand on 
the use of the environment for the purpose cf the disposal of 
its residuals. At the same time an apparent inc¥case in the 
demand for environmental amenities is taking place. This latter 
demand is commonly attributed to such factors as; growth in per 
capita incomes and a presumption that the demoad for environmental 
recreational pursuits is highly income-elastic; increases in urban 
popuration and congestion and the associated ircrease in demand 
by urban dwellers for contact with unspoiled natural environments; 
changes in preferences for environmental amenities.' 
An additional, if somewhat differen~ demaud influence . 
one is able to discern in both the academic and popular literature 
on the environment, is what has been referred to "5 'option-
demand'. That is, the demand for preservation of nQtural areas 
aud features often reflects not so much a desire to have them 
immediately accessible to oneself, but rather a desire to have 
them available in the future for oneself or fnture gl~nerations. 
Option-demand may exist even though there is no curre~t intention 
to use the preserved area and, in fact, the option may never be 
exercised. 8 
While most writers consider that the dem&nd for 9nviron-
mental recreational services has increased, the supply ~ide is 
much more difficult to disentangle. We can certainly observe 
that good quality natural environments are being pollute~ and 
sometimes destroyed by urban-industrial expansion or commercia l 
development. However, not all forms of development necesuarily 
impair rural environments. For instance, many people would claim 
that some forms of agricultural development improve the ch.\racter 
of landscapes, through providing increased colour end texture 
contrasts. Horeover, the effective supply of natural cnviro ,'1-
ments is being increased through improvements in technology, 
travel, and more efficient management of national parks. A 
closely related problem, but one which is unfortunately beyond 
the scope of this paper, is the extent to which deliberate 
"conservationist" policies should be impleme nted to increase, 
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or maintain, the supply of natural recreational/amenity services. 9 
(ii) Agricultural Produc~ion and ResiduRln 
Agriculturalists have generally ignored the large ecolog-
ical framework in which farming is conducted. Ihis may, in 
large measuie be explained by the fact that over many centuries 
the naturRI environment has proven to be extremely resiliant t~ 
the exploitive character of commercial agriculture. Over the last 
few decades, however, in order to meet the food and fibre demands 
of a rapidly expanding world population, farming has become 
more specialized and substantially more dependant on a wide array 
of inputs produced by the industrial sector. The technology 
incorporated in ,these inputs has greatly expanded man's ability 
to manipulate his immediate food-producing environment. At the 
same time a "new" threat has emerged. The applicatfon of many 
of the industrially produced farm inputs is causing serious 
biological problems, and in some instances, is threatening the 
vital self-adjusting nature of the ecosystems which agriculture 
exploits. lo 
The main residuals (pollution) produced "on-farm" result 
from intensive agricultural practices. These forms of pollution 
have evoked considerable concern in the United Ststes 11 and 
Europe, where intensive agriculture is more commonly practiced 
than in Australia. There are, nevertheless, particular r~gions 
in Australia ~uch as the irrigation area~ and certain agricultural 
practices ~uch as heavy use of pesticides on some crop~ which 
cause significant residuals problems. In general though, 
taking Australian agriculture as a whole our reading of the 
literature does not suggest that there are very significant "on-
farm" pollution problems at the present time. It seems to us that 
pollution caused beyond the f~rm-gate by various agricultural 
processing industries at the present time is probably 05 more 
,significance than "on-farm" f;>llution. However, \CIE: should stress 
'that this ~hole area 1s characterized by a high ratio of concern 
Ito facts. 
At this point we could attempt to classify and describe 
~he main forms of agricultural pollution. Such an exerc:1.se has, 
- 9 -
however, already been partly undertaken by oth~rs12 and it 
would seem more useful to outline briefly the alt~rnative 
criteria by which agricultural pollutants could be classified. 
This will hopefully provide some insight into alternative 
pollution control policies which we discuss in sone d e pth 
in a later section. One procedure would be to classify pollut-
ants on the basis of the inputs that generate them - for 
instance, fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation water. Or 
they could be classified according to the type of by-product 
produced as a residual - for instance animal wastes, and crop 
residues. Additionally, classification might be organised 
according to the environmental media through which the residual 
is transmitted, degraded, or stored - that is, air, water, or 
land; or according to the ultimate receptors - human beings, 
animals, plants, and inanimate objects. These classification 
procedures provide information relating to the form, mode of 
transmission, and ultimate receptors of residuals which may then 
be used to formulate appropriate pBllution control policies. 
Concluding Comments 
The object of this section has been to provide broad 
generalisations on the nature of the environmental quality 
problem, especially as it impinges on the agr i cultural sector. 
It will be obvious at this point that the question of fO Tmulating 
policy approaches to all aspects of the problem is far beyon d 
the scope of a single paper. As we indicated earlier we have 
chosen to devote our attention to one important sub s et of the 
overall problem - the pollution problem - and to atte~pt to 
provide a consistent framework within which that issue, at both 
the urban and rural level, can be fruitfully appro a ched. It 
is to this task that we now turn. 
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II 
POLLUTION AS AN ECONOMIC PROBLEM 
The fundamental economic problem, or at least the proble~ 
with which economists have primarily concerned themselves, is 
that of maximising society's welfare in the light of the con-
straints imposed both by the natural world and by man's limited 
knowledge of the ways in which the gifts of nature can be con-
verted into useful consumption items. While economists have 
been concerned to ensure that the processes of production and 
consumption are organised in such a way that we get as much as 
we can from what we have, scientists and technologists have been 
concerned to ensure that we have as much as we can, both by 
attempting to increase the resource base from which we operate 
and by attempting to increasingly substitute knowledge for 
material inputs in extraction and production processes. 
However, in the frantic drive to increase the productive 
capacity of the system, one prevailing constraint has received 
little attention from economists - that is the constraint implied 
by the Law of Conservation of Mass. This fundamental law of 
natural science insists that the processes of production and 
consumption may only modify, and not destroy, the matter (the 
material inputs) employed in these activitie~: except to the 
extent that reuse or reclamation is feasible and economical, 
production and consumption processes inevitably involve the 
conversion of productive inputs (including oxygen from the at-
mosphere) into an equivalent mass of non-productive residuals 
that must somehow be disposed of. 13 While it may be natural 
to think of extractive and productive activities as the primary 
sources of residuals creation, consumption activities are at 
least equally as important. In the first place, of course, the 
satisfaction of consumption desires is ultimately the raison 
d'etre of productive activities; and, in the second, while 
consumption may be the u~timate objective of economic activit y, 
it is not - and necessarily not - the end of it, for the act o f 
consumption merely ~tl:'ansfeTs mass from a form in which it is edible 
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(or yields other - less direct - consumption services) into a 
form in which it is not. In this sense the ne2d for residuals 
disposal arises both directly, and indirectly, as a consequence 
of the satisfaction of the demand for physical consumpt i on goods. 
Until recently, however, the disposal of residuals was 
r.ot regarded as a serious economic problem and that this should 
have been so is presumably attributable to the fact that such 
disposals had not interfered substantially with our other pro-
duction and consumption activities. 14 Disposal is effected, of 
course, simply by the discharge (either deliberately, or as the 
result of natural processes) of the unwanted residuals i nt o the 
atmosphere (as gases or waste en~rgy), into the waterways (as 
sewage, or as industrial residuals suspended or dissolved in water) , 
or onto the land (as rubbish, scrap, junk. garbage and so on). 
The volume of residuals to be disposed of in this way could be 
estimated, very roughly, by calculating the annual production 
of basic materials and assuming thit recycling and net accumulation 
of stocks of materials or final products will not cause this 
figure to differ very significantly from the volume of residuals 
ultimately arising. Estimates of this nature have been made for 
the U.S.A. by Ayres and Kneese [9], but there can be little doubt 
as to the essential irrelevance of their figures for the 
Australian situation. IS Moreover, the general relevance of such 
calculations is also doubtful. The aggregate volume of residuals 
discharged becomes (economically) important only when their 
disposal affects other activities in the system, and, for this 
reason, since up to a point an explicit chcice can be made 
between the various media (land, air and water) as receptors of 
residuals, the way in which residuals are disposed of and the 
location of disposal may be at least as important as the aggregage 
volume requiring disposal. 
The essential point is, of course, that the media into 
which residuals are discharged have a b asic assimil a t i ve capacity. 
That is to say, the environment at large is capable of transport-
ing, dissipating, diluting, degrading or storing to some extent 
all types of residual generated by man's production/consumption 
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activities, though its capacity to do so may be affected by 
natural phenomena (temperature, wind-speed and stream flow 
variations, for example) or by deliberate human intervention 
(such as augmenting stream flows, treating residuals before 
discharge, or such relatively simple things as building higher 
chim~ey-stacks). Up to a point, the natural qualities of the 
environment thus provide us with a means of disposing of residuals 
in an essentially costless fashion - that is, in a way which 
involves no conflict between man's use of the environment asa 
sink for residuals disposal, and such other uses for it as he 
may have. It was presumably, moreover, the real or imagined 
absence of such confli~tsthat provided the justification for 
regarding residuals disposal as .... f no economic interest. 
Coucomicantly~ . it must be the real or imagined presence 
of conflicts ~etween the various (valuable) . uses of the environ-
ment created by the disposal of residuals that has generated 
the belief that "pollution" is an economic problem. It is 
difficult to be precise about the nature and extent of the 
conflicts, in part because the nature of the "other uses" of the 
environment are not clearly or completely specified, but also 
because hard facts,and even convincing theories, are in short-
supply. However, it is clear that an almost endless list of 
potent~a1 or actual damage caused by residuals could now be 
compiled, ranging from potential threats to man's exi~tence, 
through scarcely less potentially devastating (though less 
specific) threats of ecological instability, right down to 
relatively minor damage to buildings and the like. For our 
present purposes, however, all these influences might conveniently 
be referred to as elements of the demand for a "clean enY'iron-
ment", so that the conflict to which we are referring can be 
characterised as a conflict betweec the consumption of one sort 
of commodity (i.e. physical or prodcced commodities) and another 
(a clean environment). 
That such a .conflict should have arisen or have become 
increasingly conspicuous over time might be explained largely 
in terms of economic and demographic trends that are clearly 
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ident!fiable in most developed societ!es, In the first place, 
increasing population and rapidly changing technology have 
enormously increased the productive potential of most societies, 
leading in turn to increased per capita income e~d consumption. 
But while the technology of production has been rapidly changing, 
little stimulus has been given to changes in the technology of 
residuals disposal. Since the media into which residuals are 
discharged are to a large degree "common property" resources, 
no incentive exists for users to econo~i3e on their use: l6 
improvements in the technologies associated with reuse or 
reclamation of residuals, and with treatment of residuals before 
disposal, for example, yield little or no ~r.ivate benefit in 
a world in which residuals dispoGal is, to all intents and purposes , 
free of direct charge. Thus, the increased volume of production 
and consumption has led to a directly comparable increase in the 
volume of residuals for final disposal, with little - if not 
negative - change in the quality of residuals discharged. This 
trend has of course, been compounded' by the increasing con-
centration of population and industry, so that the increased 
volume of residuals requiring disposal has also tended to become 
concentrated within well-defined air-sheds, water-stads, and/or 
geographical locations. 
These facts certainly suggest that the demand for use of 
the environment for residuals disposal has increased. However, 
we cannot immediately conclude that the supply of environment 
for all other uses has suffered a concomitant decrease. As 
we have previously observed l7 there have been many changes 
(growing wealth, improved means of travel and so on) that have 
effectively expanded the supply of environmental amenities for 
many purposes. On the other hand, of course, if there is conflict 
between increased residuals disposal and other uses of the 
environment it is important to know what has heppencn to both 
the demand for and supply of the environment for other uses. 
Whatever has happened to the supply of clean environment, it 
does seem likely that the demand has increased. That is, it does 
seem likely that increaSingly effluent societies are likely to 
be prepared to devote an expanding proportion of the ir resources 
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to securing a clean, comfortable, and ecologically stable 
environment for themselves and for future generations. At least 
at an a priori level this give~ con~iderable support to the notion 
of an increasing conflict between res~duals disposal, and other 
uses of the environment. 
What these changes really amcunt to is the fact that 
whereas in the past there has been enough clean environment to 
satisfy all the demands for it, this no longer remains true. 
The Law bf Conservation of Mass has become an effective ccnstraint 
in the sense that an explicit choice must be made between 
consumption of one sort of commodity (physical) and consumption 
of another (clean environment). 
Such choices are, needless to say, the essential subject 
matter of economics, and it is rather comforting for the 
economist to be able to point out ~hat for him the pollution 
problem emerges as one amenable to quite standard eccnomic 
reasoning. This is not, in any sense, to belittle the magnitude 
or importance of the pollution problem,oor even necessarily to 
claim that the economifit's techniques are adequate for the task, 
in hand, but merely to point out that, looked upon in this way, 
it is apparent that there is nothing inherently more difficult 
about the pollution problem than many others to which the economist 
has applied his doubtful expertise. 
In estab;ishing the economic nature of the problem at 
issue, the economist would also be aware that to identify a 
problem as one of chOice, is not necessarily to identify it as 
one requiring an expZicit sociaZ choice, that is, one demanding 
the explicit application of public policy. 
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III 
POLLUTION AS A PROBLEM OF SOCIAL CROrCE 
Many - indeed perhaps most - social choice s are not 
made explicitly as such. Rather, they emerge as the summation 
of the results of a large number of decentralised market 
decisions. In this context, there is nothing inherently ineffic-
ient about the decentralisation of decision-making: indeed, 
quite standard aDd widely applied, theorems of welfare economics 
insist that in many cases the resulting choices are in fact the 
best conceivable ones. In such cases, co-ordination of the 
decisions is achieved neatly, and at least cost, by the market 
mechanism. 
On the other hand, it is equally clear that some choices 
are not appropriately left to the co-ordinating forces of the 
market, or at least it is not obviou's that market solutions 
represent the best or least cost decisions. In these circumstances 
the social choices may be, or may require to be, made explicitly 
as soc~al choices, ~ thrbugh political mechanisms. But, as we 
shall re-emphasise at a later point, it is not immediately 
apparent that the resultant choices will better represent, as 
it were, the aggregate desires of society: the question of 
whether the political mechanism makes better choices than the 
market mechanism depends not only on the preciee nature of the 
political decision-making process, but &150 on the nature of 
the commodity, over which the choice is being exercised. Far 
example, the very characteristics which disrupt the smooth 
working of the market mechanism may also preclude efficient 
choices being exercised through the political mechanism. 
Thus, in focussing on the (so-called) pollution problem 
from a policy viewpoint, we might ask two sorts of questions -
firstly, what are the characteristics of pollution that are 
likely to make it difficult for the market to make a satisfactory 
allocation of resources to the output of II c l ean environment", 
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and secondly what are the characteristics or the political 
mechanism as an allocator of resources to alternative uses, and 
to what extent is its performanc~ in this context likely to be 
superior to (or different from) the market's? 
(a) Market Fiilure 
In the case of pollution problems what appears likely to 
result in failure of decentralised market processes to ensure 
an ideal choice between the competing uses of the environment 
is the fact that such problems are characterised by . externality.18 
Externalitie~ are often said to arise whenever the well-being 
of one econom~c unit is affected by the activities of other 
units - that is whenever utility and/or production functions 
exhibit interdependencies. However, from the viewpoint of 
identifying the eXistence of externality with the failure of the 
market mechanism to make sppropt1ate (allocative) choices rather 
more 1s required than mere interde2en~ence. Clearly many act-
.ivities involve i~terdependencies. but not all of them involve 
market failure problems. Indeed the existence of markets 
depends upon the existence of interdependencies and the function 
of markets is to internalise the interdependencies. In simple 
terms an example of what we have in mind is the observation 
that our welfare is increased by the productive activi ties of 
others, but at the margin we pay for their products .what they 
are worth to us, so that the social con tr.ibu.tion of. their 
activities is matched by ' thepB;yments ,they receive. It is only 
when appropriate compensation is .not forthcoming - when inter-
dependencies are n~t internalised - that externalities exis t . 
More precisely, and perhaps more descriptively, externalitie s 
exist whenever decision-makers do not take into account relevant 
costs or benefits of their actions, ~hich benefits and costs, if 
they were taken into account ~ouZd resHZt in different, and 
sociaZZy preferable, choices being made. 
The application of these notions to the economic prob l em 
of residuals disposal is however, perhups not so obvious as it 
might at first seem. Certainly to the extent that externali ties 
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do exist they ca~ be associated with interdependencies between the 
production/consumption of physical goods (which involves residuals 
disposal) and the consumption of what we have termed clean 
environment. By the same token, what exists is not a single 
interdependence but a compound of inter-related interdependencies 
which we could classify according to environmental media involved 
(atmosphere, lithosphere ot hydrosphere) and/or according to 
ultimately affected "parties" (humans, animals, plants or 
inanimate objects). However, we cannot immediately conclude 
that weare faced with problems of externality, for up to a 
point the market permits, and indeed positively encourages, 
adjustments by individual economic units which resolve or mitigate 
the conflict of demands. For example, individuals may make 
their demands for a clean environment effective by changing 
their residential location, or by installing air cleaning or 
conditioning devices in their home~ and will do so if this 
constitutes their least cost resp~nse to the interdependencies. 
Moreover, to take another related example, those individuals who 
demand pollution-free food or water provide a stimulus through 
the profit motive to other to provide the commodities to satis fy 
these demands, as witnessed by the availability of b ott l ed 
"pure" water and of "uncontaminated" foods. 
What is characteristic of these adjustments ia tha t th ey 
involve attempts to internalise the interdepende ncies at t he 
point where residuals appear as an unwanted input into other 
production/consumption activities, rather than at the point 
where the residuals arise as an inevitable output (by-product) 
of the production or consumption of physical goods. The e x tent 
of such adjustments of course i5 limited in the first place 
by technical feasibility considerations, and ultimately b y t he i r 
economic viability, and if adjustments above and beyond thes e 
seem to be economically desirable the emphasis Dust be sh i f te d 
to tackling residuals disposal s at source, where the y occur 
simultaneously with the production and consumption of physi c a l 
goodS. 19 However it is at this point that market inefficien cie s -
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genuine externality pro':!ier.:s - are most likely to emerge since 
adjustments of this sort inevitably involve cO-0perative agree-
ments . among the relevant individuals in circumstances where such 
cooperation seems likely to break-down. 
In the ~arket context, and given the common property 
nature of most dimensions of the natural environment, any changes 
in residuals outputs which are desirable will be achieved only by 
the "polluted" parties offering compensation to the "polluter" 
for any adjustments he makes. 2o Any such adjustments can be 
regarded as socially desirable if the marginal damage suffered 
by the polluted individuals exceeds the marginal cost to the 
polluter of changing his output, and indeed such adjustments 
could only occur through market mechanisms in so far as the 
implied net benefits exist. However, it is unlikely that the 
co-operative agreements - the bribes - will be appropriately 
arranged because the benefits of such agreements are non-
excludable - that is, the benefits of reduced pollution arising 
from a bribe offered to the pollut~r by one individual accrue to 
all affected individuals even though they have made no contribut-
ion to the cost of reducing the pollution level. Each individual 
t h u sob t a ins a It f r e e,-- r 1 de" (c 0 s t - f r e e ben e fit s ) a tot her s ' 
expense and, of course, has an incentive to obtain as substantial 
a free-ride as is possible. If, as w±11 typically be the case 
in pollution problems, the numbers of individuals involved is 
large, then each individual will be aware that any attempt on 
his part to obtain a free-ride, by "revealing" a zero preference 
for pollu~ion reduction even though he nay suffer substantial 
damag~ from residuals, will have a negligible impact on the 
negotiated outcome and is thereby given a very definite incentive 
to fail to reveal his tru~preferences. Not surprisingly since 
everyone is equally aware of these facts the market is doomed in 
these circumstances to produce an inefficient allocation of 
resources between physical cummodities and clean environment 
despite the presumed existence of benefits to everyone from a 
successful internalisation of the interdependence. 
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The main thrust of this observation is, of course, that 
if the government is to succeed where the Qarket fails, it must 
be able to overcome the difficulties inherent in the non-
excludability problem associated with tackling residuals disposal 
at source. To this end, of course, governments have available 
to them a wide variety of policy instruments ranging from their 
ability to manipulate the legal system within which the market 
operates, through to their ability to manipulate the market 
process via the imposition of taxes and subsidies. Before 
turning to a discussion of the instruments available, and their 
relative success in achieving an efficient allocation of reso u rces 
between physical goods and clean environment we turn to the s e c o nd 
of our two more general questions - is there any reason for 
believing that explicit social choices, made through the political 
mechanism, will result in better choices than the market mech-
anism? 
(b) Political Failure 
It is typically presumed in economic policy discussions 
that where the market proves to be an inefficient co-ordinator 
of decisions, the government should step in to remedy the 
market's failings. As a value-judgment, such a view would 
presumably meet with widespread approval, but it is an altogether 
different matter to establish the positive proposition 21 that 
where the government does intervene, its decisions will be 
superior to those made in the market: political mechanisms 
themselves may be imperfect in co-ordinating decisions. Certainly 
the real-world political framework appears to bear little relat-
ionship to the omniscient, infinitely benevolent government 
implied in much of the policy literature, and in this sense the 
answer to the question "can the government do better than the 
market?" is not at all obvious. 
In fact, the performance of the government in economic 
policy matters has been subjected to a certain amount of analys i s 
in the recent past. 22 Unfortunately, however, most of the theor-
etical issues are nowhere near to being resolved so that any 
attempt on our part to deduce conclusions about the likely 
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performance of the government with respect to pollution control 
must necessarily be tentative. Nonetheless, given the importance 
of the pollution problem (as well as the importance of the issues 
to be raised for policy discussions of all sorts) an attempt 
to indicate some of the more important features of the political 
mechanism's operation appears worthwhile. 
There is oue sense in which the usual presumption that 
government intervention will be oriented towards improving the 
allocation of resources is understandable. When we say that 
the market fails to efficiently allocate resources what we generally 
mean is that there is a possible change in allocation which would 
make some individuals better-off. and none worse-off: 23 if this 
is so then there would appear to be benefits to elected govern-
ments (in terms of improvements in their popularity, or probability 
of being re-elected) from improving the allocation of resources 
where the market decisions are inefficient. Indeed, if it were 
true that all government decisions re~uired unanimous support 
from the electorate then this observation would have substantial 
relevance. At least one assumes that no-one would give their 
support to policies which made them worse-off, so that, overall 
those changes in policy which occur would involve improvements in 
resource allocation in the sense that some individuals will be 
made better-off, and none worse-off. 
However, once we recognise that government need only 
strive for majority, and not unanimous, support then we must also 
recognise that both the motivation and ability of governments to 
.seek improvements in resource allocation are likely to be weak 
for at least two important reasons: 
(a) Given that the politicians, who compare political 
parties, are motivated, roughly speaking, by much the 
same aims as most "ordinary" individuals, and hence 
that they are not likely to be more than usually 
altruistic, it would seem likely that poliLical parties 
would aim to improve the efficiency of the allocation 
of resources only in so far as political processes 
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(and especially interparty competition) constrains them 
to do so. In fact, however, a party can be elected 
or ensure continuing supro~t by redistributing 
income in favour of electorally important or dominant 
coalitions of individuals in society. For this reason 
we would expect that political competition is at least 
as likely to take the form of "bribing" such groups 
of individuals (floating voters, farmers, the unions, 
businessmen and so on) by offers of specific tax 
concessions or subsidies, as it is to involve pressures 
to improve the allocation of resources. Ultimately, 
under majority rule, even a policy platform offering 
a perfectly efficient allocation of resources can be 
defeated by another platform offering an appropriate 
redistribution of income. 
(b) To the extent that incentives do exist for govern-
ments to attempt to improve on the allocation of 
resources determined by the market mecha~ism, they are 
constrained by the information that is made available 
to them about individual's preferences. However, the 
information made available to the government through 
voting behaviour is likely to be deficient for a 
number of reasons. In the first place, for example, 
since an individual voter recognises that his vote 
is unlikely to be decisive, he will (quite rationally) 
tend to seek little information about the benefits 
of publicly provided services, or at least will not 
obtain as much information about them as he would about 
equivalent goods or services available in the private 
market. In the second place, voters have only one 
vote with which to express their preferences over 
competing packages of policies (policy platfnrms): they 
are not in a pcsj~ion to reveal their preferences over 
specific projects, or the intensity with which those 
preferences are held. For these sorts of reasons the 
ballot-box is likely to be a poor source of information 
for government, and they will be obliged to rely 
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fairly heavily on less direct sources of info=mation 
provided by lobbies, formal enquiries, l~tters to 
members, and so on. However, while these sources 
provide additional information, the ~cality of that 
information is unknown, and may often reflect peculiar-
ities in the cost-sharing (tax) arrangements: 
anyone will demand more of a publicly provided service 
if it will cost them little or nothing. 
Considerations of this sort certainly confirm what was 
perhaps intuitively obvious anyway: that with regard to pollution 
control (or indeed any other major policy area) the government 
is not at all likely to achieve ~hat the market cannot - that is, 
the most efficient choice between physical goods and clean 
environment. But it also gives us reason for treating with 
considerably more caution than is usually done the presumption 
that the government will nonetheless improve on the market's 
results. The government has, of course, one advantage over 
the market: through its coercive powers (through taxation) 
the government can force everyone to contribute to the cost of 
pollution control, and in this sense has a mean~ of copitig 
with the "free-rider" (non-excludsbility) problem that is the 
prime cause of the market's failure. However, to improve on the 
market outcome the government requires some knowledge of individuals 
preferences to enable it both to calculate a mo=e efficient level 
of pollution control and to calculate an appropriate system 
of taxes to finance it, and it is precisely this which is the 
source of the political mechanisms pr~blems. 
We would not, however, want to go so far as to sugg~st 
that the government will not effect some measure of improvement 
in the market's choice between clean environment and physical 
goods, for as well as providing the government with the ability 
to coerce indiViduals, the political process provides one other 
improvement over the market in the pollution case. By respond-
.ing to the desires of a coalition of individuals the government 
~btains a degree of co-operation which (as explained earlier) 
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would be missing in the market where each individual attempts 
to free-ride at others' expense. Clearly, mor~over, the more 
homogeneous the preferences of the individunls in society 
the more likely it is that preferences of the dominant coalition 
will be fairly representative of tho~e of society as a whole, 
and hence that the government!s response will be substantially 
better than the market's. Unfortunately, we have little reason 
for supposing that the pollution issue is one on which there is 
a great deal of agreement. At least, that is, we regard the 
pollution question as involving more intense divisions of opinion 
than many other current issues, and hence we suspect that the 
performance of the political mechanism is likely to be corres-
pondingly poorer: we cannot be certain, though, whether this 
is likely to involve too much, or too little pollution control. 
This catalogue of difficulties inherent in the political 
mechanism convinces us that we should not expect too much of the 
government as a decision-maker in r~lation to pollution control. 
This is not to say that the government cannot be expected to 
improve at all on the market, and clearly the better informed 
it is, the graater are its chances of achieving a significant 
improvement. The economist's role would, then, appear to be 
to attempt to inform the government about its main options in 
controlling pollution, and to suggest a set of criteria by which 
an appropriate choice between them might be made. It is to 
an outline of this task that we now turn our attention. 
IV 
POLLUTION CONTROL 
Assuming that the government is to take action with 
respect to controlling the disposal of residuals rather than 
simply leaving the market to its own devices, we can identify 
two distinct sorts of action that it may take. Firstly~ it 
can use its power to alter the legal framework within which the 
market system works, as a means of providing a set of circumstances 
within which the market may operate more efficiently; or, 
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(alternatively or in combination with altera tions to the legal 
system) it can intervene more or less directly in market processes 
through taxes, subsidies, regulations and so forth, as a means 
of attempting to ensure a more efficient choice within any 
given legal system. 
turn. 
ge shall consider these alternatives more or less in 
After discussing what might be done to the legal system, 
we turn to a consideration of policies directly bearing on 
pollution control, proceeding in two stages: the first stage 
involves a rather ad hoc discussion of the various instruments 
available, identifying what can be said about them on general 
theoretical (efficiency) grcunds,while the second involves 
an attempt to outline what can be said about the relative 
desirability of the various options when administrative and 
other practical constraints are taken explicitly into account. 
Although we cannot claim, at this stage, to have developed a 
complete set of criteria for choosing between the alternatives, 
we at least believe that the discussion provides a consistent 
framework for further analysis. 
(a) The Legal System and Pollution Ccntrol24 
Discussion of pollution control rrocedures has some-
times suggested that a great deal of blame for pollut i on 
problems can be attributed to the legal system. The economi c 
sense in such observations might be explained as follows. 
The process of exchange which characterises market transac~ i ons 
essentially involves the exchange of property rights to 
assets, or the services of assets owned by the transacting 
parties. This of course is most easily seen in the case of a 
barter process, but the only substantive difference in modern 
market systems is that money is interposed as the medium 
through which the exchange of property rights is effected. 
However, if the exchange sy~tem (the market mechanism) is to 
function efficiently it must be possible to neatly define and 
enforce all property r.ights. If, for example, we cannot 
prevent others from benefiting from our activities (that 1s 
if we cannot enforce a property right over the benefits of 
our activities) then they can avoid the need to exchange some 
- 25 -
of their property to obtain the services of ours. This is, of 
course, precisely the proble~ we noted earlier ~s the "free-
rider" problem arising from non-excludability, and in this 
fundamental sense those problems arise from an inability to 
enforce property rights. 
The relationship of these observations to the pollution 
problem lies in the fact that much of the natural environment 
is not subject to private property rights. In most respects the 
environment is a common property resource,25 equally available 
for use by all, and it appears to be this which has inspired 
the belief that the use of the legal system to define private 
property rights would provide one way of improving the allocat-
ion of resources to pollution control. However, what would be 
required would be not simply the definition of rights, but also 
the means of enforcing those rights. The purpose in defining 
property rights would be to provide a basis from which negotiat-
ions between polluter and polluted: could emerge to int e rnalise 
the interdependence. However, so long as it is difficult to 
perceive infringements of rights or to prove damages, and while 
large numbers of economic units are involved, the negotiation 
and policing of agreements between the damaging and damaged 
parties remain in a technical end economic sense infeasible. 
It is in this light that proposals for an "Environmental 
Bill of Rights", awarding a property right to a clean environ-
ment to individuals in society, must be seen. Already modest 
beginnings with such Bills have been made in some States in the 
United States, and their major purpose seems to be to make the 
burden of proof in environmental suits (under nuisance Bnd 
property laws) less demanding. If they are successful, they 
will provide some incentives to polluters to control the 
damage they cause, or to offer compensation to affected individuals, 
and in this sense much will a~pend cn the success of prosecutions 
under the Bill, the costs of prosecutions, and the size of 
damages awarded. The worst possible outcome, however, would 
be for these Bills to replace the present situation with a 
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no-poZZution mentn!ity: 
be economically dC9i~able. 
performance ucul~ ne~m to be alight, and theze is ~ f~ir pre~ 
8umption that major improvements will reGuire the zovern~ent 
to make use of more direct means of intervention in the market·s 
operation - that is, the sovernment will have to usc its 
regulatory and fiscal powers. 
(b) The DEe of Fisea]. Instruoents and Regulat ions in Pollution 
Control 
Of the several possible ways of proce~~in g th~o~gh t he 
discussion of the alternative tax/subsidy/regclatory Folicies 
thai might be pursued by governments we have adopted the following 
two-stage procedure first, we consider the cajor slternativcs 
largely in terms of the conventional ,Paretian efficiency frame-
work, attempting to indicate the extent to whic~ they previde 
appropriate incentives (and continuous pressure), for firms to 
reduce the pollution damage they inflict on others; and, secondly, 
we turn to consider the economic and political limitations imposed 
on the use of these instruments by information problems, . 
adrniniutrative costs and other practica! const raint s. In this 
w~y we attempt to provide some indication about appropriate 
criteria that might ultimately be B?plied to the chcice between 
the altern~tive policies. 
I~ a technicaZ sense there are (if we follow the 
clansification adopted by Bower & BD~ff"rd [15] fou r basic methods 
of controlling pollution: reduction in the volume nud/or 
i~provement in the quality or . time pattern of residuals gener-
ation; modification of residuals after ge~eration; impro vene nt 
of the assimilative capacity of the envi~onment; c, t · a p p 1. i c r'. t ion 
of protective measures at the point where dama~e is i nfl i cted 
on the ultimate receptors. Our analysis is primarily concerned 
with th~ first two of these methods, so that in a sens e we a r e 
implici t ly assuming that optimum modifications to th2 
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assimilative capacity of the environment £n~ ~ inal pr0 te ctive 
meaSULes are being undertaken. 
The various pollution control pol icy c~~ions. to be 
discussed, may be further distinguished by whether they operat e 
primarily through the price mechanism, or are ~ore in the form 
of direct regulations Dr prohibitions on pollution levels. Within 
the first category it is helpful to make a further distinction 
based on the point in the production/consumption process at which 
the policy is applied. Taxes may for. exam~le, be levied on: 
pollution as an output~ as with the environmental pricing and 
standards procedure; on outputs jointly produced with pollution, 
es with a production tax on, say» the sugar procecsing industry; 
or on inputs with a high pollution productivity~ such a~ soma 
pesticides. 
In the somewhat ad hoc discussion of these policy 
options which follows, it should be . kept in mind that there is a 
fundamental interdependence among the various residu&l streahlS. 
Different combinat i ons of pollution control policies sr~ therefore , 
likely to lead to quite different relative bur.de~ 3 b eing pIeced 
on the various residuals-receiving environmental media. Thus, 
where reference is made, say~ to an environmental standards au d 
unit tax system achieving a target ebatement in water pollution 
at minimum social cast, there is an im~licit p~e3umption that 
there is no offsetting increase in 'socially damaging' air or 
land pollution. 
An interesting, a nd seemingly promising devel op ment, in 
recent literature is ba3ed on the p remis e that most en7iTon~~ntal 
common property resources are of a 'multiple pur.pose - mUlt ip le 
user' nature and that the~~t~~~O~9idB~cigG~ referre d to above, 
are frequently quite crucial. 26 Most writers in this area 
recommend that regional environmental/pollution problems should 
be tackled through a collective choice mechanism i~ tile form 
of a Regional Agency. These agencies would have a mauageri ~ l/ 
control function~ the first step of which would usuall.y be t o 
develop an economic-ecological model in order to explain the 
functional relationships which describe the int erdepe~dcn t c h aracte~ 
of the whole production-consumption-weste-aSEimilation-ecolo gical 
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hopefully, will provide the agency with su f fic!e~t informntio~ 
on how the system works and so enable it to formulate approprl & ~e 
policy measures. 27 
We are unfortunately unable to pursue tnis aVenue of 
research in the present paper. However, our discussion of the 
individual tax/subsidy/regulation instruments is relevant 
because it is largely these instruments that will be c0mbined i u 
various ways to form complete pollution control policy package s . 
THE "IDEAL" PIGOVIAN TAX & EMISSIONS TAXES. 
It eme rges from the literature on cxte ~n ali ty p~ob12ms 
that a particularly attractive (and perhaps the uost ideal) f orm 
of government intervention would be for it to impose th2 
so-called ?igovian tax 28 on polluters. This tax is levied on a 
pollution-generating activity with a rate schedule determined 
by the marginal net damage caused at ~ Bch activity level. 
Since the tax rate is related directly to the dama g e 
caused, this app roach ensu res an II op timal'l ou tpu t 0 f rc s id ual s 
in the most general possible sense. That iS 9 firms ar e not only 
induced to lower their production levels in ord~r to lower t h e~r 
residuals output~ but are also offered positive incentivEs tu 
minimise the damage they cause per unit of output pro~&ced. 
Pro d u c e r s mig h t. for e ~c a til pIe, bee nco u rag edt 0 \I t r e 2 t " re si d u e 1 G 
before disposal, to reallocate dispos~l between the rec~ ptive 
media~ or to chang ~ their techniques of production to minimise 
the impact of the tax by minimioing damages caused per unit of 
output. Moreover, research into new damage-minimising production 
techniques ~ould be made a more profitable activity. 
While the properties of the Pigovian tax are 
impressive, the difficulties involved i~ its us e a r E at l ea st 
equally impressive. The base of the tax is not such tangibl e 
variables as the firm's output level or its input of particular 
resources, nor is it bas e d on the volume of discharge of pa ~ticular 
residuals, but, rather, the tax is to be calculated specificall y 
acc0rding to the damage caused by the firm's activity.29 S 5.nee ? 
as we have pointed out, the firm can vary the form of its activ ity 
to reduce the clam~ge cp-used, any attempt to relate th~ tax t v 
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emissions, output, or inputs used, must repres e nt a substantial 
departure from the principal advantages clai~ec for the tax. 
Moreover, to calculate the optimal tax what we require to know 
is not so much the current marginal damage caused by the firms 
activity, but rather what damage the activity will cause when 
the level and organisation of the activity have been adjusted 
in optimal fashion. Not surprisingly, it is now widely accepted 
that this ideal pollution tax will usually be administratively 
and informationally infeasible. 
In this light, the variation on the ideal tax represented 
by emissions taxes appears much more attractive. In fact, taxes 
imposed on emissions of particular residuals retain many of the 
features of taxes based on damages caused by those residuals. 
In particular, of course, they provide firms with direct incentives 
to adjust their production techniques, or to install control 
devices, so as to minimise the impact of the emission tax on the 
firm's profitability. On the other hand, several factors milita te 
against the efficiency of these taxes. Unless emissions of all 
damaging residuals are taxed at appropriate rates, and all points 
of emission subjected to monitoring, firms will have an incentive 
to change their techniques of production, to those which generate 
relatively more of untaxed residuals, or to change their points 
of discharge to those which are unmonitored. Mo r eove r , the 
"appropriate" rates of the taxes, required to achieve optimal 
adjustments by firms, must be determined by the damages caused 
by the emiSSions, so that ultimately the calculation of these 
taxes is plagued wi:h broadly the same i nforma t i on p r oblems 
as damages (Pigovian) taxes. 
These obviously Significant difficulties in approaching 
the "ideal" solution to pollution problems have stimulated 
discussion of other approaches to pollution control 30 whi~h retain 
many of the features of the i~ ~ al taxes, but replace the notion 
of optimal levels of pollution control with the notion of an 
acceptable level of control. Of these VIe consider the "environme nta l 
pricing,i proposal, and the "pollution quotas" scheme. 
ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS 
(i) Environmental Pricing 
The environmental pricing approach as proposed by 
Baumol and Oates [12] involves the specification of a set of 
standards that will ensure that an 'acc~ptnble' level of 
environmental quality is achieved. It needs to be stressed from 
the outset that the standards would be chosen according to 
somewhat arbitrary criteria. For example, on the basis of 
information concerning the effects of polluted water on human 
health, fish life, and recreational pursuits, a decision may be 
made that the biological oxygen demand (BOD) of the organic 
waste contained in a river should not exceed a level of X. The 
authority would then levy a set of taxes 31 on firms emitting 
wastes into the river at a rate of t(y) units per gallon of 
discharge. The rate of tax paid by each firm, t(y), would vary 
according to the BOD value, y, of an individual firm's effluent. 
Each firm would thus be given a financial incentive to reduce 
its volume of effluent discharge and to improve the quality 
(BOD value) of the discharge. A possible refinement would be 
to allow the value of 't' to vary according to such factors as a 
firm's location, and with seasonal conditions insofar as the 
waste assimilative capacity of the river is a function of seasonal 
conditions. Such refinements will, however, usually quite 
drastically increase the information required by the authority. 
Ignoring the above possible refinements, the authority 
should obtain sufficient information from iterative adjustments 
in the tax rate to enable it to estimate appropriate tax levels 
for the achievement of a target level of water quality. Moreover, 
it would be possible to adjust the initial target standards if 
their attainment were to prove unexpectedlyexpensivc, or 
inexpensive. 
The use of unit taxes has the important o?timality 
property of ensuring that th~ target standards are realized at 
least-cost. So long as firms aim to minimize costs for any 
given output level~ each firm will reduce emissions to the pbint 
where the marginal opportuni_y cost of a further ~aduction in 
emissions is equal to the tax. Since~ in relation to the 
quality of their discharge, all firms in the region are subject 
to the same tax, the marginal cost of reducing pollution will 
be equalized across all firms and activities. Thus, it is 
impossible to reduce the aggregate direct cost of the specified 
decrease in pollution by any rearLangement of the emission 
reduction. Any alteration in the resultant patteln of polluti on 
emissions would involve an increase in pollution output by one 
firm, the value of which to the firm would be l~ss than the cost 
of the corresponding reduction in pollutioa emissions by some 
other firm. 
Moreover, in a dynamic context unit taxes have the 
advantage of exerting continuous pressure on the polluter to 
improve his waste treatment process. A greater incen~ive for 
technical innovation is thus maintained with a unit tax system 
than with direct controls where the polluter has no incentive to 
do more than meet the legal standard. 
The standards and environmental pricing approacn will 
not, in general, lead to Pareto efficient levels of the production 
activities and the corresponding socially 'optimal' level of 
pollution. The cost saving that can be echieved through the use 
of unit taxes may, however, be substantial. Kneese and Bower 
[54], in a study of possible control methods in the Delaware 
estuary, estimated that, compared to a direct control system 
requiring each polluter to 4educe hs pollution by a fixed per-
centag~t a system of unit taxes achieving the same level of 
pollution abatement would be only half as costly. 
(ii) Pollution Quotas 
An alternative procedure for attaining the specified 
environmental standards would be to create pollution quotas 32 
equal to the aggregate target level of emissiQns~ An economic 
unit would be legally bound to hold quota rights equGl.to itc unnual 
waste discharge. Initially the pollution ri8hts could be 
allocated by auction, or distributed in proportion to the volume 
of existing firms current emissions. Thereafter, the quotas 
would be freely transferable and, through the establishment 
of a market in quota rights, an exchange value f or pollution 
rights would be determined. 
The research work on transferable production quotas 
for agricultural output is directly applicable, mutatis mutandis, 
to pollution quotas. Accordingly, the following discussion is 
brief. Firstly) we may note that a transferable quota system 
will, like unit taxes on emissions, lead to an efficient pollution 
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mix among firms and activities. That is. a 0 gregnte abatement 
costs for the target level will be minimized. An advantage of 
the quota scheme, as compared with the environmental pricing 
proposal, is toat the price of quotas (the equivalent of the unit 
taxes) will adjust automatically to the level required to achieve 
the environmental target. In contrast to the trial-and-error 
experimentation that will generally be required with a system of 
unit taxes, the outcome with a quota scheme will be more certain 
and the authority's decision costs lower. 
Several refinements to the basic quota scheme are 
possible. For example, futures markets in quota rights could be 
established, aud/or anti-pollution groups could be permitted to 
buy quota rights which they had no inCe~ti~n of exercising. The 
latter refinement could prove useful since it prov i des some 
indication of the demand by conservationists to reduce pollution 
below the turget level. This demand, however, may be very mis-
leading due to 'free-rider' influences. 33 
Satisfactory operation of unit taxes or pollution quotas, 
as a vehicle for operating an environmental pricing scheme , 
requires that emissions can be monitored at . a reasonab le administ-
rative cost. There are few significant forms of 'on-farm' 
pollution in this category that we are aware of. Probably the 
best example is the large scale feedlot raising of cattle which i s 
now beginning in Australia, with all its attendant prob l ems of 
animal waste disposal. At present, the main potential for 
applying an envircnmental pricing scheme to pollution generated 
by agricultural production, probably lies beyond the farm gate. 
Many of the agricultural processing industries are ver y important 
sources of pollution, particularly water pollution. Th e se include 
the processing of: forest products, sugar, dairy rrod ~ cts, meat, 
and fruit and vegetable3. In Queensland detailed estimates of 
the BOD and solids, in pounds weight p er annum, are available for 
most of these processing industries. 34 
The main forms of 'on-farm' generated polluti on not 
amenable to mon~toring and measurement are the highly dispersed 
discharges from fertilizers, pesticides. and irrigation . The 
feasible policy options for these forms of pollution would a p pear 
to be production taxes, input taxes, and direct regulations. 
?RODUCTIO~ TAXES 
It is frequently suggested that E t ~x s hoa l d be imp0~e d 
on the output of goods when their produc ti cn gene ~ate3 harrr f u l 
residuals. From the standpoint of ecoaomic efficiency and 
incentive to innovate~ an o~tput tax represents 3 part i cularly 
crude control procedure. The primary weakness of this tax is 
that it provides no incentiVe to substitute production techniques 
which generate lower damage per unit of output for those creatine 
higher per unit damage. Furthermore~ output taxes offer no 
incentive for pollution reducing technical innovation, or for the 
use of pollution control processes that do not directly reduce 
private costs of production. It is also worth noting that if an 
input with a high pollution productivity is en infe ri or inpet 
in the production process, the i~position of an output tax may 
lead to an increased pollution output. 
Some defend an output tax on the grounds of its 
administrative advantages. However, a tax levied according to 
the relative pollution ~roductivity ~f inputs offers simila r 
administrative advantages Gnd is superior in terms of resou~ce 
allocation and incentives to innovate. An output tax would be 
an appropriate policy only in unusual situations, such as where 
there are no input substitution possibilities in production, and 
there is a technically-fixed relation between ou tpu t and pollutant 
emissions. 
INPUT TAXES 
The prime virtue of in~ut taxes is their admi~istrat-
ive feasibility. Ia particular, input taxes may be t he be st 
control procedure for situations where the monitoring of 
pollution emissions is technically impossible, or would involve 
very high administrative costs. For example~ for highly disperse d 
discharges such as runo:f water carrying agrictlltural fertilizer s 
or pesticides. 
With an input tax a firm woul~ reduce its pollutio n 
emiR~ions~ not simply by reducing production as with an output 
tax, but also by changing the input mix. Providing an appropriate 
rate(s) of input tax(es) is selected, the post-tax resource 
allocation will be mor2 efficient than that w~ich wculd prev2il 
with an output tax. A government, of course, would never have 
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sufficient information to levy 'optimal' input ta:es. This would 
require detailed knowledge or the rel~tive pollution productivity 
of the various resources, the elasticity of outp~t supply,and 
the elasticity of substitution between resources. Even with 
such inforoation, input taxes will not generally 2ssure a Pareto 
efficient resource allocation, since they provide no incentive 
to use e~ission-control equipment to improve the quality of 
emissions and/or reduce their volume. In some instances, the 
least-cost way of reducing pollution may be to continue to use 
the same input-mix, but install emission-control equipment. 
There is another procedure that is fairly closely 
related to input taxes - namely, subsidization of pollution 
control equipment. This procedure aSSumes particular significance 
in the light of the experience of the Australian Senate Committee 
on water pollution [5, pp.lll-120]. Tax concessions and 
subsidies on pollution-control equipment were the most commonl y 
proposed forms of polluti~n control made by fir ms giving 
evidence before the Commi~tee. Perhaps the most important point 
to make here, is that a subsidy on pollution-control equipment 
is, on its own, of little value. Unless firms are penalized in 
some way for waste emissions, they have little i ncentive to 
install equipment which neither adds to revenues or reduces 
productions costs, no matter how small the post-subsidy equipment 
cost may be. However, it is possible that tax con~essions and 
subsidies of this sort, in conjunction with public opinion which 
is critical of polluting activity, may induce firms to install 
pollution-control equipment to improve their public image. 
Alternatively, firms may fear that inaction will lead to mo r e 
stringent control measures at a later time. 
DIRECT GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS 
The policy options for pollution control that we have 
considered up to this point .. 11 have some component of government 
regulation or control. The element of regulation is, however , 
char.nelled through the market (price) mechanism. In contrast, 
with policies of direct government regulation the price 
mechanism is completel~ supplanted by a system of centralized 
controls. 
Economists largely regard direct regulations (includin g 
prohibition) as naive solutions to externality problems, while 
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this form of intervention dtends to be particlIlarly favoured by 
governments. Economists are anxious to ~void recourse to the use 
of a system of direct cont~ols in the place of aystems utilizing 
the price mechanism, because of the well known inefficiencies 
of direct controls. In particular, a government will seldom, if 
ver, have the formidable amount of information necessary to allow 
it to instigate a system of direct controls that will attain a 
reduction in pollution at least social cost. Also, direct 
regulations and prohibition have additional social costs in the 
form of policing and administrative costs which are not incurred 
'with the market mechanism. The cost of policing and enforcing 
pollution regulations and prohibitions may be reduced by imposing 
fairly punitive fines (and/or gaol sentences) en offenders. 
Where the probability of detection is low fairly punitive fines 
will usually be required as an effective deterrent if the regulat-
ions are to be successfully enforced. 
Despite our reservations with respect to the use of 
direct government controls there are situations where we believe 
this form of intervention may be the best available alternative, 
particularly fer those forms of pollution characterized by 
considerable risk, uncertainty and high information costs. To 
illustrate this point we may consider, briefly, the interesting 
economic problem posed by the use of some pesticides. 35 In general, 
the pesticide situation has been characterized by fairly rapid 
changes in technology leading to the development of new pesticides, 
new practices, and generally changing situations. Moreover, ~"e 
have only very limited knowledge of the effects of many of thes e 
pesticides on food chains and ecosystems. In these circumstances, 
a comprehensive system of regulations, prohibitions and carefully 
defined property rights may be the best instruments available to 
Bovernments to control their use. Regulations may be first 
timposed at the development and manufacture stage. 
Certain characteristics which ere likely to generate 
~ubstantial negative extGrnalities (such as high toxicity and 
~igh persistence) may be identified and legislation passed which 
~ould prevent the marketing of any pesticide whose toxicity and 
~ersistence levels were above a specified ~aximum. Next, something 
lless than IIfull" property rights may be given for some pesticides 
~n commercial use. Property rights could be restricted by care-
::u1ly specifying the conditions under .. ;~ .. ich a pesticide could, 
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and could not, be used. For instance, by ~estrictiag use to 
licensed operators only~ specified crops, and certain times of the 
year. Finally, governments may legislate for mEximum acceptable 
levels of pesticides in foodstuffs and enforce the legisiation by 
a comprehensive monitoring system. 36 Justification for the above 
forms of intervention is largely dependent on the information and 
administrative costs of the alternative pollution control 
procedures, and we turn now to a general discussion of theDe issues. 
Information and Administrative Considerations in the Choice of 
Pollution Control Policies 
With the policy options specified, and some of their 
important features (advantages as well as disadvantages) identified 
we now focus on the more specific question of what can be said 
generally about the choice among them. In other words, what 
attributes of the various p olicies are likely to be important in 
ranking them on a better-worse scale? Our discussion is, of 
necessity, brief, but it should at least serve to highlight 
those issues which require further th6ught. 
The efficiency characteristics of control procedures 
are, without question, of prime importance. However, as our out-
line of the policy options has already emphasised, there are at 
least two other critical attributes of the policies: first, their 
informational requirements; and secondly their administrative 
costs and measurement requirements. 
The crucial significance of informational and administ-
rative costs in the choice of an appropriate pollution control 
policy is perhaps best illustrated by ranking the various proced-
ures in order o£ preference, initially assuming perfect information 
and zero adm~~i3trative costs. Clearly the ideal target for 
regulation (tax) is the marginal pollutipn damage functions them-
selves (i.e. Pigovian taxes). Next, is the activity of polluting -
the pollution emissions as reeasu=ed by some technical criterion, 
such as BOD, which will, to a greater or less extents be 
correlated with the marginal pollution damage function. There 
will seldom, if ever, be a one-to-one correspondence between 
these functions. And this is why, naedless to say, Pigovian taxes 
are theoretically superior to variable emission taxes and envir-
onmental pricing and standards (via unit taxes or quotas). 
"~ l 
Fin. nll-)r ~ '1~. rio t:.. s a " ...... t -!.- "'tl ,··; to., ,_" P,. ~ ... ,_ : ,~ ~"'! #- ? -L'" :::', '_,~e '", ,',:.. !~ ~_, ,., ~ • ~ ';" A.. .. 
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dir e ct weys, to th 2 ac~ o ~ pollution nay ~ e th e rJ,~, iC7 t~r~Rt . 
Thus the order of preference in terms o f resou rce &11u~ 2t ive 
( . , d " ., 1DC_U ~ng 1nnovat1Ve) criteria is: Pollution d2mage (P~govian) 
tax; variable emission taxes g environmental p ri~ing and st?cdards 
via unit taxes on d i scharge or quotas; an input tax ; a productio'i":. 
tax; and direct reg~lations a~d prohibitions. 
HOHever, when information and admin istrative costs ~ 'Le 
incorporated the ranking might easily be reve~sed o 
faced with situations involving little information, and a hi~h 
degree of uncertaint~ (such as in the pesticides case) the onl y 
feasible approach may be to impose stringent regulations on the 
production or use of products which are identifiable as the sou r ~ e 
of the problem. Certainly , too ~ taxes on output s of goods, or 
inputs used will be easier to administer th e n taX~ G on e missions 
or damages caused. But, in general, we cannot be specific about 
the extent to which the inform a tion and adm in is tr ative proble~s 
will reverse the ordering established.' by the efficiency criterion. 
The best we can do is to scrutinise sone of the more important 
issues involved, and to this end we now conside r information 
problems in general and measu~emen t problems in particular. 
(1) Info=mation Problems 
One important typ e of in r ormaticn prublem ~cncerns th9 
identification of t he bene fit s aud costs of a chang8 in the 
pollution level per se. It is genzrally arguecl - and ScE~S to be 
widely accepted - that calculation of the a pp ropriate Pigov i an 
taxes on pollution output is in fo~rua t icncl1y inf easible. and that 
a combination of quantitativ e an~ qualitative r cst=i ctlons on 
pollution (the envizonmental standa rd s app r02ch ) will there f ore ~e 
nece=>sary. \<That thi S imme dis te ly imp lie s is tha :: t1~~ "standa rds" 
approach requires less information, OL that the i n form ation req ui red 
is l e ss costly ~o obtain . than fo r the Pigovian tax option. 
Hoy.'ever, t llis type of cu:-g u ment s eE::!l1S to us ~o b e ::: uspect ir. th s 
follo~7ing sense. What we require to know in order to celculate the 
Pigovian taxes is the mar ginal social dam a ge function: 
standards approach on the other hand it woul~ seem to b8 impor t-
ant to know som2thin g about both the social dam g ge function, a~d 
the "social cost or pollution control" function s o as to be 
sure that ceeting the standa=d will involve an improvement in 
the allocation of resources. ' Cer~ainly without knowledg e of 
this s or t there i s an l'~'l'e-e '" . . 
. L. .L _ .. ,.: can g e r t hat: "? G 11 :.: !.: :!.. 0 i ~ cor: t ~ 0 1 
will be taken too in th e s ense that ~~? C00t i~ t~ ~ms of 
-:':0:, - ' 
sumption foregone involved in meet in g tt e st andards may 
exce~d the cost of damages irr. pose c in t h e unc0r'; : ':0 11 ~d ::it :! 3. ti c :: : 
the arguments involved would c£rtainly seem to require some 
further consideration. 
Tne second sort of informational problem is conc e rned 
with ensuring that the "least-cost" method of achiEvin~ pollution 
control is adopted. There are in fact two particular problems: 
to ensure that the "rights t o pollute" are allocated ef ri ciently 
among firm3; and to ensure that firms are given the (co nt inu o us) 
incentive to achieve least cost reductions in pollution levels 
themselv es. As we sugg~sted in our discussion of the variOU8 
policy options, the achievement of these object i.ves requires 
that the taxes or fines employed be related directly to the 
pollution level, and more specifically to t he d a mage c aus ed -
hence the attractiveness of Pigo via~ taxes and t he unit taxes 
i nvolved in environment a l pricing, or the establishment of 
markets for pollution quotas. However, it also io clear t h at 
an ad ditional requirement is that the location of the firm } th e 
location of the resi duals d is posal point (hEight of c~i8ncy e t c .) 
and tta form or qualit y of the wastes ge nerated be v a r i ables 
taken into account in setting the taxes, fines and co on. ?his 
requireuent is, n ~ edle33 to say, particula~ly de~aDdin8 in 
terms of information re q uir R~ents, a~d ther e is a clea r danger 
that with inadequately formulated policies some pollution p rob lemG 
may be exacerbated. For exampl~, wh~re ai~ polluticn is being 
taxed, the water pollution problem may be subst~ntiall y increased. 
With the predominant ignorance that Fervedes this a~ea~ , the 
problem-by-problcm approach to gove~nment intervention that is 
typically propos e d Q.uy prove i ufp.~io~ to mOT~ gen~r al policies, 
such as ecros:.:>-thc::-·boaru t[lxes on all physical outputs. 37 
Msasurement PrvEl~ 
The meas urement cf pollution emissions to e nsure th& ~ 
s taEd<lt' ds, reg ·'..lla t ions, o r po 11 u t ion quo t a s are b ei ng De t, 0 r ::0 
establish tox l iaoi1:i'C i es, r a ises protler.J3 ilO r: ouly t L' i: d e t el."T , i ::.-
iu g 1: ;1(.: fe ;:..s ib':"li-::y of th e: adopu:::cl k-l01 :i.ey ,-p-,:, :l.o u : au : ;:::150 fe,: C:et er-
n:i!l 7 J"~ th s 2ppJ:c ::' ri<~ ::('. 'J8 f, ~ec cf po llu t:: :.nr. ab..l::e r; "' >.t:, o:. r-: pfl.::: i ';ul Qr 
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issue, however, that ~eems worth consider~ng is whether the 
measurement costs differ substantially betwe e~ the ~se of taxes 
and quantitative restrictions to reduce pollucio~. That a 
significant difference does exist is often implied in the 
literature, and presumably the relevant reaGoning is that 
while ta~es require more or less continuous monitoring of the 
pollution level of every firm, quantitative restrictions can 
be policed by occasional measurements of the pcllution output 
of a few firms selected at random, with punitive fines calculated 
to maintain disincentives to exceed the pre-determined pollution 
level. What this argument ignores is that while the measure-
ment costs to governments is reduced, the cost to firms are 
increased: if the fines are appropriately punitive, the 
quatitative restrictions will require firms to monitor their own 
pollution output. To establish the usual aEsumption ~hat 
quantit~tive restrictior.s are less costly we would need to 
argue that there is an asymmetry in ~essurement costs accord-
ing to whether firms or governments are responsible for the 
measurement, and it is not at ell obvious that this i s so. 
Concluding Com~ents: 
From the prc~eding discussion it bec om es ap?arent that 
it is not easy a priori to indicate which policy options are 
likely, in general to .emerge as the "3€:cond-best" .-,Then informat-
ion and administrative problems are taken i~to account. 
Moreover, there are other important fectors which h av e: in 
both an economic and a political sense, an importart bearing 
on the choic~ of the policy approach. The most important of 
these iasues that we have not tak en into ac~ount is, perhaps, 
the distributional consequences of the d~fferent policy options. 
It is, in fact, difficult to discuss these consequ e nces except 
in very general t~rms because we h~ve little ideu of ~ho 
ultimetely bears the bur~en (the real income loss) of the 
taxeE, subsidies, regulations and so fcrtt ttat are normally 
proposed. The distribution of the real cost burden of a part-
icluar po:lution control program will be dependent on the 
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pattern of change of f ac:or and product pricts that it causes . 
Despite the difficulties involved io aGs£ssi~g the distribution 
of the benefits and the cost burdens or p ollt;ti ~n contrel 
programs, it is nonethel e ss true that co nside r at i cns such as 
the maximization of social welfare, and ultimately the political 
acceptability of particular policies will depend fairly 
crucially on the incidence, as well as the form, of the gover-
nment's intervention. 
FOO TNOTES 
1. 2e e 9 fo:-: ir,sta nce, [4, 5, 6, 7 ,8) 33 } . 
2. Income tax conces sions t ierl to the develoD~e~t O~ land fer 
agricultural production introduc e a b~as ;gai~ot using 
land to pro v id e natural recreati0na l/ame~~tv S Er ~ ~c e s. 
It i.s common for so-called n?i. tt Stre. e t" fa.;r::2TS t o 
benefit from t he se tax concessions. Moreov~ r . the rura l 
la.nd they ac~uire io frequently within e6GY r ~ach of 
urban areas. It is precisely th is laud which is likely 
to be most in demand to p=ovide rEcreatio nal/amen~ty 
serviceG. 
3. For some evidence on air pollution as it relates to 
agriculture in Australia and the United States Gee 
[17, pp. 27-291 and [4, pp, 113-126]. 
4. Sec (5, pp. 45-47]. 
5. Throughou.t th:l.s pap.:!::" we use the words "rural" and 
"natural" interchCiIl3eable. The words refer broadly to 
all Don-metropolitan areas. 
6. For Ci discussion of the economic significanc e of our 
reservoir of genetic stocks s~e Krutilla [57J. We do 
not discuss ~his aspect of the natural envi=o ~ment l~ the 
present paper. 
7. Davi.dson et. ale [34J have made some interesti Lg sugg8St-
lons regarding the formation of pYeferenc ~s (dem a nd) 
for recreationa l pursuits involvin~ the a~enities provirled 
by natural environments, but whose cGn3 ~mptic~ depends 
predominantly _upon the priur acquieitioil of s~ec iali ze d 
skills gained from experience. The most important poin t 
they make is that learning-by-doing will st ~mula te ~ utur e 
demand for these environmental . amenities, and that prese n t 
and future deman d fu nctions are therefore, interdepen~ e ~ t . 
8. It seems possibl e that an optio n -dema nd m~y even exist 
for persons who place a value on tha me re exi a te nce of 
biological and geomorpholoGical va=iety and it3 widesprea d 
distribution. 
9. For some interesting work on various aspects o f t he 
ecor~om ics of cons e rvation see: [29, 41, 57, :·8, "/ o) . 
10. For a discussion of the problem of enviroufuenta l stress 
and threats to the selt-ad j usting nature of ec~ s ys t 2~s 
see [28, 72]. 
11. For work on the various dimensions of on-farm pol lution 
overseas see [1, 17, 38,46,59, 75, 80], 
12. See, [17, 30, o · , u J. J • 
13. Two [10in::5 c~ r::. 5 ::. n ~ J: r 0 ill 
in th~ first 
the pre ' J i. (1 1; ::. ~-: -. .. T 'J S ~ ; ... ~. -2. neE: s r e qui r e 
p 1 ace ~ ;..: ~ \ f: COil:--~ ;: '- c: _~ z:"L. 'J~;' C! r:. c' no ill i c 
SOTIle 
14. We should perhaps emphasis8 that we are not Gugge Bt~ng 
that pollution is 2 ne~ problem, end the foll owi ng observat-
ions on 14th Century LondoD quoted by Knees e in [55] 
indicates that it is not even a st=i ~ tlv ccst-Tn~u3triai 
Revolution problem. tlBy the killing of- g~· ea.t beasts, from 
whose putrid blood running down the streets and the bowels 
cast into the Thames, : the air in the city ~s very mu ch 
corrupted and infected, whence abominable and most filt~lY 
stinks proceed, sickness and many other evils have h~ppenecl 
to such as have abode ill the said city, or have resorted to 
it". Tcdays prob1e!TI is, ho .... ·ev~!', of a different order of 
magnitude a~d co mpl exity to earlier pollution episodes, 
and the problem is in a sense co mp ounded by the apparently 
increasing willi~gncss of individuals to fcrego a substantial 
Bnount of physical consumption for psychic and other 
benefits of a pollution-free environment. 
15. Tileir figures suggest in fa.ct th-c.,t ~_n 1965 basi.c materials 
production in the U.S.A. was 2.492 c!llio n to ns~ of which 
over 600 million tons were agricultural p ro ducts (including 
forestry, fis~ery and ~ildlife products). 7~2 subsequent 
comments in the text apart, t he agricultura l sector is likely 
to be concerned with the residuals generated by their pro-
duction activiticE only in so far 3S they occur as on-f arm 
residuals, letting processing and consumptio n £ctivities 
deal with their own residuals problems. 
16 . The famousG:eek economist Aristotle saw the problem involved 
hcre very clearl y when he tn:ote: . "For that ,·,hi ch is common 
to the greatest number haG.the least Care beGtc\V~d upon it". 
[2,p. 44]. : 
17. We refer the reade~ back to our dis cussio n ~~ Section I 
of the demand and supply of environmental amenities. The 
central problem here revolves around the diffi c ul ty of 
obtainin~ operational measures of dem2ud and s~pply of 
environment services. 
18. The literature on externality problems in general in by 
now very substantial. Am o ng tbe more iuportRnt cn~tributions 
are those of Coase [27] and Buchanan aud Stubblcbine [20], 
while Mishan (60} has recently presented a survey of the 
literature containing an extensive bj.b liogr~phy . Some 
thoughts on the rcla~ionshiv hetween externalitie s and 
pollution are co n t ained in Ayres an d Kneese [9] and 
Rothenbe rg [691 for example. Ho~ eV2r the ideas contained 
in our section ar.e nomewhat G.i.fferen:: Ll SCillie -r-espects to 
traditional views, ~ut provide a car e cons~stent, and ~ore 
approp riate, appro2ch to the exter~a:ity ~rool~~ . 
1 9 . I tis p 0 s sib 1 e, h 0 F eve r, t h 2 tin 2 f t ~. ':. :J. ~ --: ::.: i c ~ ~ .. ~ <. ;-' f: :::.~ is" 
in the cas e 0 f a Co jus Gll e n t s 3. t the "i ,: -;. t: t. ,. ,J c. J - t ~.. ['0 l h.:: t 
g o vernme nt policy r;j.ght be requirec. t~ c·s;: '.:c s:~:::'- :. cj~cr:t 
degrees of citigatio~ of pollu tion as an un~?nte ri input. 
20. Tbe co mpe ns ation referred to here is a GG~t of hri~c cr 
sidr::-pay;nent to pclJ.Hters to induce l:nclI1 ~(> 2.J ter- their 
behaviour - to redu~e their pollution. To ca ll the~ bribes 
(with all that word's moral overtones) se e~s un fortunat e 
si~ce in an economic sense they are no different fro 5 prices 
paid for goods and services in the market. 
21. "Positive propositions': are taken to be jud;;me-cts of f0. ct. 
as opposed to value judgments. The difference between 
these two judgments is that judgments of fect are capable, 
at least in principle, of being refute~ by e~pi~i ~a l 
observation while value judgments are not. 
22 . The maj o r contributions are the work of Dow~s [35] aad 
Bu c hanan and Tullock [21]. ~ore recent contributions can 
be found in issues of the journal Public Choice. 
23. If we adopt the hypothetical compensation approach, ho~ever~ 
this assertion would need to be somewhat mor~ guarded. 
24. The relationship between externality problems in general 
and the legal system is subjected to careful examina tion 
by Coase [27]. Parish (Australi~n Economic Pap ~rs . June 
1972: "Economic Asnects of Pollutio:l Cor:.tro:, H ;. also 
has an interesting discussion of Coase's pro?osilio~s as 
they ~elate 3pecif~ca11y to pollution control. 
25. The major e~ceptioD involves land, over whic h private 
property rightB are widely defined. Ho~ever, with land it 
mayb s difficult to enforce one's property rig h ts in Dany 
instan c es since one has to be able to identify the offender( s) . 
Moreover~ some land areas are regarded sti~l as essentially 
communal property. 
26. Probably the best exposition of this approach is that 8iven 
by Kneese [51]. 
27. For papers which consider simultaneously economic and 
e co l o gi c al goals see [24, 51, 83, 84]. 
28. The taxes are named after Pigcu who f~rst proposed th ei r 
use. Fo~ these, and all other taxes, we (implicitly ) 
adopt the assumption that the pollution problem is the 
only source of ine~ficie~cy in the system. Just h ow 
crucial this assump~iou appears depends ve £y muc h on 
one's views about hew to deal with second-be a t issues. 
29 . Note, too, that we have to identify not s~mply aggregate 
pollution damage (at the margin), but, in ract , the 
contribution of each individual f~r~ to ~ l~t fa~~82 . 
30 • 0 £ the f a i L 1. y 1 a r gel:t t era t u r eo nth Q s e po 1. J. ;. :- ~ 0 r 
co ntrol procedures, the papers by Bau~01 &nd OatcF ~121 . 
Zerbe (37), and R.M . Parish (Aus t ralian Econo~ic Pcncr~~ 
June 1972: "Eccno::lic Aspects of Pn llt:t:i.or Cc:-:.~::cl ") 
were instruQental in helping to f ormu late O~~ ideas 
for this section. 
31. The discussion of taxes for various pollution contro l 
procedures applies directly, mutatis mutandis to the 
payment of subsidies to firms reducing their ~011ution 
emissions, or inputs, or outputs. The main differences 
between taxes and subsidies lie in their distributionsl 
consequences. However, SODe of the diotributional 
effects h~v e implications for resource allocation. First. 
from the viewpoint of economic efficiency e mi ssion taxes 
have the important advantage of yielding revenue in a 
manner that does not have the resource misallocative 
effects that characterize Qost taxes. By contrast, 
subsidies will usually be financed by raising taxes 
which will, in turn, genera!ly introduce economic 
inefficiency elsewhere. A further disadvant~gc with 
subsidies, is that the base lev el o f emiss io~s from which 
reductions a~e to be measured must be determined for 
each firm. This involves addit~oual informational 
costs, and c reates an incentive for firms to inflate 
thei r reported base levelG of emissions • 
. " .... 
A final point relating to ~istri~utioilal/allocat­
ive effects is that the distribu~ional in c iden c e of 
various policy options is c losely linked uith the~r 
political acceptability. This being so, distrihutional 
and resource allocative effects becom~ in & sense, 
insepar?ble. 
32. For an early discussion of pollution quotas £ee Dales [32]. 
33. Free~rider effects are likely to arise since individual 
I couservationists' (with a hiZh demand for a c l cBu 
env~r6nment) may rat~onally choose not to ~ecom~ members 
of a cooperative "quota buyinel1 conservat:'-on group 
because they assume their o wn individual cc ntribution 
would have a negligible effect on the ~uantity and 
quality of clean environment provided. 
34. See [5, pp. 45-47]. 
35. The pesticides which have probably cause d the most 
concern in recent years are thos e belonging to t he 
chlorinated hydr oc a.rb on g.:-oup, of phich rD! is the most 
important. 
36. In Australia, the Commonwealth Department of Primary 
Industry performs about 25 , 000 a&alyses annually of 
foodstuffs for nesti c id c and other residucs. This 
1: If "'f 1. II.;: .... I r .... -; ~ ...... ~ 
represents a form of finaL protec~~on Lor ~ne AuSt _~~la 4 
consumer and also helps to eusu~e ~hat stanGa~ds se: 
by count.:- ies importing Australian foodstuffs will be met. 
Of cou rse , consumers mny (and do) ~eflect ~ heir preferenc~s 
through the market: me c hanism via a Q2IDand for "crganically 
growIl " (pesticide free.) foodst'J ffs . 
37. This argUI="l e"[i:: :Ls (;:; ·:?l2.~. ~ ?C. :..ri ..... C~j.:'~'~-;:' -~ :.:~Y ".!.~~;.~' .':::~-:-.!~ 
r:!anu script - "O?t:'mal Poii.cy Cbo :i.c:e iJ~. de::: l':'C2·:,:.c.~.~·1::)'" 
by D.G. Brennan ard T. EcG~irE9 ~r t~c ~~rt~2~~2~ 
~ational University and Dalhousie University, ~2spcct f721y. 
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